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Pref ace 
In this dissertation I examine the relationship of 
various concepts and theories of subjectivity to political 
praxis. Specifically this dissertation seeks to determine 
which concept of subjectivity is most useful for grounding 
an emancipatory feminist politics. My central thesis is 
that the postmodern feminist conception of subjectivity that 
conceives the subject as performative is precisely the 
conception of subjectivity most adequate to the project of 
emancipatory politics. 
Philosophy has long been concerned with the 
relationship of theory and practice. By looking at the 
relationship of theories of subjectivity to the practice of 
emancipatory politics, this dissertation aims to advance our 
understanding of this complex relationship. Of particular 
concern are the concepts of gender and patriarchy, concepts 
basic to feminist theory. Philosophers have traditionally 
ignored gender in defining subjectivity, and have overlooked 
patriarchy as a system of structural domination. By 
specifically examining the contribution that feminist theory 
makes to our understanding of the relationship between 
theories of subjectivity and political praxis, I hope to 
contribute to an understanding of the role gender plays in 
v 
our conception of subjectivity and how this relates to an 
emancipatory political praxis aimed at disengaging ourselves 
from patriarchy. (An assumption upon which this dissertation 
is built is that patriarchy is indeed an oppressive system 
from which liberation is necessary. This assumption will 
not be defended in the dissertation, although the legitimacy 
of making such normative claims will be addressed.) 
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. In 
Chapter One I offer a critical examination of certain key 
elements in the thought of Karl Marx, the great theorist of 
revolutionary social transformation. Specifically, I 
examine Marx's conception of human nature, the Marxian 
account of the relationship between private property and 
gender (drawing here primarily on Engels), and Marx's 
conception of revolution. In this chapter I am critical of 
many aspects of Marxism, but I argue that Marxism and 
postmodernism should not necessarily be seen--as they most 
often are seen, especially by Marxists--as antithetical. 
In Chapter Two I critically examine some basic tenets 
of the thought of Sigmund Freud. I examine Freud's 
structural model of the mind, his discussion of female 
sexuality and gender construction, and his metanarrative of 
the development of civilization. I argue that Freud offers 
a useful critique of Enlightenment rationalism, and that his 
complex and multidetermined model of the mind is important, 
including his theory of the unconscious. Ultimately, 
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however, I am highly critical of Freud's ideas about female 
sexuality and gender, and conclude that Freud remains 
complicit with patriarchy throughout his work. 
In Chapter Three I begin an explicit discussion of 
postmodern theory with an analysis of Michel Foucault. I 
start with Foucault's critique of Marx and Freud. I then 
examine Foucault's genealogical method, the "repressive 
hypothesis," his analysis of truth, power, subjectivity, and 
resistance. I conclude that Foucault's discussion of 
constructed subjectivity, and his contention that 
subjectivity itself is a site of politics opens a place for 
postmodern feminist theory. Ultimately, however, Foucault 
does not adequately develop the gendered aspects of 
subjectivity, nor does he discuss how a specifically 
feminist emancipatory politics can emerge from his work. 
Chapter Three ends with a defense of Foucault against Nancy 
Fraser's criticism that his position lacks an adequate 
normative grounding for an ethical politics praxis. 
In Chapter Four I discuss Jane Flax. I begin with her 
analysis and critique of Marx, Freud, and Foucault. Next I 
discuss her concept of the multiple self, her critique of 
rationality, and her alternative conception of justice. 
While in many ways Flax's project is similar to my own, I 
argue that she ultimately reifies dichotomous thinking by 
discussing psychoanalysis, postmodernism, and feminism as 
separate discourses, often opposing them to each other. I 
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conclude that Flax's concept of subjectivity as fluid and 
multiple is useful to postmodern feminist theory, and that 
she enriches this postmodern conception of subjectivity 
with psychoanalytic insights. 
In Chapter Five I examine Judith Butler, a postmodern 
feminist philosopher. I begin by discussing Butler's 
critical examination of what is traditionally thought of as 
political praxis and who is considered the subject of 
politics. I go on to analyze Butler's treatment of 
universality, and then her key concept, the "performative 
self." I argue that the concept of first articulated by 
Foucault as the constructed self and then developed by 
Butler into the performative self is the most useful for 
grounding an emancipatory feminist politics. By 
deconstructing the ontologically grounded subject, 
performative theory allows for the practical and strategic 
enactment of various subject positions and thus provides us 
with the necessary tools for carrying out various 
emancipatory political strategies. (It insists, however, 
that we always examine the political implications and the 
exclusionary practices that this strategic employment 
entails) . 
In the final section of Chapter Five I address Seyla 
Benhabib and Nancy Fraser's criticism of Butler. Benhabib 
criticizes Butler for having an inadequate concept of 
agency. She also claims that performativity is overly 
viii 
deterministic. Fraser criticizes Butler for employing 
anti-humanist language, for offering an inadequate theory of 
liberation, and for lacking normative grounds on which to 
secure her politics. I defend Butler against these 
criticisms. 
In my concluding chapter I address an array of standard 
criticisms which are leveled against postmodern philosophy 
generally, and which, therefore, could be addressed to the 
theory I have advocated. I choose as representative of 
politically-committed critics of postmodernism the Marxist 
theorists Ellen Meiksins Wood and Terry Eagleton. I offer a 
close reading of recent works of each, and conclude that 
their criticisms do not hold up under scrutiny. 
My director, David Schweickart, through his exciting, 
politically engaged scholarship and wonderful teaching, was 
a mentor and a role model of what a philosopher is. I wish 
to thank him for his guidance and inspiration throughout my 
graduate career, and particularly for his generosity with 
time and energy in directing this dissertation. I 
gratefully acknowledge Pamela Caughie for introducing me to 
what ultimately became my area of specialization: postmodern 
feminist theory. She has provided years of invaluable and 
inspiring discussion and friendship. I also wish to thank 
David Ingram for his useful comments on my dissertation and 
for his friendship as well. I thank my parents, Paul and 
Bella Dolinko for teaching me to value learning and for 
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inspiring me to always strive to attain my goals. I also 
thank my husband's parents, Sonny and Bob Weiner, for always 
supporting and believing in me throughout the time I have 
been in graduate school. Finally and most importantly I 
wish to thank my husband, Joel Weiner, for his love, 
patience, intelligence, kindness, and humor. It was his 
unwavering belief in me that always kept me going throughout 
this project. It is to him that I dedicate this 
dissertation. 
x 
Chapter one 
Marx 
This chapter on Marx is written with a specific aim in 
mind. It will not attempt to deal with the whole of Marxian 
thought. Specifically I will look at Marx's concept of human 
nature, and how this is connected to his theory of social 
intervention: namely revolution. 1 I will not address the 
entirety of these two topics, but rather will look at them 
with the aim of comparing them to Freud and Foucault, and of 
showing how Marxian concepts come to be criticized and 
expanded on by contemporary postmodern feminist 
philosophers. 
Marx and Human Nature 
In analyzing Marx's conception of human nature, I draw 
primarily on Marx's early writings, since this notion is 
addressed more systematically there than anywhere else. 
There are, of course, many controversies in this area. In 
my view, three of the best commentaries here are Bertell 
Ollman, Richard Schmitt and Carol Gould. I will build on 
1While some interpreters of Marx argue that there are 
significant differences between his view and those of 
Engels, others say that they are primarily interchangeable. 
(Bertell Ollman maintains the latter position.) In this 
work I will not attempt to distinguish between the two 
views. 
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their analyses. 
In this section I will argue that Marx's theory of 
revolution is grounded in an Enlightenment concept of 
subjectivity. Although Marx conceives of the individual as 
"an ensemble of social relations," a concept with postmodern 
resonances, his agent of change, the proletariat, is 
conceived of as a unified locus of revolt that can overthrow 
a unified locus of oppression. In this section I will show 
that while Marx, and some scholars of Marx, give the 
interpretation of subjectivity a nuanced and contextual 
dimension, ultimately Marx's subject is confined within the 
Enlightenment tradition and is a genderless, rational agent. 
It will be seen that Marx does have a conception of a 
socially constructed self, but unlike the postmodern 
conception of constructed subjectivity there is an essential 
core to Marx's socially constructed self, which is then 
shaped by external conditions. In other words, most 
postmodern theorists argue that the self is decentered and 
socially constructed: There is no core element that is then 
shaped and molded by social and power conditions; the whole 
self is a constructed self. For Marx the self has, in a 
sense, a double core. There is a core common to all human 
beings at all times, and there is a core element, common to 
all people in the same social circumstances. For him social 
circumstances are defined by economic conditions. He does 
not look at how, for example, gender and race affect and are 
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affected by social circumstances. Thus he can assume all 
people of the same class will develop the same 
consciousness. According to the Marxian theory of 
subjectivity, there is a core self which is acted upon. In 
contrast, postmodern theory argues that the action itself 
produces the subject. 
Marx examines human nature in order to look at the 
possibility for social transformation. He was, as Engels 
said at his graveside, "a revolutionist."2 The thesis of 
this dissertation is that the way in which we conceive of 
human nature sets limits on what type of social 
transformation we think is possible. In his discussion of 
Marx Schmitt supports this thesis: "Marx and Engels studied 
the process of social transformation. They were interested 
in human nature because that 'nature' sets limits on the 
sorts of changes that are possible."3 Marx's conception of 
human nature delimits his theory of emancipatory politics. 
In understanding Marx, it is therefore essential to examine 
together his theory of human nature and his theory of 
politics. 4 
2Robert Schmitt, Introduction to Marx and Engels: A 
Critical Reconstruction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 
xiii. 
3Ibid., 12. 
4About Marx's theory of human nature, Bertel! Ollman 
writes: "Human nature is most often treated as a cipher in 
Marx's system or described with a few simple adjectives. In 
those instances where it is taken as a significant variable, 
it has never been sufficiently integrated with Marx's other 
4 
Marx does not study subjectivity and human nature in 
the abstract; rather his subject is always situated within a 
specific historical, economic, and political environment. 
There are some aspects of human nature, however, that Marx 
says are common to all people at all times: the possession 
of "certain powers and needs, some of which he calls 
'natural' and others 'species•. 115 According to Ollman, this 
distinction between "natural" and "species" is that on which 
Marx rests his entire theory of human nature. 6 Natural 
powers (Kraft) are those that humans share with every living 
thing. Species powers and needs (Bedurfnins) are possessed 
only by humans. In this way Marx sets humanism apart from 
naturalism. Humanity itself is seen by Marx as a process of 
development from completely natural beings guided only by 
natural powers to fully human beings guided by species 
powers. Thus for Marx humanity is a process of becoming, 
and this becoming of humans is the movement of history. 
This idea of humanity as becoming is seen in Marx's 
conception of power. 
"'Power' .•. suggests potential, the possibility-
-particularly in changed conditions--of becoming 
more of whatever it already is. As elements in 
Marx's conception of reality, powers are related 
to their own future forms as well as to other 
theories." Bertell Ollman Alienation: Marx's Conception of 
Man in Capitalist Society (Cambridge: At The University 
Press, 1971), 75. 
5Ibid. I 76. 
entities in the present. . . .Marx sees them in 
the process of change and, through a study of 
their organic law, knows in a general way what 
they are changing into. At each stage their 
progress can be charted by the evidence of the 
individual's skills and achievements. 7 
Human development can be measured by the extent to 
which humans realize their species powers; human history is 
the progression of these powers. This is what Marx means 
when he writes, "The forming of the five senses is a labor 
of the entire history of the world down to the present. 118 
The way in which people realize these powers is the way in 
which people relate to nature. 
While power is a faculty, ability, function, or 
capacity, needs are drives or desires often for things that 
5 
are not readily available. According to Marx, people become 
aware of their powers through their needs. Marx says "the 
production and satisfaction of these needs is an historical 
process."9 The progress of history can thus be measured by 
the progress of human needs. 
According to Marx, each stage in history creates 
its own distinctive needs in man, and with the 
passing to the next stage these needs disappear, 
along with their owners, to be replaced by new 
7Ibid. I 77. 
8Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844, trans., Martin Milligan (Moscow, 1959), 108, quoted in 
Bertel! Ollman, Alienation, 279. 
9Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844, trans. T.B. Bottomore, in Erich Fromm Marx's Concept 
of Man (New York: Unger, 1966), 199-200. 
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people and new needs. 10 
This is what is meant by Marx's "material dialectic". 
As people progress from natural beings to species beings, 
they work within nature, and they transform nature. In the 
process of transforming nature, they create new needs, which 
they then transform nature to realize. This is why Marx 
says that in communism people are rich in needs, because it 
is in the creation of needs that humans expand their power. 
As they transform nature, they realize the capacity of their 
powers. 
People's powers, according to Marx, exist in them as 
"tendencies and abilities, impulses" (Anlagen und 
Fahigkeiten, als Trieb) . 11 It is in the creation of needs 
that these powers are increasingly actualized. According to 
Marx, this process of developing needs and powers is the 
process of becoming human. Richard Schmitt writes: 
Here, then, is Marx and Engels' conception of 
human nature: At any particular historical stage, 
human beings have certain specific material needs 
that they meet in particular ways and with very 
specific forms of social organization. As the 
ways change in which needs are met, the needs 
themselves as well as the forms of social 
organization change. One result of those changes 
is that human nature itself changes. 12 
For Marx what makes us human is that we produce our 
100llman, Alienation, 78. 
11Karl Marx, "The Bourgeoisie and the Counter-
Revolution" quoted in Bertel! Ollman, Allienation, 274. 
12Schmi tt, Introduction, 2 6. 
means of existence. How we produce what is necessary to 
satisfy our needs determines who we are, and as we produce, 
we develop our powers, and we develop new needs. This in 
turn leads to development of social organization and new 
modes of production. As a result of a change in needs, an 
increased capacity of our species powers, and a 
transformation in our social organization, human nature 
develops and changes. 
Marx is a "historical materialist" in that he believes 
our social existence determines our consciousness. As we 
create the world, we create ourselves. This dialectical 
movement between needs and powers is expressed in people's 
relationship to nature. We create ourselves in the process 
of transforming nature. "The growth of man's capabilities 
toward the ends inherent in them, in each individual as in 
history itself, is primarily the result of productive 
activity." 13 It is productive activity that allows human 
powers to develop to their full capacity. Marx writes, "By 
7 
thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the 
same time changes his own nature. He develops his 
slumbering powers and compels them to act in obedience to 
his sway. " 14 
According to Marx individuals are always determined by 
130llman, Alienation, 102-103. 
14Karl Marx, Capital, vol 1, A Critical Analysis of 
Capitalist Production (New York: International Publishers, 
1967) I 177 • 
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their social function and their relationship with nature. 
For Marx, while there is an essential human nature, it is 
capable of developing and changing; it is not static. For 
Marx, even though our nature or essence is changing, we do 
have an essence--our powers developed through our 
work/labor. Work is the combined action of all human 
powers. "It is the need of all man's powers for the most 
direct means to their combined fulfillment, and it is common 
to people in all societies. " 15 It is also part of our 
essence to need each other, i.e. we are fundamentally social 
beings. 
Marx, in a sense, gives a (loosely interpreted) 
constructed account of human nature, i.e. we create 
ourselves through our labor activity. As Gould writes, "Marx 
holds that individuals create this nature in their activity, 
and therefore it is neither fixed nor presupposed. This 
eventuates in a conception of a changing and developing 
essence." 16 During this labor activity we create and develop 
our natural powers and transform and expand them through our 
action. 
According to Marx what distinguishes us as humans is 
that we produce ourselves through our labor activity. We 
create ourselves by producing our means of subsistence. 
150llman, Alienation, 101. 
16Carol c. Gould, Marx's Social Ontology (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1978), 34. 
According to Marx our human nature is formed through our 
work, specifically what we do to meet our needs in 
productive activity. Work is the active relatedness of 
humans to nature. He writes: 
[Human beings) themselves begin to distinguish 
themselves from animals as soon as they begin to 
produce their means of subsistence, a step which 
is conditioned by their physical organization. By 
producing their means of subsistence men are 
indirectly producing their actual material 
life. . . . 
This mode of production must not be 
considered simply as being the reproduction of the 
physical existence of the individuals. Rather it 
is a definite form of activity of these 
individual, a definite form of expressing their 
life, a definite mode of life on their part. As 
individual express their life, so they are. What 
they are, therefore, coincides with their 
production, both with what they produce and with 
how they produce. The nature of individuals thus 
depends on the material conditions determining 
their production. 17 
According to Marx, our mode of production determines 
who we are. As we produce things to satisfy our needs, we 
produce ourselves as well, and since different people 
produce things in different ways, they develop into 
different types of people. Through this process of 
production, or work, people develop their essential powers. 
9 
Changes in the mode of production lead to changes in human's 
essential powers, and changes in human's essential powers 
lead to changes in the mode of production in an attempt to 
satisfy newly created needs. 
17Karl Marx, "The German Ideology" in The Marx-Engels 
Reader, 2d ed., ed. Robert c. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company), 150. 
Changes in the mode of production lead to changes in 
the social organization of society. According to Richard 
Schmitt, 
What is distinctive about the conception of human 
nature held by Marx and Engels is .... that human 
beings make themselves be who they are . .. . 
Central to human nature, then, is this ability of 
human beings to determine who they will be. 18 
Through the process of work human beings not only produce 
their means of subsistence but they produce themselves. 
Unlike classical materialists, who stress the impact of 
10 
environment on essentially passive human subjects, for Marx 
human beings actively shape reality and are shaped by it. 
As they produce, they change reality, and they create new 
needs for themselves, which they then develop new means of 
production to satisfy, and in the process they create 
themselves as humans. 
It is important to notice that human beings determine 
who they are in the context of their natural and economic 
environment. To say that human beings construct themselves 
by changing nature is to say that human beings appropriate 
nature. In Marx's sense "appropriation means to utilize 
constructively, to build by incorporating. 1119 People 
appropriate nature by making it in some way a part of 
themselves. 20 We can now see how Marx begins to erase the 
18Schmitt, Introduction, 8. 
190llman, Alienation, 91. 
20Ibid. 
subject object distinction. People are defined through 
material conditions and the appropriation of nature, while 
at the same time material conditions (nature) is defined 
through people. 
What is distinctive about the productive activity of 
11 
humans is that it is a conscious intentional activity. Human 
labor is premeditative, as Engels says, "premeditated, 
planned action directed toward definite ends known in 
advance. " 21 
Marx writes: 
What distinguishes the most incompetent architect 
from the best of bees, is that the architect 
raises his structure in imagination before he 
constructs it in reality. The labor process ends 
in the creation of something which, when the 
process began, already existed in the workers 
imagination, already existed in an ideal form in 
natural objects, but he also realizes, in the 
nature that exists apart from himself, his own 
purpose to which he has to subordinate his own 
will. Nor is this subordination a momentary act . 
. . his purposive will, manifesting itself as 
attention, must be operative throughout the whole 
duration of the labor.n 
Marx is here distinguishing human labor activity from that 
of animals. The actions of animals are driven by instinct, 
or "natural powers," whereas the actions of humans are 
conscious and driven by conscious or species powers. "If 
natural powers can be viewed as establishing the framework 
21Engels, Dialectics of Nature quoted in Vernon Venable, 
Human Nature: The Marxian View (New York: The World 
Publishing Company, 1966), 66-67, n. 137. 
22Marx, capital, 17 8. 
in which life itself goes on, then man's species powers 
express the kind of life which man, as distinct from all 
other beings, carries on inside this framework. 1123 In The 
12 
German Ideology Marx writes, "consciousness takes the place 
of instinct or ..• his instinct is a conscious one."M 
Another thing that distinguishes human productive 
activity from that of animals is that, unlike animals, human 
beings are species beings, and because they are species 
beings they are free. In the manuscript "Alienated Labor," 
Marx clarifies what he means by species being: 
Human beings are species beings, not only because 
in practice and in theory they adopt the species 
as their object ... but also because they treat 
themselves as the actual, living species .... 
The animal is immediately identical with its life-
activity. It does not distinguish itself form it. 
It is its life-activity. Human beings make their 
life-activity itself the object of their will and 
of their consciousness.~ 
As species beings, understood as beings who define their own 
nature, human beings are free. 26 Human beings are not 
determined, they are free to create themselves. This 
ability to create themselves and define what it means to be 
a human being is, according to Marx what all human beings 
have in common. 
230llman, Alienation, 85. 
24Marx, "German Ideology," in Marx-Engels Reader, 158. 
25Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, in 
Marx-Engels Reader, 75-76. 
26Ibid., 75. 
Marx and Engels in contrast to many philosophers, 
claim that human beings have in common only very 
general characteristics such as the potentiality 
for freedom-for defining what it means to be a 
human being--or the inclination to think before 
acting. . . . Human nature--that is, what 
differentiates us from animals-does not consist of 
specific traits but concerns our ability to change 
our traits and thus to define our human nature in 
new and different ways by changing our 
circumstances. 27 
13 
Human beings, as species beings, think of themselves as 
a species; they are aware of their ability to define who 
they are. Human beings are self conscious; they are aware 
of themselves as individuals active in pursuing their own 
ends.a This awareness involves "mutual recognition, the 
act of seeing oneself in others, extends each individual's 
awareness to cover the whole human race; he realizes that 
the actions of others have aims similar to and even 
connected to his own. " 29 Thus human beings make all of 
nature, including each other, their objects. 
Species being does not mean that the individual is 
subordinated to the species; rather it means that human 
beings see themselves as part of a species, and develop 
their species powers in mutual cooperation with one another. 
"Human beings do not determine the meaning of being human 
each for him- or herself. They do that collectively. Human 
27Schmitt, Introduction, 12. 
280llman, Alienation, 84. 
29Ibid. 
14 
beings are fundamentally social beings. 1130 
It is important to note that Marx is against both 
collectivism and individualism. Of collectivism--and by 
this I mean the view that societies, states and nations are 
superpersons--Marx writes, "Just as society itself produces 
human beings as human beings, so is society produced by 
them. What is to be avoided above all is the 
reestablishing of 'society' as an abstraction vis a vis the 
individual. " 31 
Marx is also against individualism: 
The individual and isolated hunter and fisherman, 
with whom Smith and Ricardo begin, belongs among 
the unimaginable conceits of the 18th century •. 
The human being is in the most literal sense 
a zoon politikon, not merely a gregarious animal, 
but an animal which can individuate itself only in 
the midst of society.n 
According to Marx human beings are social animals; they can 
create themselves as human beings only in a social context. 
In this sense Marx distinguishes himself from other 
Enlightenment philosophers such as Descartes who 
characterize human beings as rational agents independent of 
social, economic or political functioning. For Marx, since 
30Schmitt, Introduction, 12. 
31Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts in The 
Marx-Engels Reader, 86. This establishing of society as a 
superperson is precisely what Freud begins to speculate 
about at the end of Civilization and Its Discontents when he 
brings up the idea of the cultural superego.) 
32Karl Marx, The Grundrisse in The Marx-Engels Reader, 
222-223. 
15 
human beings are species beings, they are essentially bound 
to nature, objects and each other. This idea of humans as 
zoon politikon also distinguishes Marx's idea of revolution: 
if people are inherently social and cooperative, then their 
work towards social intervention will be cooperative, rather 
than individualistic. 
In his "Sixth Thesis on Feuerbach" Marx writes,"the 
human essence is no abstraction in each single individual. 
In its reality it is the ensemble of social relations."n 
Similarly, in the Grundrisse Marx states that "Society 
expresses the sum of interrelations, the relations in which 
individuals stand." 34 As Gould writes, "Marx is operating 
with an ontology of both real individuals and real 
relations."" Gould goes on to argue that for Marx the 
"individual" and "relation" are not separable concepts. 
This is seen in the discussion of both labor and species 
being. If we recall from the previous discussion that for 
Marx individuals create themselves through their laboring 
activity, and if we remember that the "fundamental mode of 
this (labor] activity is social,"~ then we can see that as 
beings who define themselves concretely through their 
33Karl Marx, Theses on Feuerbach in The Marx-Engels 
Reader, 145. 
34Karl Marx, The Grundrisse, trans. M. Nicolaus (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1973), 265. 
35Gould, Marx's Social Ontology, 31. 
36Ibid. I 3 4 . 
laboring activates human beings are social beings. Gould 
writes: 
[T)he primary attributes that characterize the 
concretely existing individual and the primary 
activity of this individual involve his or her 
relations with other individuals. These 
relationships constitute these individuals as 
social individuals. Since sociality is the mode 
of being of these individuals, to take individ-
uals simply as human and not as social is to 
abstract them from the concrete context that makes 
them the individuals they are. 37 
In order to understand humans as fundamentally social, we 
must remember that for Marx we cannot examine human nature 
independently of concrete social structures within which 
human nature develops. As has been argued, for Marx it is 
in the nature of individuals to act cooperatively as they 
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work to appropriate nature and transform themselves as they 
develop their species powers. 
For Marx human beings are not only inherently social, 
but they are also fundamentally rational. It is in this 
emphasis on rationality that ultimately Marx's conception of 
human nature falls within the Enlightenment tradition. 
Ollman argues that ultimately Marx is saying that the 
distinguishing characteristic of human beings is their 
ability to think rationally. The previous discussion 
established that what characterizes species power (in 
distinction to natural power) for Marx is the ability to 
engage in conscious, purposeful, planned activity. Ollman 
37 b'd I 1 ., 34-35. 
argues that this could be called rational activity. And 
since such activity is, according to Marx, the 
distinguishing characteristic of human nature, then it can 
be argued that Marx goes along with the Enlightenment 
tradition in saying that all human beings share a common 
essential defining characteristic, which is rationality. 
Ollman states it this way: 
If life activity, in its most general sense , is 
life itself, the energy, movement, change of pace 
and rhythm devoted to satisfying natural needs, 
then species life activity stands out as its 
conscious, willed, purposive, flexible, 
concentrated and social facets which enable man to 
pursue the unique demands of his species. 
All the qualities Marx attributes to species 
life activity fit rather neatly into a category 
which Marx never used for this purpose. What have 
I said but that Marx view work as 'rational,' in 
the sense that man grasps the nature of what he 
wants to transform and is able to direct his 
movements accordingly?B 
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Unlike Descartes and other Enlightenment rationalists Marx's 
conception of humans as rational is a contextual, 
materialist rationality. The capability of human beings to 
fully realize their rational capabilities is determined by 
their relationship with nature, i.e. determined by what 
stage human beings are at in their historical development 
characterized by their social relationships and mode of 
production. Unlike the more traditional Enlightenment 
conception of human nature, Marx sees human nature, not as 
something fixed, but as something that develops and changes. 
380llman, Alienation, 114. 
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He puts great stock on human freedom, and does not--contrary 
to popular belief--think the individual should be 
subordinated to the state. 
There are certain elements in Marx that have an almost 
postmodern ring, particularly the notion of the individual 
as an ensemble of social relations. In spite of the non-
fixity of Marxian human nature, there are, however, some 
constants. Humans are fundamentally rational. Moreover, 
humans, at least all those belonging to a given class, are 
fundamentally the same. Each of these assumptions are, from 
a postmodern feminist perspective, problematic. Not only 
are they problematic in their own right, but they will 
suggest a concept of social transf ormation--the classical 
Marxian revolution--which, as I will later discuss, is also 
highly problematic. 
The idea that we are constructed within power 
configurations is a notion Marx shares with postmodernism. 
Marx would say that this laboring activity is our essence, 
shared by all people, but, our nature as laborers is 
affected by the power configurations of our society. 
However, for Marx, these power configurations are first and 
foremost economic power structures, as opposed to the power 
structure of gender or race, for example. 
It is this emphasis on economic power structures that 
allows Marx to privilege labor over any other form of human 
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activity. 39 His emphasis on labor as the cons ti tuti ve human 
activity is what leads him to determine that identity within 
each class is uniform. While he does in some places 
indicate that heredity plays a role in identity, 4°his 
general theory holds that it is the conditions of class that 
determine identity. 
A further, implicit, assumption made by Marx is that 
all members of a class (whether, for example, male or 
female, Jew or Christian, Black or White) experience the 
same oppression. "By exaggerating the determining role of 
economic factors, 1141 Marx can argue that all members of a 
class will for the most part develop similar powers and have 
similar needs. Marx assumes that economic factors will 
eclipse differences of gender and race, "Even the natural 
diversity of species, as, for example, the differences of 
wane of the major discussions in socialist feminist 
writings on Marx is that he privledges the activity of 
production over that of that of reproduction and that his 
analysis concentrates on the oppression of workers under 
capitalism and for the most part ignores an explicit 
analysis of women under the oppression of patriarchy. See 
for example Heidi Hartman, "The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism 
and Feminism: Towards a More Progressive Union," in Women 
and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of 
Marxism and Feminism, ed., Lydia Sargent (Boston: South End 
Press, 1981) 1-41; Iris Young, "Socialist Feminism and the 
Limits of Dual Systems Theory" in Throwing Like A Girl and 
Other Essays in Feminist Philosophy and Social Theory 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 21-35. 
40see Ollman, Alienation, 126. 
41Ibid. 
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race, etc ••.. are and must be checked historically."a 
Marx fails to recognize power differentials within 
classes, examining only those between classes. It is just 
such an analysis that postmodern theory demands. The 
Marxist concept of political intervention, therefore, 
involves a wide-scale mass cooperative effort of one class 
to overthrow another. But there are not simply unified 
classes but differential power distributions among classes. 
Postmodern theory calls for an examination of the 
interaction of multiple sites of oppression, not just the 
oppression of one class by another. According to Marx there 
is a single fundamental division to consider in political 
theory--the division between the proletariat and bourgeois. 
Postmodern theory permits us to consider this fissure, but 
does not emphasize it. There are many important 
relationships to examine and possible sites of oppression. 
It follows, as we shall see, that it is a mistake, 
conceptually and politically, to overemphasize the 
importance of one large, unified revolution in effecting 
major social change. 
Marx and Engels on Private Property and Gender 
For Marx all human development takes place within the 
context of specific modes of production, which shape both 
42Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, German Ideology, 
trans. R. Pascal (London: International Publishers, 1942), 
410. 
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individual consciousness and social relationships. 
consequently we must examine what happens to human nature 
with the introduction of private property. According to 
Marx the introduction of private property ultimately 
alienates human beings from their species powers, and thus 
from the essence of their human nature. In this section I 
will discuss the introduction of private property and what 
effect this has on a fundamental social relationship: that 
between women and men. I will first briefly examine Marx's 
original account of private property and gender as stated in 
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, and in The 
German Ideology. I will then look at how this position is 
developed by Engels in The Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State. In all of these works Marx and 
Engels argue that the determining factor in history is the 
mode of production and the property relations that define 
it. The structure of society, including the family, depends 
on how people produce their means of existence through 
developments in the mode of production. 
In The German Ideology Marx gives his first 
systematic statement of historical materialism. As part of 
this metanarrative he examines the historical development 
of, among other things, the family. One of Marx's main 
concerns in this work is to examine the division of labor. 
It is in developing this concept that he introduces his 
discussion of the family. In this work Marx gives a 
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succinct account of the role of the family in terms of 
establishing private property and the division of labor. 
Marx's basic thesis here is that division of labor is the 
basis of private property. Division of labor was initially, 
"nothing but the division of labor in the sexual act, then 
that division of labor which develops spontaneously or 
•naturally' by virtue of natural pre-disposition (e.g., 
physical strength), needs, accidents, etc., etc."~ We 
observe that Marx bases his analysis on the assumption that 
there is a "natural" division of labor. This is a profound 
and unexamined assumption about human nature--that men and 
women are naturally different and that this difference is 
partially responsible for the division of labor. He offers 
no argument for this crucial point, but like Engels will do 
in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, 
simply states it as a fact. This unproven fact then becomes 
the basis for his analysis of the origination of private 
property and the division of labor, two crucial aspects to 
his entire philosophy. 
This analysis also shows Marx's inattentiveness to 
gender roles and the development of patriarchy. For a 
philosopher whose analysis of the origination of capitalism 
is voluminous, he devotes very little space to the 
"naturally" occurring division of labor based on the 
43Marx, The German Ideology, in Marx's Concept of Man, 
ed. Erich Fromm (New York: Ungar, 1966), 204. 
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differences in the two sexes. He simply says it is based on 
"natural predispositions" and substantiates his argument 
with "etc. etc.". One can hardly imagine Marx casually 
putting forth the claim that humans have a "natural 
predisposition" toward class distinctions and substantiating 
this claim with "etc. etc.". Marx goes on to say that the 
division of labor, which is what alienates humans from their 
own nature, is based on these "natural predispositions." 
Marx writes: 
(T]he division of labor .... is based on the 
natural division of labor in the family and the 
separation of society into individual families 
opposed to one another, is given simultaneously 
the distribution, and indeed the unequal 
distribution .... of labor and its products, 
hence property: the nucleus, the first form, of 
which lies in the family, where the wife and 
children are the slaves of the husband. This 
latent slavery in the family .... is the first 
property. 44 
Marx continues his analysis stating that, "division of 
labor and private property are, moreover, identical 
expressions: in the one the same thing is affirmed with 
reference to activity as is affirmed in the other with 
reference to the product of the activity."tj According to 
Marx private property and the division of labor are both the 
cause and the result of alienation. Marx also states that 
the natural division of labor is the cause of private 
property and the division of labor. The result of this is 
44Ibid., 205. 
45Ibid., 205-206. 
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the degradation of women. At the nexus of this analysis is 
the unexamined assumption that there was an original and 
natural division of labor. 
There are positive aspects to Marx's account which are 
worth noting. Marx does recognize that women are indeed 
oppressed (unlike the vast majority of the philosophers of 
his day). Furthermore, according to Marx the oppression of 
women is not an eternal condition, but rather one that can 
and will be changed. This is one of the liberating aspects 
of historical materialism, and one reason Marx tells the 
metanarrative the way he does in The German Ideology and in 
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Since 
Marx has linked "the slavery" of women to the origination of 
private property, he argues that with the abolition of 
private property we will also see the abolition of the 
women's degradation. According to this Marxian 
metanarrative the division of labor and private property 
lead to both alienation (on which Marx focuses most 
extensively and explicitly) and the degradation of women (on 
which Marx focuses rarely and cryptically). Thus he can 
argue that by abolishing both (as would happen in communism) 
we end both alienation and the degradation of women. 
While for the most part Marx ignores women in his 
philosophy, he does make the important claim that one can 
judge the level of development of culture by the "humanity" 
of the woman-man relationship. In the third of The Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, "Private Property and 
Labor," Marx makes one of his rare comments about women: 
In the relationship with woman, as the prey and 
the handmaid of communal lust, is expressed the 
infinite degradation in which man exists for 
himself; for the secret of this relationship finds 
its unequivocal, incontestable, open and revealed 
expression in the relation of man to woman and in 
the way in which the direct and natural species 
relationship is conceived. The immediate, natural 
and necessary relation of human being to human 
being is also the relation of man to woman . . 
From this relationship man's whole level of 
development can be assessed. It follows from the 
character of this relationship how far man has 
become, and has understood himself as, a species-
being, a human being. The relation of man to 
woman is the most natural relation of human being 
to human being. It indicates, therefore, how far 
man's natural behavior has become human, and how 
far his human essence has become a natural essence 
for him, how far his human nature has become 
nature for him. It also shows how far man's needs 
have become human needs, and consequently how far 
the other person, as a person, has become one of 
his needs, and to what extent he is an individual 
existence at the same time a social being. 46 
The vast majority of Marx's philosophy focuses on 
economic factors and the political division between the 
proletariat and bourgeois, yet here Marx makes a profound 
statement about the relationship between women and men. 
What I have briefly introduced in this section and what I 
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will consider more thoroughly in the next is to what extent 
is Marx and Engels' overall argument distorted in order to 
link the introduction of private property to the 
relationship of women and men? If we put together what they 
46Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 
in Marx's Concept of Man, 126-127. 
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wrote in The German Ideology and what Marx wrote in "Private 
Property and Labor," it becomes apparent that it is crucial 
for Marx and Engels to establish that the degradation of 
women is linked to the origination of private property, so 
that they can show that by abolishing private property, we 
will move towards becoming species beings and human beings. 
This Marxian metanarrative undergoes a major shift when 
Engels discovers the anthropological work of Lewis Henry 
Morgan, who published Ancient Society in 1877. The Origin 
of the Family, Private Property and the State is based on 
Morgan's Ancient Society. About Morgan Engels wrote in 
1884, "in his own way ... [he] discovered afresh in America 
the materialistic conception of history discovered by Marx 
40 years ago." The central idea in Morgan's Ancient Society 
is, according to Eleanor Leacock, 
that human history can be defined in terms of 
successive stages. . . . He stated that it was 
the 'successive arts of subsistence which arose at 
long intervals' which were responsible for the 
development of the three major stages. He 
proposed parallel sequences in the history of 
social, economic and political institutions. By 
implication, they were closely related to the 
economic sequence.~ 
Morgan's work offered concrete data to support Marx and 
Engels' metanarrative of historical materialism first 
outlined in The German Ideology. Morgan's analysis offered 
anthropological evidence of the development of private 
47Eleanor Burke Leacock, Introduction to The Origin of 
the Family, Private Property and the State by Frederick 
Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1972), 10. 
property and how this effected family structures and other 
social and political interactions. 
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The evidence provided by Morgan was extremely important 
to Engels and is the reason for the difference between the 
account of the origination of private property given in The 
German Ideology and that given later by Engels in The Origin 
of the Family. Private Property and the State. Prior to 
Morgan, Marx and Engels assumed that humanity had always 
been divided into classes. (Hence the opening lines of the 
communist Manifesto: "The history of all hitherto existing 
society is the history of class struggles. 1148 ) So in the 
beginning Marx and Engels posit the division of labor as 
coterminous with private property, and since they see the 
gender division as "natural," they see woman as the first 
form of property. Morgan provided anthropological evidence 
indicating that early humanity was in fact communistic. 
With this data the metanarrative first told in The German 
Ideology can now take on a more Hegelian dialectical form. 
As Engels develops the metanarrative in The Origin of the 
Family, Private Property and the State history moves from 
primitive communism (thesis) to class society (antithesis) 
to ultimate communism (synthesis). 
In The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the 
State Engels argues, in accordance with basic Marxian 
48Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist 
Manifesto (New York: Washington Square Press, 1965), 57. 
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doctrine, that historical development can be traced in terms 
of changes in the mode of production. All structures in 
society, including the family, and all human relationships, 
including relationships of class and gender, depend on how 
people produce their means of existence through developments 
in the mode of production. Human progress is measured in 
terms of changes in this production. 
Drawing on data from Morgan, Engels constructs a 
metanarrative to establish that the origin of the family, 
like the origin of everything else, is economic. He 
postulates that there was a time when land and property were 
owned communally, inheritance was through the mother, women 
were strong and powerful leaders, and when women's work was 
valued as much as men's work. According to Engels, the 
monogamous family as we know it came into existence with 
private property, which brought about the "world historical 
defeat of the female sex. 1149 
Engels begins by going through a narrative of the 
development of the family from the most primitive, which is 
group marriage, to the contemporary form of monogamy. The 
overall trend in the development of the family is that the 
acceptable sphere of sexual relationships (above all for 
women) is increasingly narrowed. The oldest form of family 
49We observe that in this account private property is no 
longer conterminous with the sexual division of labor, nor, 
as seems to be the case for Marx and Engels earlier, is the 
monogamous family taken to be "natural." 
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is group marriage--characterized by promiscuous sexual 
intercourse and an absence of prohibitions and restrictions 
on sexual partners. The next form of family is the 
consanguine family. In this arrangement marriage groups are 
separated according to generation. The only exclusion in 
terms of sexual relationships is that between parents and 
children. The next stage is the punaluan family in which 
brothers and sisters cannot mate. After this comes the 
pairing family in which one man and one woman mate; however, 
men are allowed both polygamy and occasional infidelity. 
Growing out of the pairing family is the monogamous family, 
the first form of family to be non-communistic, patrilineal, 
and patriarchal. All forms of family before monogamy are, 
according to Engels, communistic. And in the communistic 
society production was centered around the household. As 
long as women control the mode of production, which during 
this time was centered in the household, women will remain 
in power. Thus Engels maintains that before monogamy 
society was communistic, matrilineal, and matriarchal. 
Engels wants to show that the origin of the family is 
economic and that changes in the mode of production lead to 
changes in the organization of society. Consequently he 
must establish an economic basis for matriarchy, which can 
then be replaced with patriarchy. If he can show that 
patriarchy is based on the establishment of private 
property, then he can show that if we eliminate private 
property we will also eliminate patriarchy. In order to 
understand the steps Engels takes in his argument, I will 
briefly discuss how he thinks private property comes about 
and what effect this has on the power of women. 
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In describing the communistic household Engels' writes: 
Communistic housekeeping ... means the supremacy 
of women in the house; just as the exclusive 
recognition of the female parent, owing to the 
impossibility of recognizing the male parent with 
certainty, means that the women--the mothers--are 
held in high respect. One of the most absurd 
notions taken over from the 18th century 
enlightenment is that in the beginning of society 
woman was the slave to man. 50 Among all savages 
and all barbarians .... the position of woman is not 
only free, but honorable. 51 
The last stage of marriage groupings to be communistic 
(before the non-communistic monogamous family) is the 
pairing family. Engels emphasizes that in the pairing 
arrangement, as in all communistic households, women were 
supreme in the house, they were held in high respect, they 
were free and honorable, and were the "great power among the 
clans, as everywhere else. They did not hesitate, when 
occasion required, 'to knock off the horns,' as it was 
technically called, from the head of a chief, and send him 
50This was Marx and Engels earlier view as stated in The 
German Ideology and The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts 
of 1844. 
51Frederick Engels, The Origin of the Family, Private 
Property and the State, with an Introduction by Eleanor 
Burke Leacock (New York: International Publishers, 1972), 
113. 
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back to the ranks of the warriors. " 52 While in the pairing 
family women were powerful, free, and honorable, Engels also 
states that " women had now become scarce and highly sought 
after. Hence it is with the pairing marriage that there 
begins the capture and purchase of women. 1153 
The progression from the pairing family to the 
monogamous family takes place, according to Engels, with the 
advent of private property. Engels argues that the 
domestication of animals, as well as metal working, weaving, 
and agriculture were the changes in the mode of production 
that led to this change in the structure of society. With 
the introduction of these new technologies labor power began 
to produce surplus over and above the subsistence. This 
surplus led to the accumulation of wealth. In addition to 
this, the center of production moved outside the household. 
We observe that Engels, like Marx in The German 
Ideology, assumes that there is a natural division of labor. 
Based on this assumption, he postulates that women worked 
within the household while men were responsible for 
activities outside the household--such as gathering food and 
domestication animals. In the communistic family production 
was centered around the household, so women were in charge 
and society was matriarchal. Once the mode of production 
52Lewis Henry Morgan, Ancient Society, ed. Eleanor Burke 
Leacock (New York: World Publishing Company, 1963), 464, 
quoted in Frederick Engels, origins, 11. 
53Engels, Origins, 112. 
changed to include agriculture and the domestication of 
animals, the center of production moved to outside the 
household, where men were in charge. Thus society moves 
from matriarchy to patriarchy. 
According to the division of labor within the 
family at that time, it was the man's part to 
obtain food and the instruments of labor necessary 
for the purpose. He therefore also owned the 
instruments of labor, and in the event of husband 
and wife separating, he took them with him, just 
as she retained her household goods. Therefore, 
according to the social custom of the time, the 
man was also the owner of the new source of 
subsistence, the cattle, and later of the new 
instruments of labor, the slaves. 54 
Here Engels sets up an explanation as to how and why men 
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came to own property and rule over women. He bases this on 
an original sexual division of labor. 
In communistic societies inheritance was passed down 
through the mother. Yet as men's wealth increased (because 
they were the ones who owned the private property, namely 
cattle, which is now producing surplus), their position in 
the family became more important than that of the women's. 
Men wanted to overthrow the power of women and ensure that 
their property would be inherited by their children. Yet, 
according Engels, communistic societies were matrilineal; 
decent was determined through the mother--called "mother 
right"--thus men had to first overthrow "mother right.''" 
~Ibid., 119. 
55Engels derived this term from J.J. Bachofen Myth, 
Religion and Mother Right, trans. Ralph Manheim {Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1967). 
Thus on the one hand, in proportion as wealth 
increased it made the man's power in the family 
more important than the woman's, and on the other 
hand created an impulse to exploit this 
strengthened position in order to overthrow, in 
favor of his children, the traditional order of 
inheritance. This however, was impossible so long 
as descent was reckoned according to mother right. 
Mother right, therefore, had to be overthrown, and 
overthrown it was. 56 
How did this revolutionary shift in power take place? 
Engels' answer to this is worth quoting in full. 
This [the overthrow of mother right] was by no 
means so difficult as it looks to us today. for 
this revolution--one of the most decisive ever 
experienced by humanity--could take place without 
disturbing a single one of the living members of 
the [clans]. All could remain as they were. A 
simple decree sufficed that in the future the 
offspring of the male members should remain within 
the [clans], but that of the female should be 
excluded by being transferred to the (clans] of 
their father. The reckoning of descent in the 
female line and the matriarchal law of inheritance 
were thereby overthrown, and the male line of 
descent and the paternal law of inheritance were 
substituted for them.~ 
It was this "simple decree" that brought about "the 
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world historical defeat of the female sex." Matriarchy was 
replaced by patriarchy, matrilineality by patrilineality, 
and communism by private property. And women were "degraded 
and reduced to servitude." It was this overthrow of mother 
right which marked the transition from the pairing family, 
which was communistic, to the monogamous family, which is 
not. According to Engels, monogamous marriage is not based 
56Engels, Origin, 119-120. 
57Ibid., 120. Emphasis my own. 
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on love but on property; it is a way for a man with property 
to make sure he has someone to pass it on to. The 
monogamous family is based on the supremacy of the male. 
Men give their property to their male children. According 
to Engels, the origin of monogamy is economic: 
It was the first form of the family to be based 
not on natural but on economic conditions--on the 
victory of private property over primitive, 
natural communal property .... the sole exclusive 
aims of monogamous marriage were to make the man 
supreme in the family and to propagate , as the 
future heirs to his wealth, children indisputably 
his own. . . .monogamous marriage comes on the 
scene as the subjugation of the one sex by the 
other; it announces a struggle between the sexes 
unknown throughout prehistoric period. 58 
Not only is the subjection of women based entirely on 
economic conditions, but this subjection is the prototype 
for all class oppression. He continues: 
And today I can add: the first class opposition 
that appears in history coincides with he 
development of the antagonism between man and 
woman in monogamous marriage, and the first class 
oppression coincides with that of the female sex 
by the male. 59 
Since Engels equates the subjugation of women to the 
economic circumstances of private property, he argues that 
the communist revolution will ameliorate the oppression of 
woman. He writes, "The modern individual family is founded 
on the open or concealed domestic slavery of the wife, and 
modern society is a mass composed of these individual 
58Ibid. , 128. 
59Ibid., 129. 
families as its molecules. 1160 In order to liberate women, 
Engels argues, it is necessary to bring them back into the 
public realm. This requires that the monogamous family as 
an economic unit be abolished. Monogamy arose from the 
concentration of wealth in the hands of men. Engels 
proposes to transfer the wealth from individual men to 
society as a whole. Then men do not have to worry about 
their children inheriting their private property. This 
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transfer of wealth calls for a social revolution. Once the 
means of production is owned in common, the single family 
ceases to be the economic unit of society. 
There are some logical problems with Engels' narrative 
which bear consideration. 61 In his discussion of the pairing 
family Engels' description of the social arrangements makes 
many assumptions only explained by the patriarchal context 
from which he theorizes. 
Engels states that in the pairing marriage there is the 
"capture and purchase of women." This statement raises two 
questions. If women were strong and powerful and could 
"knock off the horns" of a chief, how could they so easily 
be captured? Doesn't the "capture and purchase of women" 
negate Engels statement that at this stage "the position of 
60Ibid., 137. 
MFor a similar examination see Jane Flax, "Do Feminists 
Need Marxism?" in Building Feminist Theory: Essays from 
"Quest," A Feminist Quarterly (New York: Longman, 1981). 
women is not only free, but honorable"?~ Free, honorable, 
and powerful people do not get captured and purchased. 63 
The implications of this are important. On the one had 
Engels needs to claim that women in communistic societal 
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relations are free and honorable so that he can blame their 
downfall on private property and the consequent mode of 
production and social organization. On the other hand his 
own argument is so entrenched in a patriarchal context that 
he is not able to support his basic claim (that woman were 
powerful before the advent of private property and it was 
changes in the mode of production which led to their defeat, 
not independent social changes). 
Engels also makes the assumption that it is men and not 
women who want sex. 64 He states, "In this stage [the pairing 
62Rosemarie Tong raises a similar question, "did [it] 
not strike Engels as odd that a powerful matriarch would let 
herself be forcibly seized as a wife by a man whose 'horns' 
she could have 'knocked off'?" Feminist Thought: A 
Comprehensive Introduction (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 
246, nt 25. 
63In patriarchal slave societies, ancient Greece, for 
example, men are taken as slaves, "free and honorable" men, 
who have been defeated in battle. So "free and honorable" 
people do sometimes get captured and purchased. The 
difference between the capture and purchase of male slaves 
in patriarchal salve societies, and the capture and purchase 
of female wives in the matriarchal pairing family, is that 
the former have first been defeated in battle, whereas the 
later, according to Engels' narrative, remain free, 
honorable, and powerful, yet are still captured and 
purchased. 
64Gerda Lerner writes: "Engels' speculations on the 
nature of female sexuality have been criticized as 
reflecting his own sexist Victorian values in their 
unexamined assumption that nineteenth-century standards of 
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family], one man lives with one woman, but the relationship 
is such that polygamy and occasional infidelity remain the 
right of the men, even though for economic reasons polygamy 
is rare, while from the woman strictest fidelity is 
generally demanded throughout the time she lives with the 
man and adultery on her part is cruelly punished."M 
cruelly punished by whom? Engels claims that women are the 
head of the household, they are free and honorable, they can 
knock the horns off a chief, and yet they are cruelly 
punished. Engels continues: "The marriage tie can, 
however, be easily dissolved by either partner; after 
separation, the children still belong as before to the 
mother alone."~ On the one hand women are not allowed 
sexual freedom and are cruelly punished, and on the other 
hand they are automatically allowed to keep their children. 
This does not make sense except as support for Engels' 
argument. Again, it is essential for Engels' overall 
argument to claim that before private property societies 
were matrilineal and matriarchal so that he can show 
female prudery could explain the actions and attitudes of 
women at the dawn of civilization." Gerda Lerner, The 
Creation of Patriarchy (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986), 22. Sigmund Freud makes a similar assumption in 
Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. and ed. Peter Gay 
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1989), especially in 
Chapter Four where he contends that in civilization men want 
sexual relations with women and women want to be with their 
children. {This is stated explicitly on page 56.) 
65Engels, Origin, 111. 
66Ibid. 
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patriarchy stems from private property. But the evidence he 
is giving for matrilineal and matriarchal societies does not 
support his claim that they actually existed.~ On the one 
hand he claims matriarchy and matriliniality and on the 
other he keeps giving examples that show women were 
controlled by men. If Engels cannot prove matriarchy, 
however, then he cannot prove that private property is the 
cause of patriarchy. 
Engels' explanation of the "world historical defeat of 
the female sex" is based on an assumption of a "natural 
division of labor" and "social custom". Throughout this 
work Engels unquestionably assumes a basic division of labor 
in which women work inside the house, producing most of the 
material goods, while men hunt. 
The man fights in the wars, goes hunting and 
fishing, procures the raw materials of food and 
the tools necessary for doing so. The woman looks 
after the house and the preparation of food and 
clothing, cooks, weaves, sews. They are each 
master in their own sphere: the man in the forest, 
the woman in the house. 68 
670n the question of whether or not matriarchies existed 
see Johann J. Bachofen, Myth, Religion and Mother Right: 
Selected Writings of J.J. Bachofen, trans. Ralph Manheim 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967); Robert 
Briffault, The Mothers: The Matriarchal Theory of Social 
Origins, ed. with an Introduction by Gordon Rattray Taylor 
(New York: Howard Fertig, 1993); Eleanor Burke Leacock, 
Introduction to The Origin of the Family, Private Property 
and the State by Frederick Engels (New York: International 
Publishers, 1972); Gerda Lerner, The Creation of Patriarchy 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
68Engels, Origin, 218. 
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rt is this arrangement that, "according to the social custom 
of the time" leads to men owning "the new source of 
subsistence, the cattle." What social custom? How can 
man's ownership of private property, which led to the world 
historical defeat of the female sex, be explained simply as 
a social custom of the time? Doesn't a statement of such 
magnitude require a better argument, or at least an 
argument? Does the fact that Engels doesn't feel the need 
to argue this point more carefully indicate that he and Marx 
do not place too much value on the introduction of 
patriarchy per se and the defeat of woman? Could it be that 
they gloss over this because they see the introduction of 
private property as the main problem? 
Engels states that "a simple decree" sufficed to 
overthrow mother right. He further states that not a single 
member of the clan was disturbed by this revolution and that 
all could remain as they were. But this is incorrect, since 
obviously the daughters do not remain as they were. They 
are now compelled to leave the maternal clan. Moreover, he 
is talking about an overwhelming change in the power 
structure of society, calling it one of the most decisive 
revolutions in human history, yet according to Engels this 
does not have a major effect on human nature. This seems to 
contradict Marx's own argument about human powers needing to 
be free to develop and developing within the context of a 
specific society. The fact that women are now going to be 
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"slaves of lust" does not seem to strike Engels as a major 
infringement on their basic human freedom. One can hardly 
imagine Marx and Engels describing the proletariat 
overthrowing the bourgeois, and saying it "could take place 
without disturbing a single one of the living members of 
society," or that it could take place by "a simple decree". 
The fact that Engels can so casually dismiss the overthrow 
of matriarchy and the establishment of patriarchy indicates 
the lack of importance he ultimately places on the equality 
of women. By Engels own account the women at this time were 
respected and powerful, they "could knock the horns off" 
someone, so why would their overthrow be so easily 
accomplished? The consequences were, after all, immense: 
The overthrow of mother right was the world 
historical defeat of the female sex. The man took 
command in the home also; the woman was degraded 
and reduced to servitude; she became the slave of 
his lust and a mere instrument for the production 
of children. This degraded position of the 
woman .... has gradually been palliated and glossed 
over, and sometimes clothed in a milder form; in 
no sense has it been abolished.~ 
This passage, besides announcing the decisive decline of the 
power of women, makes another profound assumption. "the 
woman was degraded ... a mere instrument for the production of 
children". Engels is obviously placing no value on this 
form of production. He is all too causally dismissing the 
value of women's reproductive function. Furthermore, while 
Engels carefully examines changes in the mode of production 
69Ibid. I 120-121. 
throughout Origins of the Family, Private Property and the 
state he ignores the history of reproduction. This seems 
like a case, similar to what we will see with Freud, where 
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the patriarchal context within which Engels and Marx are 
theorizing clouds their rationality. For thinkers who place 
so much emphasis on material circumstances and surplus, how 
could they not even examine the value of women's 
reproductive functioning?m 
In addition to these logical problems with Engels 
narrative, recent anthropological evidence indicates that 
factually it is incorrect as well. According to Gerda 
Lerner's The Creation of Patriarchy, the ethnographic data 
on which Engels' based his analysis has been largely 
discredited. 71 According to Lerner, "the assumption that 
there is one formula and one pattern for the sexual division 
of labor is erroneous. The particular work done by men and 
women has differed greatly in different cultures, largely 
depending on the ecological situation in which the people 
find themselves. 1172 This challenges Engels' argument that 
men are the original possessors of private property (cattle) 
7
°Many socialist feminists think that one way to 
incorporate Marxism and feminism is to examine the value of 
reproduction as well as that of production. 
71Lerner, Creation of Patriarchy, 22. See pages 22-24 
for a discussion of Engels. For a more detailed account of 
the archeological, ethnographic, and anthropological data 
both supporting and disproving Engels' account see Eleanor 
Burke Leacock's Introduction to origin. 
72Lerner, Creation of Patriarchy, 22. 
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because they work outside the household, an assumption 
central to his entire argument. While Engels' analysis 
greatly simplifies the division of labor between women and 
men and his conclusions are not supported by Lerner's data, 
she does find his analysis a useful one. She states that 
"his great merit was to point up the impact of societal and 
cultural forces in structuring and defining sexual 
relations."n In other words, by connecting the world 
historical defeat of the female sex to economic conditions, 
he opens up an analysis of gender to social interpretation 
and disrupts the idea that biology is destiny, or that 
because women have children they are destined to be 
inferior. This is an extremely important contribution and 
should not be overlooked. 
My fundamental criticism of Engels' account is that 
this is just a story, not a careful, rigorous analysis. It 
is a metanarrative, which serves as an important orienting 
devise for a political project. This is not an account 
without worth. Engels shows that the subjection of women is 
a socially constructed situation and one that can change. 
However, this account is deeply flawed and the consequences 
have been enormous. Engels subordinates women's struggle 
to overcome their oppression to the class struggle to 
overcome private property. Engels' metanarrative obviates 
the need to explore the complex interactions of class and 
TIIbid., 23. 
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sex, because, according to his analysis, the opposition 
between the sexes is based solely on economic conditions and 
in a state of communism will be erased. 
Engels constructs his metanarrative in such a way as to 
make the oppression of women coextensive and commensurate 
with the advent of private property. A serious flaw in the 
work of Marx and Engels, however, is that their work largely 
ignores the specific aspect of women's oppression and 
focuses almost exclusively on class oppression and the need 
to abolish private property. There is no discussion on the 
need to abolish patriarchy. This is why understanding the 
flaws in this argument are so crucial to the overall focus 
of this work, which is an examination of ways to disrupt 
patriarchy. If, as many Marxists argue, patriarchy is based 
on the establishment of private property, then one would 
logically argue that social intervention aimed at 
challenging patriarchy would logically begin with the 
overthrow of private property. I would argue that 
patriarchy is not dependent on private property and thus I 
claim that by getting rid of private property we will not 
necessarily get rid of patriarchy.n 
The issue to consider is where does one locate the 
source of oppression and thus where does one locate efforts 
nThere is an ongoing debate among some feminist 
theorists about the relationship between capitalism and 
patriarchy. The nuances of this debate are beyond the scope 
of this work. 
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to bring about changes in society. Marx and Engels argue 
that the major source of oppression is class oppression, 
based on unequal relationships of property (the owners of 
the mode of production verses those who lose their freedom 
and themselves because they do not own the means of 
production) . I am not here arguing that this is not a major 
source of oppression, but rather I am arguing that it is not 
the source of oppression. Patriarchy is a source of 
oppression, connected in many ways but not identical to 
capitalism. I therefore disagree with Engels' conclusion 
that the "world historical def eat of the female sex" is 
based solely on economics. 
It is clear from this examination of Engels that he 
does not give careful enough consideration to the 
origination and role of patriarchy. His analysis of the 
overthrow of matriarchy and matriliniality is deeply flawed. 
This does not mean we dismiss Marxian economic theory 
because it lacks a cohesive theory of patriarchy. It means 
Marx and Engels and their definition of human nature and 
their concept of revolution cannot stand alone; it must be 
read along with those of other thinkers such as Freud, 
Foucault, Flax, and Butler. 
Marx's Concept of Revolution 
As we can see, the conception of human nature implicit 
in Marx's writings of 1844 is that human beings are free and 
continually developing beings whose spirit is embodied in 
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their labor activity. Human beings express their nature in 
their labor, for labor is the way humans develop their 
species powers by transforming nature. Through labor human 
beings are able to appropriate nature; they make nature 
their object. Human beings are unique in that they make all 
of nature, including each other their object. Human labor 
is an essential expression of human nature because, 
according to Marx, human beings create themselves as they 
transform nature. But, Marx argues, under capitalism 
conditions of alienated labor separates us from our "true" 
nature. This analysis would lead to the conclusion that in 
order to free human nature, it is necessary to abolish the 
capitalist system, a system in which capitalists owns the 
means of production and workers are forced to work for them. 
In fact, the abolition of capitalism is seen to be both 
necessary and sufficient for human emancipation. Marx 
writes towards the end of the "Alienated Labor" manuscript: 
From the relation of alienated labor to private 
property it also follows that the emancipation of 
society from private property, from servitude, 
takes the political form of the emancipation of 
the workers; not in the sense that only the 
latter's emancipation is involved, but because 
this emancipation includes the emancipation of 
humanity as a whole. For all human servitude is 
involved in the relation of the worker to 
production, and all the types of servitude are 
only modifications or consequences of this 
relation. 75 
This is an important and revealing passage. Here Marx 
75Marx, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 
in Marx's Concept of Man, 107. 
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is saying that emancipation of workers will lead to the 
emancipation of society as a whole because, as he says, "all 
human servitude is involved in the relation of the worker to 
production, and all types of servitude are only 
modifications or consequences of this relation." Here Marx 
is obviously giving priority to the emancipation of the 
workers, and saying that if workers are emancipated, then 
all other forms of emancipation will follow. One can assume 
here he would mean that the emancipation of women would 
follow the emancipation of workers. In other words he is 
saying that if we get rid of the structural domination of 
capitalism, then the structural domination of patriarchy 
will follow. 
This is a point where I and most other feminist 
scholars disagree with Marx. It may be true that Marx's 
analysis of capitalism, and the project of overthrowing 
this system, are essential aspects of any genuine theory of 
liberation, but these elements do not in themselves comprise 
a complete theory of liberation. 
Marx's concept of human nature leads to his concept of 
political intervention. He thinks that the way to bring 
about fundamental change is to engage in a large scale, 
socio-political revolution, in which the workers unite to 
overthrow the capitalists and thus gain control of the means 
of production, "The first step in the revolution by the 
working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of 
ruling class. "76 Marx thinks that we are species beings, 
that we are essentially cooperative. With this conception 
of human nature, he can conceive of workers uniting and 
forming a massive, united group which can act as a unified 
force to overthrow capitalism. 
Two elements need to be interrogated here, Marx's 
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concept of agency, and his concept of revolution. These two 
areas are fundamentally connected, so that reconceiving 
agency requires reconceiving our concept of emancipatory 
strategies of political intervention. I would argue that it 
is in Marx's limited conception of agency, limited to agency 
primarily constructed within economic power configurations, 
that has made Marxists overlook the forms of political 
intervention waged by some feminists. Indeed as David 
Schweickart has observed, "Marxism, the philosophy of 
revolution, has missed what is perhaps the greatest 
revolution of our century, 1177 {Schweickart, 350) namely the 
revolution against patriarchy. Marxism has missed this 
revolution because of its concept of agency. Marx believed, 
as expressed in the passage quoted above, if we eliminate 
class domination and capitalism, all other forms of 
oppression will likewise disappear. Marx can say this, 
because he is not looking at the differential power 
76Marx and Engels Communist Manifesto, 9 3 . 
77David Schweickart, Against Capitalism {Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), 350. 
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configurations within each class. He sees class 
consciousness as a unified concept, because, in his view, 
all people of the same class are dealing with the same basic 
form of oppression. 
Among the differential power configurations Marx's 
analysis eclipses are the gender relations within classes. 
women and men are not equal within the working class. Marx 
overlooks the oppressive force of patriarchy, independent 
from capitalism, which leads to the oppression of women qua 
women. This is not to say that Marxism has been hostile to 
feminism. Most Marxists accept the basic legitimacy of the 
feminist project. There is a recognition that women have 
been oppressed and that they have the right to challenge 
this oppression. The difficulty arises in conceiving how 
the struggle of women relates to class struggle. If women's 
struggle is subsumed under the rubric of class struggle, 
then it can be argued that a revolution which leads to class 
liberation will automatically lead to women's liberation as 
well. On the other hand if women's struggle is thought of 
independently of class struggle, it is difficult for many 
Marxists to conceive of women making a revolution--in the 
Marxist sense of this term (armed uprising, large scale 
general strike, etc.)--as women. If, however, we reconceive 
of agency, and what we mean by the category of women 
(something I will develop in subsequent chapters), then, as 
we shall see, it is possible to reconceive ''revolution" as a 
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network of alternative strategies of political intervention, 
not all of which are modeled on the political revolutions of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (or the Russian and 
Chinese revolutions of the twentieth century) . 
Part of reconceiving political intervention involves 
reconceiving power. What I will argue in the following 
chapters is that what postmodern feminism brings to the 
discussion of emancipatory politics is both a reconception 
of agency (both one that explicitly thematizes gender and 
one that looks at how our concept of human nature is 
constructed within various matrices of power, one of which 
is patriarchy) and, a more nuanced understanding of power. 
Once we understand how agents are constructed within various 
power configurations, then our idea of political 
intervention can change. "Seizing power" is no longer the 
only model of emancipatory political practice. If we think 
of power in the postmodern terms of Foucault, Flax, and 
Butler, not as something to be seized, but rather as 
something in which we already are embedded, something within 
which our identity is constructed, then rather than seizure, 
the project becomes one of reconfiguration, redeployment, 
and renegotiation. This is a contribution that postmodern 
feminist theory makes to the discussion of emancipatory 
politics. 
There is also the problem of Marx's concept of class. 
It can be argued that this idea, in uniting a large group of 
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people under the rubric of "class," marginalizes the 
differences inherent in this group of people. Revolution in 
the Marxian sense relies on a universalizing and thus 
totalizing concept of human nature, whereas postmodern 
feminist theory, as we shall see, wants to focus on the 
differences that are eclipsed in such a concept of human 
nature. Schweickart has noted that, 
[I]t quite difficult for most Marxists 
(particularly male Marxists) to grant equal weight 
to the two struggles [feminists challenging 
patriarchy and Marxists challenging capitalism] 
and hence to regard with sufficient seriousness 
the theoretical research and practical actions of 
feminists that have no obvious or immediate 
bearing on class. It is difficult to grant equal 
weight because it is difficult to see how the 
feminist agenda contributes to the Revolution 
(capital R) . 78 
It is only hard to see how feminist contribute to the 
Revolution, if we remain in the context that has been laid 
out by Marx, namely that the major force of human oppression 
is capitalism, that the fundamental agent of change is a 
united working class, and that the model of revolution is an 
abrupt seizure of political power. According to Marx's 
conception of the person, labor is the fundamental 
constituent of human subjectivity and humans are 
fundamentally rational as well as social. The postmodern 
feminist critique of this line of thought interrogates these 
three major premises of Marx's conception of human nature: 
What if labor is not the only or most central constituent of 
78Ibid., 352. 
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human nature? What if we are not fundamentally rational? 
What if we are as asocial as we are social-- or rather 
neither by nature? What if we are not all (in the same 
class) fundamentally the same? By challenging and 
disrupting Marx's concept of agency, postmodern feminist 
theory opens up new avenues of political intervention and 
broadens possibilities for resistance to various systems of 
structural domination such as patriarchy and capitalism. 
In the following chapters I will argue that the new 
notion of radical transformation needed by Marxism is 
provided by a postmodern feminist conception of self and 
political intervention. I will argue that ''performativity" 
is just such a new practice, one that will use some of the 
insights of Marxism and provide a plausible notion of 
effective emancipatory political practice. 
Marxism is an important revolutionary theory dealing 
with economic oppression, but we need other theories of 
political intervention to deal with issues such as gender. 
What postmodernism allows is a plurality of intervention 
strategies. Unlike Marxism, which insists that all current 
forms of oppression are linked to capitalism, postmodernism 
allows for, and indeed demands, multiple sites of 
intervention. This is because postmodernism does not see 
power as univocal. In this way postmodernism has a place 
for Marxism, since postmodernism is a "pluralistic 
philosophy of liberation". It is therefore incorrect to see 
52 
postmodernism as antithetical to Marxism, as many theorists 
do; rather postmodernism allows for the practice of various 
strategies of intervention, among them Marxist revolutionary 
strategies. But it is a modified, because non-hegemonic 
Marxism, that postmodernism allows for. 
Chapter Two 
Freud 
Freud's theory of the unconscious and his attention to 
the role of the body and of desire in forming the self has 
played an important role in disrupting the classical modern 
philosophical idea associated with Descartes that the 
transcendental subject is a unified rational agent with 
unmediated self-knowledge. In this chapter I will give a 
summary and critical analysis of three aspects of Freud's 
work that are particularly relevant to my project: his 
structural model of the mind, his theory of the construction 
of gender identity, and his metanarrative of civilization, 
attending to any possibility of social intervention that 
these concepts reveal. 
I will pay particular attention to the way in which 
gender is developed in these various parts of Freud's theo-
ry. Freud's anxiety about female sexuality extends 
throughout his work. While his theories challenge many 
previously held notions of rationality and sexuality, I will 
argue that his own ambivalence about female sexuality 
pervades and at times distorts his analysis. He remains 
constrained within the patriarchal ideology that presumes 
men to be superior to women biologically and culturally. 
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Freud's Structural Model of the Mind 
Freud's concept of the self both disrupts and 
reinforces Enlightenment concepts of subjectivity. His 
theory challenges the Enlightenment concept that the self is 
a unified rational agent capable of full self-awareness; he 
develops a model of the mind that is radically decentered. 
Rather than of a unified rational agent, Freud's model is 
one of a divided mind that is constantly in conflict with 
itself. Moreover, this mind is primarily unconscious and 
permeated by irrationality. 
Freud's work is, however, permeated by the 
Enlightenment conception of science. He insists on 
positivist notions of science, and he wants psychoanalysis 
to be accepted as such a science. 1 The issue of the 
scientific status of Freud's thought is a major one in the 
literature, but from a postmodern feminist point of view, 
this is not the important issue. First of all postmodernism 
is highly suspicious of "scientific" rationality, especially 
in the social sciences ("sciences of man''). Secondly, 
whether or not Freud's theory is scientifically well-
grounded--meaning that there have been controlled 
• 
1But while the Enlightenment concept of science privileges the 
disengaged rational observer, Jane Flax makes the provocative 
a~gument that Freud's own, "[a)nxieties about gender deeply affect 
his supposedly gender-neutral concepts of knowledge and the nature 
of psychoanalytic practice." Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, 
Fe~inism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West (Berkeley: 
University Of California Press, 1990), 67. 
experiments verifying his basic claims--the fact remains 
that Freud's model of the mind seems to accord with many 
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people's experience. Whatever the scientific status of 
Freud's theory, it is safe to say that many people have been 
influenced to think of themselves as Freudian subjects. One 
can think of themselves this way. The important question for 
a postmodern feminist is should one?2 
There are three basic parts that make up Freud's model 
of the mind: the id, the ego and the superego. 3 Each is 
formed by both inner and outer experiences and is at once 
psychic, somatic, and socio-historical. 4 These multiple 
forces influencing the formation of self are significant in 
terms of understanding the relationship of Freud's model of 
the mind to his conception of society. Freud's subject is 
20n psychoanalysis as a science see Jane Flax, "Psychoanalysis 
and the Philosophy of Science: Critique or Resistance," Journal of 
Philosophy, LXXVII, 10 (October 1981) : 561-569; Jane Flax, "Final 
Analysis" chap. in Disputed Subjects: Essays on Psychoanalysis, 
Politics, and Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 1993) 37-58; 
Marshall Edelson, Hypotheses and Evidence in Psychoanalysis 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); Adolf Grunbaum, 
"Epistemological Liabilities of the Critical Appraisal of 
Psychoanalytic Theory" Nous XIV, 3 (September 1980): 307-386; Peter 
Gay, Freud: A Life for our Time (New York: W.W. Norton, 1988); 
Adolf Grunbaum, Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis 
(Madison: International Universities Press, 1993); Frederick Crews, 
Skeptical Engagements (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986); 
Arnold Goldberg, The Prisonhouse of Psychoanalysis (Hillsdale, NJ: 
Analytic Press, 1990). 
3Freud's conception developed and changed over his lifetime; 
The Ego and the Id represents for the most part his final version. 
The analysis in the following section will focus primarily on this 
work. 
4Flax, Thinking Fragments, 61. 
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inherently embodied and can and should be understood within 
the context of culture and history. This model challenges 
the Enlightenment conception of the subject as an entity 
that is unaffected by embodiment. Moreover, Freud's subject 
is ultimately socially constructed, although unlike 
postmodernists, Freud tempers this social construction of 
the self with a significant degree of biological 
determinism. 
The basic tenet of Freud's model of the mind is, "[t]he 
division of the psychical into what is conscious and what is 
unconscious[.]"5 It is this idea of the unconscious that is 
most disruptive of traditional rational philosophical 
thought. Freud himself realizes this: 
To most people who have been educated in 
philosophy the idea of anything psychical which is 
not also conscious is so inconceivable that it 
seems to them absurd and refutable simply by 
logic. 6 
The reservoir of the unconscious, according to Freud, 
is primarily the id. The id is the most primitive part of 
the mind, and it is the part from which the other parts, 
over time, develop. The id is completely unconscious and is 
the repository of most of our drives, instincts, wishes, 
and desires. The id contains everything psychological that 
is inherited. It is also the reservoir of the libido, the 
5Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id, ed. James Strachey, trans. 
Joan Riviere (New York: W.W. Norton, 1960), 3. 
6Ibid. 
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psychic energy of the entire mind, and thus the energy of 
both the ego and superego are derived from the id. The id, 
as the locus of the instincts, is connected to the somatic 
functioning of the organism and supplies energy to satisfy 
this area as well. We can see that the id is significant in 
terms of the movement away from the Enlightenment notion of 
disembodied rational subjectivity. The id is both 
unconscious and irrational. Moreover, being intricately 
connected to the somatic functioning of the person, it is 
necessarily embodied. 
The ego is "that part of the id which has been modified 
by the direct influences of the external world through the 
system of Pcpt.-Cs [perception-consciousness]. .the ego 
seeks to bring the influence of the external world to bear 
upon the id and its tendencies."7 The ego comes into 
existence so that the organism can mediate between itself 
and the external world. While the id has no awareness of 
the external world, the ego, through perception and 
consciousness, is able to take in and process information 
from the external world: "For the ego, perception plays the 
part which in the id falls to instinct. 118 The ego moves 
into and negotiates through the world of objective reality. 
While the id operates solely on the basis of the "pleasure 
7Ibid., 15. 
8Ibid. 
principle," the ego obeys the "reality principle. 119 The 
pleasure principle is the immediate gratification of 
instinctual needs, while the reality principle is the 
sublimation of instincts into socially acceptable behavior 
that conforms to the conventional expectations of parents, 
authority figures, and society in general. 
The ego, which is partly conscious and partly uncon-
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scious, is the site of the rational part of the mind. It is 
the ego that is responsible for the self-preservation of the 
person. It contains the capacity to calculate, plan, 
execute action, common sense and reason. 10 While the ego is 
the locus of rationality, it is, "ultimately derived from 
bodily sensations, chiefly from those springing from the 
surface of the body. It may thus be regarded as the mental 
projection of the surface of the body .... besides 
representing the superficies of the mental apparatus. 1111 
Here we see another aspect of Freud's disruption of the 
traditional Enlightenment concept of self. The part of the 
mind which is responsible for rationality has an embodied, 
relational character, which is in stark contrast to the 
disengaged, disembodied subject employed by thinkers such as 
9For a discussion of the reality principle and the pleasure 
principle see Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 
trans. and ed. James Strachey, with an Introduction by Peter Gay 
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1961), 14, 26-29. 
1
°Freud, Ego and Id, 15. 
11Freud, Ego and Id, 16 nt 1. 
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oescartes. 
Another striking element of Freud's discussion of the 
rational element, which has implications for postmodern 
feminist theory, is that it is inseparable from the irra-
tional. According to Freud, "The ego is not sharply sepa-
rated from the id; its lower portion merges into it. " 12 
with this we get to one of the most important, radical, and, 
I think, most useful elements of Freud's thinking. Our 
subjective position is not a stable, rule-governed, wholly 
logical and rational position providing a solid foundation 
from which we can theorize. Rather it is inextricably bound 
to the unconscious and irrational as well as to the body and 
to the psycho-social aspects of our present culture. Within 
this context the ability to think objectively and in a 
"purely" rational fashion becomes a rather messy project. 
To further complicate this issue, the ego's position, 
according to Freud, is precarious. Freud writes, 
We see this ... ego as a poor creature owing 
service to three masters and consequently menaced 
by three dangers: from the external world, from 
the libido of the id, and from the severity of the 
super-ego. 13 
The final part of the mind to develop is the superego. 
The superego is both a biological and a cultural construct. 
If we consider ... the origin of the super-ego as 
we have described it, we shall recognize that it 
12Freud, Ego and Id, 14. 
13Ibid., 46. 
is the outcome of two highly important factors, 
one of a biological and the other of a historical 
nature: namely, the lengthy duration in man of his 
childhood helplessness and dependence, and the 
fact of his Oedipus complex. • . . We see then, 
that the differentiation of the super-ego from the 
ego is no matter of chance; it represents the most 
important characteristics of the development both 
of the individual and of the species; indeed, by 
giving permanent expression to the influence of 
the parents it perpetuates the existence of the 
factors to which it owes its origin. 14 
The superego is fundamentally a social construction. 
It is the internalized representation of the authority 
structures operating in society. (A fundamental structure 
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which is internalized during development of the superego is 
patriarchy, though Freud himself seems not to have realized 
this.) 
The superego is the internalized representative of 
parents and other authority figures. It is the moral aspect 
of the mind and is responsible for our conscious and 
unconscious feelings of guilt. The superego represents 
society's interest in maintaining social order. It should 
be noted that patriarchy is a basic assumption in the 
development of the superego, for as Freud says, "The super-
ego arises, as we know, from an identification with the 
father taken as a model. 1115 
The superego is developed as a resolution of the 
14Ibid., 25. 
15Ibid., 44. 
Oedipus complex. Freud's basic theory of the Oedipus 
complex differs significantly for boys and girls. In this 
section I will discuss the Oedipus complex in boys, which 
Freud takes as the "standard" model. For boys, "an 
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ambivalent attitude to his father and an object-relation of 
a solely affectionate kind to his mother make up the content 
of the simple. . . Oedipus complex in a boy. 1116 The boy's 
primary attachment is to his mother, and he sees his father 
as a threat to his relationship to his mother. The fact 
that the boy has intense sexual feelings towards his mother 
makes him aggressive towards his father, for he sees his 
father as a competitor for his mother's affection. In order 
to successfully resolve this conflict, the boy must switch 
his primary attachment from his mother and begin to identify 
with his father. Since the boy is attracted to his mother, 
he fears that his father will know this and try to harm him. 
He fears, in fact, that his father will castrate him. The 
key to the successful resolution to the Oedipus complex in 
boys, according to Freud, 
is the discovery of the possibility of castration, 
as proved by the sight of the female genitals, 
which forces on him the transformation of his 
Oedipus complex, and which leads to the creation 
of his super-ego and thus initiates all the 
processes that are designed to make the individual 
16Ibid. I 22. 
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find a place in the cultural community. 17 
This fear of castration leads to a repression of the sexual 
feelings for the mother and those of hostility and 
aggression towards the father. These feelings are 
transformed into an identification with the father. The boy 
notices that he, like the father, has a penis, and therefore 
that he, like his father, is a man. The resolution of the 
Oedipus complex is an internalization of the father's 
authority, and the creation of the superego. Freud holds 
that the superego while later modified by the 
internalization of other authority figures, maintains the 
character of the father. 18 It should be noted that the 
resolution of the Oedipus complex and the formation of the 
superego are the boy's initiation into patriarchy, and 
indeed into misogyny. "One thing that is left over in men 
from the influence of the Oedipus complex is a certain 
amount of disparagement in their attitude towards women, 
whom they regard as being castrated. 1119 
Freud's structural model of the mind poses important 
challenges to Enlightenment concepts of subjectivity. In 
introducing the notion that the mind is not a fully self-
17Sigmund Freud, "Female Sexuality, 11 in The Standard Edition of 
The Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud vol XXI, trans. 
James Strachey (London: The Hogarth Press, 1961), 229. 
18Freud, Ego and Id, 24. 
19Freud, "Female Sexuality," 229. 
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present rational entity, he has significantly disputed the 
traditional philosophical concept of subjectivity. His 
model is one which conceives of the self as non-unitary, 
with a large irrational and unconscious component. For 
Freud the self is fundamentally an embodied entity, and 
therefore gendered. Another essential dimension of the self 
for Freud is its social construction. According to his 
model, the self is developed over time. Although Freud does 
not stress this fact--indeed he sometimes writes as if his 
model is timeless and universal--it is easy to see, given 
the importance Freud places on family structure and 
authority figures, that the socio-historical context in 
which it develops is crucial. From a postmodern feminist 
perspective these are valuable contributions to an analysis 
of subjectivity. A problematic aspect of his model, 
however, is that it is excessively biologistic. Throughout 
he assumes the male model to be normative and arrives at 
some troubling conclusions regarding women. In the next 
section I will examine Freud's analysis of the Oedipus 
complex in girls and his discussion of the construction of 
female sexuality. 
Female Sexuality and Gender Construction 
According to Freud it is more difficult for girls to 
overcome the Oedipus complex than it is for boys. This 
difference is significant, since it is the resolution of the 
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Oedipus complex that leads to the development of the 
superego and thus to the child's being able to fully 
participate in society. "The development of a little girl 
into a normal woman is more difficult and more complicated, 
since it includes two extra tasks, to which there is nothing 
corresponding in the development of a man. 1120 These two 
extra steps involve the girl switching her primary erotic 
zone from the clitoris to the vagina, and switching from the 
mother to the father as the primary object of desire. 21 
Just as the boys resolution of the Oedipus complex is 
initiated with his fear of castration, this is the same in 
girls, but without the positive results. While the boy 
resolves his Oedipus feelings by identifying with the father 
and internalizing his father's values and thus integrating 
himself into society, the girl cannot come to this same 
conclusion: 
Quite different are the effects of the castration 
complex in the female. She acknowledges the fact 
of her castration, and with it, too, the 
superiority of the male and her own inferiority; 
but she rebels against this unwelcome state of 
affairs. 22 
It is important to note that Freud thinks that such 
rebellion can easily lead to neurosis or an "abnormal" 
20Sigmund Freud, "Femininity," in New Introductory Lectures on 
Psycho-analysis in The standard Edition of the Complete 
Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud vol. XXII, ed. and trans. 
James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press, 1965), 117. 
nFreud, "Female Sexuality," 225. 
22Freud, "Female Sexuality," 229. 
masculinity complex. 
The discovery that she is castrated is a turning-
point in a girl's growth. Three possible lines of 
development start from it: one leads to sexual 
inhibition or to neuroses, the second to change of 
character in the sense of a masculinity complex, 
the third, finally, to normal femininity. 23 
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The little girl thus begins her journey into adulthood with 
the knowledge that she is inferior since "her self-love is 
mortified by the comparison with the boy's far superior 
equipment. " 24 According to Freud, this recognition of her 
lack of the coveted penis can have three possible outcomes 
in the adult women. She may cease her sexual desire 
entirely, and thus become frigid, she may defiantly over-
emphasize her masculinity (often leading to lesbianism); or 
she may take the first steps toward definitive femininity by 
accepting her father as a primary love object and become 
more passive sexually. 25 Ultimately, however, a woman does 
not become "normal" until she has a baby, and preferably a 
boy. 
The wish with which the girl turns to her father 
is no doubt originally the wish for the penis 
which her mother has refused her and which she now 
expects from her father. Their feminine situation 
is only established, however, if the wish for a 
penis is replaced by one for a baby, if, that is, 
a baby takes the place of a penis[.]M 
23Freud, "Femininity," 126. 
24Ibid. 
25Freud, "Female Sexuality," 229. 
26Freud, "Femininity," 128. 
Freud continues, 
A mother is only brought unlimited satisfaction by 
her relation to a son; this is altogether the most 
perfect, the most free from ambivalence of all 
human relationships. A mother can transfer to her 
son the ambition which she has been obliged to 
suppress in herself, and can expect from him the 
satisfaction of all that has been left over in her 
of her masculinity complex. Even a marriage is 
not made secure until the wife has succeeded in 
making her husband her child as well and in acting 
as a mother to him.n 
The fact that a girl resolves her Oedipus complex 
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differently from a boy has far-reaching social consequences. 
According to Freud, 
In the absence of fear of castration the chief 
motive is lacking which leads boys to surmount the 
Oedipus complex. Girls remain in it for an 
indeterminate length of time; they demolish it 
late and, even so, incompletely. In these 
circumstances the formation of the super-ego must 
suffer; it cannot attain strength and independence 
which give it its cultural significance, and 
feminists are not pleased when we point out to 
them the effects of this factor upon the average 
feminine character 28 
This account, we observe, is exceedingly biologistic. 
Freud insists that he is only being scientific. In opening 
his discussion of female sexuality and of the Oedipus 
Complex Freud writes that he is, "bring[ing] forward nothing 
but observed facts, almost without any speculative 
nibid., 133-134. 
28Freud, "Femininity," 129. For similar attacks on feminists 
and any others who claim that women and men are equal see 
"Femininity," 116, 129; "Female Sexuality," 230 nt 1. 
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additions. " 29 But clearly there is more going on here than 
just careful attention to "observed facts." And Freud 
himself knows this, for later in the same essay he writes, 
"If you . . . regard my belief in the influence of the lack 
of a penis on the configuration of femininity as an idee 
fixe, I am of course defenseless. 1130 Thus Freud is 
admitting to being defenseless at one of the most crucial 
junctures in his thought. Almost his entire theory about 
the roles of women and men in society depend precisely on 
this idee fixe of Freud's, yet, while he finds it an 
important enough idea on which to base his theory of 
sexuality, he cannot provide an argument to defend this 
position. Freud's theory of gender formation depends on the 
basic assumption that men, simply by virtue of possessing a 
penis, are superior to women. And because men have this 
biological attribute, it follows that they are better suited 
to running society, which is the basic assumption of 
patriarchy in Freud's work. 
So when Freud says that he is bringing nothing forward 
but the observed facts and not making any speculations, it 
is essential to notice the context within which he observes 
these facts. The context is an implicit assumption that 
patriarchy is the natural, and in fact the only possible, 
3 Freud, "Femininity," 113. 
30Ibid. I 132. 
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structure of society. In developing his theory of 
sexuality, which is inseparable from his theory of 
subjectivity (since all subjects are embodied and the 
various aspects of the mind are, as has been shown, 
inextricably bound to both the body and to the culture, past 
and present), Freud is incapable of escaping the confining 
theoretical framework of patriarchy and misogyny. 
Nowhere in this detailed discussion of the construction 
of gender identity does Freud provide an argument to support 
his contention that the girl's "equipment is inferior" or 
that having a penis is in itself something to be desired. 
While he provides some interesting ideas about the social 
construction of gender identity (for example, in observing 
that gender identity is not something given from birth, and 
in thinking about what it means for a child to think of 
herself or himself as a girl or a boy) his theory ultimately 
rests on a biological determinism that is not argued for or 
supported. 
Many feminists have criticized Freud's treatment of 
female identity formation in general, and his concept of 
penis envy in particular. Simone de Beauvoir offers one 
such critique. In the Second Sex Simone de Beauvoir 
critiques the overall lack of philosophical justification in 
Freud's work. She points to Freud's lack of concern for the 
independent destiny of women, claiming that Freud simply 
adapted his account of the psycho-sexual development of 
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boys/men to that of girls/women without adequate theoretical 
support. Beauvoir maintains that Freud simply assumes, with 
no philosophic or scientific explanation, that "woman feels 
that she is a mutilated man." Beauvoir continues, 
Many psychoanalysts today admit that the young 
girl may regret not having a penis without 
believing, however, that it has been removed from 
her body; and even this regret is not general. It 
could not arise from a simple anatomical 
comparison; many little girls, in fact, are late 
in discovering the masculine construction, and if 
they do, it is only by sight. The little boy 
obtains from his penis a living experience that 
makes it an object of pride to him, but this pride 
does not necessarily imply a corresponding 
humiliation for his sisters, since they know the 
masculine organ in its outward aspect only--this 
outgrowth, this weak little rod of flesh can in 
itself inspire them only with indifference, or 
even disgust. 31 
Beauvoir's point is that Freud assumes the male model 
as normative and thus assumes girls, in comparing themselves 
to this normative model, feel abnormal or mutilated. Freud 
gives no consideration to the idea that boys, when comparing 
themselves to girls, might feel alarmed that they have an 
extra growth. This is because Freud always assumes the male 
body and male development to be standard and "normal". 
Beauvoir criticizes Freud for failing to account for the 
social origin (as opposed to a purely biological one) of 
male sovereignty.n 
31 Simone De Beauvoir, The Second Sex, trans. 
Parshley (New York: Vintage Books, 1989), 41. 
and ed. H.M. 
32Ibid. , 4 2 . 
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Throughout Freud's discussion of female sexuality, from 
the Oedipus complex to penis envy, he introduces "normality" 
as a normative concept that can (and is) used against women. 
This operates in two ways. First of all, permeating Freud's 
discussion of female sexuality is the basic idea that male 
psycho-social-sexual development proceeds along (and indeed 
establishes) the "normal" trajectory, while female 
development is "abnormal" in that it deviates from the male 
route. Male sexual development is put forth by Freud as the 
standard normative model, leaving females to be classified 
as "mutilated" deviants. Secondly, there is the notion of 
"normal" femininity, which, as we have seen, culminates 
successfully only when a woman becomes compliantly 
heterosexual and gives birth to a son. A woman who does not 
follow the prescribed path is not only "abnormal" in the 
neutral sense of being different, but in the clinical-
normative sense of having something wrong with her, and in 
need of treatment. 
Because girls/women cannot follow the regulative model 
of male sexuality Freud concludes that they often suffer 
from neurosis. But because Freud is so firmly entrenched in 
a patriarchal context, he demonstrates a blindness to the 
possibility that patriarchy is the cause of neurosis and 
should be changed. In Civilization and Its Discontents when 
Freud is discussing the etiology of neurosis he writes, 
It was discovered that a person becomes neurotic 
because he cannot tolerate the amount of 
frustration which society imposes on him in the 
service of its cultural ideals, and it was 
inferred from this that the abolition or reduction 
of those demands would result in a return to 
possibilities of happiness.n 
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Given this description of the etiology of neuroses it is not 
surprising that Freud found more women then men "neurotic". 
What is surprising is that Freud himself shows a remarkable 
lack of insight about how patriarchy and misogyny are 
factors in the formation of this neurosis. In his 
discussion of female sexuality, Freud states that a woman 
can only feel complete and obtain happiness if she has a 
male child so that she can possess the coveted penis. Freud 
remarks that with a male child, "a mother can transfer to 
her son the ambition which she has been obliged to suppress 
in herself." It seems important to ask why is such a 
suppression demanded at all. Freud does not seem to think 
this an issue in need of explanation. Might the explanation 
be that it is patriarchal society, which does not allow the 
full participation of women in the public sphere, that 
demands the suppression and sublimation of women's ambition 
into socially acceptable behaviors such as raising children. 
If women were allowed to fully participate in the affairs of 
society, might this not result in "the return to the 
possibility of happiness." Therefore, rather than having 
male children and suppressing their ambitions, it seems that 
33Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 39. 
a more effective strategy for women to feel complete and 
avoid neurosis, even in Freud's own terms, would be the 
"abolition or reduction" of the demands of a patriarchal 
society on the submission of women. 
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According to Freud's model of female sexuality, women, 
because of their "abnormal" psycho-sexual development, are 
unable to fully participate in civilization. This is first 
articulated in his discussion of the superego. As we have 
seen, the superego is the result of the successful 
resolution of the Oedipus complex. The superego is 
important for a person to succeed within society, since it 
is the superego that allows people to "find a place in the 
cultural community. " 34 The problem, of course, is that 
Freud has said that it is harder for girls to resolve the 
Oedipus complex and since successful resolution of the 
Oedipus complex is necessary in order to develop a strong 
superego, we can see that Freud will argue that women are 
not as able to participate fully in civilization. For Freud 
the superego "answers to everything that is expected of the 
higher nature of man. " 35 "Religion, morality, and a social 
sense" are to be found in people (men) because of their 
superego. 36 Thus he can confidently state, "It seems that 
34Freud, "Female sexuality," 229. 
35Freud, Ego and Id, 27. 
36Ibid. 
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women have made few contributions to the discoveries and 
inventions in the history of civilization."n 
Freud's theory of female sexuality, despite its obvious 
misogynist tone, still has much to offer to a postmodern 
feminist analysis. The major contribution Freud makes is 
his recognition that sexuality and gender identity are 
indeed constructed and multi-determined. Freud, however, 
does not examine how this construction takes place within 
existing socio-cultural power configurations, much less how 
his own theories are influenced and constructed within these 
same power dynamics. He tries to claim scientific 
legitimacy for his ideas, and maintains that they offer 
universal explanations, rather than recognizing them as 
culturally specific. What he does not examine, therefore, 
is how his own ideas are deeply rooted in patriarchal 
assumptions, and thus he is led to establish male sexuality 
as normative and male anatomy as the ideal. Ultimately his 
concept of gender as constructed is distorted and flawed by 
his biological determinism. By challenging this biological 
determinism with a more comprehensive examination of the 
effects of socialization, we can have a more complete 
picture of the development of gender and self.n 
nFreud, "Femininity," 132. 
38one way to subvert Freud's biological determinism is to 
examine the social construction of biology itself. on the social 
construction of biological facts, see Judith Butler Bodies That 
Matter: on the Discursive Limits of "Sex" (New York: Routledge, 
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Freud's Metanarrative of Civilization 
According to Freud's analysis in Civilization and Its 
Discontents no one can be truly happy in civilization, 
because civilization goes against our basic instinctual 
impulses--sexuality and aggression. These impulses, 
originating from the id, want immediate satisfaction. Freud 
calls this immediate gratification of our instinctual 
impulses "the pleasure principle." Civilization, however, 
demands that we sublimate our instinctual desires into 
socially acceptable behavior, what Freud terms "the reality 
principle." According to Freud no one is ever truly happy 
in civilization because the fundamental human impulse 
towards individual happiness is in opposition to the basic 
aim of civilization. In other words, within civilization 
there is always a conflict between the pleasure principle 
and the reality principle. 
In order to explain why individual happiness is 
antithetical to the demands of civilization, Freud 
constructs a theory as to the origin of civilization. 39 
Freud claims that the first acts of civilization were tool 
1993); Emily Martin The Woman in the Body: Cultural Analysis of 
Reproduction (Boston: Beacon Press, 1992). 
39Freud discusses 
following analysis I 
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usage, the building of dwellings, and the control over 
fire. 40 Of these, Freud maintains that the control over fire 
is most "extraordinary" and "unexampled". 41 He speculates 
that primal man had a habit of putting out fires by 
urinating on them. According to Freud this is both 
satisfaction of infantile desires and an engagement in a 
homosexual competition of sexual potency. Fire, says Freud, 
was originally thought of as phallic; indeed Freud says that 
there is, "no doubt about the originally phallic view taken 
of tongues of flame as they shoot upwards. 1142 Thus by 
urinating on the fire, men were engaging in a homosexual 
competitive activity-- the phallus of the man who put out 
the fire was more potent than the phallus of the fire. 
However, the first person to control his desire and not put 
out the fire, was able to gain an important advantage--he 
gains control over nature and makes use of the fire. 
While men conquered nature by refraining from 
micturating on fire, "woman had been appointed guardian of 
the fire which was held captive on the domestic hearth, 
because her anatomy made it impossible for her to yield to 
4
°Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 42. 
41 In a footnote Freud puts forth a conjecture about the role of 
fire in the origination of civilization, an idea he develops more 
in "The Acquisition and Control of Fire." 
42Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 42. 
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the temptation of this desire. "43 Freud maintains that there 
is a connection between, "ambition, fire and urethral 
eroticism." Freud concludes from this analysis that men are 
naturally more ambitious than women. 
Freud asserts that civilization first appears as an 
attempt to regulate social relationships. The decisive step 
in this process is the "replacement of the power of the 
individual by the power of the community. 1144 This institutes 
a form of order in which behavior is regulated by law, and 
no one is at the mercy of brute force. "The first requisite 
of civilization, therefore, is that of justice--that is, the 
assurance that a law once made will not be broken in favor 
of an individual. This implies nothing of the ethical value 
of such a law."~ The individual's claim for freedom and 
liberty is in conflict with the cultural claims of the group 
as a whole, and in order to maintain order, law is 
introduced. 46 
The first enactment of this crucial replacement of the 
power of the individual with the power of the community 
43Ibid., 43. 
44Ibid., 49. 
45Ibid. 
46This discussion of justice has many similarities to The 
Republic Book 2, in which Glaucon makes the case that justice is 
only an instrumental good. (Socrates, on the other hand, argues 
that justice is both an instrumental and an intrinsic good.) Freud 
himself clearly sees justice as an instrumental good. 
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takes place within the family. In the primitive family, 47 
the father had complete control and ruled without 
restriction. Above all, he had complete control over all 
the women, which he kept to himself. In order to limit the 
authority of the father, the sons banded together to 
overpower him, thus making the discovery "that a combination 
can be stronger than a single individual. "48 Freud 
continues, "The totemic culture is based on the restrictions 
which the sons had to impose on one another in order to keep 
this new state of affairs in being. The taboo observances 
were the first 'right' or ' law. ' " 49 In banding together to 
kill the father, a strong sense of fraternity developed, as 
well as a sense of guilt. Freud contends that this guilt, 
resulting from this original act of patricide, continues to 
be stored in our unconscious and is often expressed in 
religious rituals. 
This initial act of patricide marked the transition 
from the primitive family (or primal horde) to civilization. 
According to Freud, civilization comes about because man 
wanted woman--or, as Freud calls it, "his sex object"--
available to him on demand, and woman wanted to be with her 
47In Civilization and Its Discontents Freud refers to this as 
the "primitive family" where elsewhere, such as in Totem and Taboo, 
he speaks of this as the "primal horde." 
48Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 55. 
49Ibid. 
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children. Thus he says that the "parents" of civilization 
are Eros and Ananke--Love and Necessity.~ 
Ultimately, however, civilization comes into conflict 
with the erotic or sexual love of a man and a woman. Erotic 
love is the relationship between two people, while 
civilization depends on the relationship between groups of 
people. This conflict between erotic love and civilization 
is expressed in the conflict between the family and the 
larger community. And it is this conflict that leads to 
women "retarding and restraining" the development of 
civilization. 
Women .... in the beginning, laid the foundations 
of civilization by the claims of their love. 
Women represent the interests of the family and of 
sexual life. The work of civilization has become 
increasingly the business of men, it confronts 
them with ever more difficult tasks and compels 
them to carry out instinctual sublimations of 
which women are little capable. 51 
Freud claims that men have only a limited amount of 
libidinal energy, which they must distribute between 
civilization (culture), and women. The more a man uses his 
libidinal energy for the works of civilization, the less 
energy he has for his family; consequently, "woman finds 
herself forced in the background by the claims of 
50Ibid. 
51 Ibid. I 59. 
civilization and then adopts a hostile attitude towards 
it."ll 
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In the previous discussion of the Oedipus complex and 
the consequent development in woman of a weaker superego, we 
saw the precursor to this analysis. Freud claims that 
because women are not as capable as men of sublimation, or 
channeling their libidinal energy into socially acceptable 
activities, they are not capable of fully participating in 
that civilization. 
This Freudian metanarrative regarding the origins of 
civilization has, at its foundation, numerous problematic 
assumptions. In almost all places his analysis is gendered 
and either based on, or relates back to, his analysis of the 
sexual differences between males and females. Freud applies 
his analysis of penis envy and the Oedipus complex to his 
analysis of civilization. The lack of a penis is the reason 
why women are unable to fully participate in civilization, 
because it is the lack of a penis which ultimately leads to 
women developing weak superegos, and their inability to 
successfully sublimate libidinal desires. In Civilization 
and Its Discontents Freud goes so far as to say women 
"retard" and "restrain" the development of civilization.~ 
Freud's conception of the origin of civilization is built on 
llibid. 
~Ibid. 
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his assumption of traditional gender roles, i.e. that men 
want sex and women want to be with their children. He never 
questions these traditional ideas about sex roles. He 
doesn't propose that women might want sexual satisfaction or 
that men might want to be near their children. Like Engels, 
Freud's metanarrative presumes a sexual division of labor. 
Women remain in the home and take care of the children, 
while men work outside the home. Like so many of his basic 
assumptions, he never examines, argues for, or explains this 
one. He just takes it as his implicit starting point. 
Freud, like Engels, tries to take seriously the latest 
findings (in his time) of anthropology. He justifies his 
primal horde myth by citing Darwin: "Darwin deduced from the 
habits of the higher apes that men, too, originally lived in 
comparatively small groups or hordes within which the 
jealousy of the oldest and strongest male prevented sexual 
promiscuity. 1154 This Darwinian thesis, however, is generally 
considered false by contemporary anthropologists and 
biologists. According to Peter Gay, "the conjectures of 
Darwin and others about the prehistoric horde governed 
autocratically by a polygamous and monopolitic male did not 
stand up well to further research. Freud's stirring 
portrayal of that lethal fraternal rebellion against 
~The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, vol. XIII, Totem and 
Taboo (London: Hogarth Press, 1964), 125. 
81 
patriarchy seemed increasingly implausible. 1155 
Freud, while critical of Lamarck, was at the same time 
strongly influenced by him. Freud believed that a 
primitive, originary patricide was reenacted over and over 
again during early human history and that each male, even 
now, has "stored this phylogenetic legacy in his 
unconscious, including the resulting sense of collective 
guilt over the primal crime. 1156 Contemporary biology 
disputes this latter contention. Developmental biology has 
shown that acquired traits cannot be genetically passed on 
from one generation to the next. 57 
In addition to the factual inconsistencies in the 
Freudian metanarrative, we should also note that its overall 
import is deeply pessimistic about the possibility for human 
happiness, now or ever. For Freud any organized society 
runs counter to individual happiness. 
The two urges, the one towards personal happiness 
and the other towards union with other human 
beings must struggle with each other in every 
individual; and so, also, the two processes of 
55Peter Gay, Freud: A Life For Our Time (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1988), 333. 
56The standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, trans. and ed. James Strachey, vol. XXIII, Moses and 
Monotheism: Three Essays,132 as quoted in Adolf Grunbaum, 
Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis (Madison: 
International Universities Press, 1993), 277. 
57For discussions of the anthropological basis of Freud's 
conjecture on the beginning of civilization see: Grunbaum, 
Validation in the Clinical Theory of Psychoanalysis, 276-277; Peter 
Gay, Freud: A Life for our Time, 332-335. 
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individual and of cultural development must stand 
in hostile opposition to each other. . 58 
Because of how he conceives subjectivity--as inherently 
egoistic and as striving toward individual satisfaction--he 
cannot see this subject as happy within the context of any 
society. 
It is important to notice that for Freud it is 
individual happiness which is emphasized. In contrast to 
Marx, Freud does not think that it is natural to have a 
communal sense or "species being". The fact that he sees 
the individual as 'egoistic' influences his idea of social 
intervention. For him the individual cannot be happy in any 
type of civilization because "the main aim of individuals is 
'egoistic' or the urge toward happiness, while the main 
emphasis in the development of civilization is 'altruist' or 
the urge towards union with others in the community. 1159 
Thus he has no concept of political intervention in the 
sense that Marx does, that individuals can come together and 
overthrow a repressive regime and bring about a society that 
is more conducive to human growth. 60 
It would seem that Freud forecloses all possibility for 
meaningful intervention that would increase human happiness, 
58Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 106. 
59Ibid. I 105. 
~arx and Freud also have very different views regarding work 
(Civilization and Its Discontents, 55) and private property 
(Civilization and Its Discontents, 70-71). 
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since he sees civilization as inherently restrictive of 
individual happiness. He does, however, offer a curious 
idea for political intervention at the end of Civilization 
and Its Discontents. After discussing the similarities and 
differences between the individual and the cultural super-
ego, Freud suggests: 
If the development of civilization has such a far-
reaching similarity to the development of the 
individual and if it employs the same methods, may 
we not be justified in reaching the diagnosis 
that, under the influence of cultural urges, some 
civilizations, or some epochs of civilization-
possibly the whole of mankind- have become 
•neurotic'? An analytic dissection of such 
neuroses might lead to therapeutic recommendations 
which could lay claim to great practical interest. 
I would not say that an attempt of this kind to 
carry psycho-analysis over to the cultural 
community was absurd or doomed to be fruitless. 61 
Here we have Freud suggesting that some societies 
(one presumes he is speaking of our own) have become 
excessive in their repression of sexuality, and hence might 
be able to relax some of their restrictions, making them 
less neurotic. Still and all, changes of this nature cannot 
be expected to make to large a difference. 
overall the Freudian metanarrative of civilization is 
highly conservative: the group is bound to assume ascendancy 
over the individual;~people will never really be happy--so 
61Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, 109-110. 
62Again a comparison with Marx's more optimistic vision is in 
order: for Marx real individuality is enhanced, not crushed, in a 
truly human society. 
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why try? The best he can do is suggest that certain 
societies might themselves be neurotic. Most importantly 
Freud's metanarrative seems particularly oppressive to 
woman, since it posits women as relatively incapable of 
participating fully in the world of politics and work, given 
their limited capability for the instinctual sublimations 
upon which civilization is based. 
Freud's theories, for all their flaws, do hold some 
value for a postmodern feminist political praxis. His 
concept of the self--as decentered, divided, embodied, with 
a significant irrational component--undermines the 
Enlightenment idea that the self is primarily a self-
reflective rational agent. His concept of the unconscious 
challenges the Enlightenment idea of knowledge, in that it 
shows that fully transparent reason is not possible. He 
introduces the idea that the self is heterogeneous and 
multidetermined. According to his analysis both the self 
and gender are constructed by complex forces. 
Ultimately, however, Freud's theories are deeply 
flawed. He attempts to establish the male model of psycho-
sexual development as universal and normative. In 
attributing universality to his concepts of self and 
sexuality, he consistently ignores the fact these concepts 
are gender specific and culturally and historically 
relative. And because he himself is oblivious to the over-
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arching patriarchal dimensions of his analysis, he is blind 
to the possibility of radically altering patriarchal 
structures. 
Chapter Three 
Foucault 
Michel Foucault's postmodern philosophy criticizes 
both Marx and Freud for creating "global, totalitarian 
theories. " 1 He thinks that both Marx and Freud offer 
totalizing metanarratives of the subject and of history that 
obscure the operation of power. 2 There is no concept in 
Foucauldian philosophy more basic than power. According to 
Foucault the subject is constituted within various matrices 
of power. For Foucault there is no subject position outside 
of these fields of power. If his conception of power is 
correct, it becomes necessary to reconceive strategies of 
1Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin 
Gordon, trans. Gordon et. al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1980), 80. For a discussion of Foucault's concept of 
totalizing theory as it relates to Marx and Freud, see Jana 
Sawicki, Disciplining Foucault: Feminism, Power, and the 
Body (New York: Routledge, 1991), 51-53; Barry Smart,"The 
Politics of Truth and the Problem of Hegemony," in Foucault: 
A Critical Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (London: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986), 157-173; Barry Smart, Foucault, Marxism 
and Critique (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1983), 
especially 162-167; see also Paul Rabinow Introduction to 
The Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1984), 4 and 7. 
2For a discussion of totalizing metanarratives see 
Jean-Francios Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984). 
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political intervention. The revolutionary model described 
by Marx is inadequate in terms of this reconception of 
power. Other forms of resistance must be given more 
prominence. 
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In this chapter I will first examine Foucault's 
critique of Marx and the problem of globalizing discourse. 
Next I will discuss the genealogical method, which Foucault 
presents as an alternative to such discourses. I will then 
examine Foucault's discussion of the repressive hypothesis 
and his critique of Freud. After analyzing Foucault's 
critique of Marx and Freud, I will look at Foucault's 
alternative conception of power and of truth and how this 
relates to his concept of constructed subjectivity. I will 
examine how his reconceptualization of power, truth, and 
subjectivity informs his idea of political resistance. 
Finally, I will defend Foucault against an important 
criticism levelled against him by Nancy Fraser. 
Foucault's Critique of Globalizing Discourse 
Much of the literature on Marx and Freud is comprised 
of various scholars arguing whether or not these theories 
are really scientific. Scholars try to prove that a 
discourse such as Marxism or psychoanalysis qualifies as 
"scientific" in order to appeal to the status and authority 
of science to legitimate the knowledge and truth established 
by these discourses. Other scholars challenge the 
scientific status of the theories in order to deny them such 
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legitimacy. Foucault claims that in order to establish a 
discourse as scientific, however, an artificial continuity 
is imposed by including certain forms of knowledge and 
excluding others. The narrative structure enforced by these 
globalizing discourses is one which imposes a rigid, linear 
analysis that subsumes all theoretical and practical issues 
under a single rubric of knowledge. 3 Foucault therefore 
maintains that debating the scientific status of a Marxism 
or psychoanalysis is the wrong issue to address. Indeed, 
the very fact that such an issue is raised is indicative of 
the problem with scientific discourse. The question 
Foucault asks, as a genealogist, is why do these discourses 
want to be recognized as scientific? 
I would remind you how numerous have been those 
who for many years now, probably for more than 
half a century, have questioned whether Marxism 
was, or was not, a science .... the same issue 
has been posed ... in the case of psycho-
analysis. . . . But to all these demands of: 'Is 
it or is it not a science?', ... the genealogist 
would reply: 'If you really want to know, the 
fault lies in your very determination to make a 
science out of Marxism or psychoanalysis ... '· 
If we have any objection against Marxism, it lies 
in the fact that it could effectively be a 
science. (I]t is surely necessary to question 
ourselves about our aspir-ations to the kind of 
power that is presumed to accompany such a 
science. It is surely the following kinds of 
questions that would need to be posed: What types 
of knowledges do you want to disqualify in the 
very instant of your demand: 'Is it a science'? 
Which speaking, discoursing subjects--which 
subjects of experience and knowledge--do you then 
3According to Foucault Marxism is the metanarrative of 
wealth and economics and Freudian psychoanalysis is the 
metanarrative of sexuality. 
want to 'diminish' when you say: 'I who conduct 
this discourse am conducting a scientific 
discourse, and I am a scientist: Which 
theoretical-political avant garde do you want to 
enthrone in order to isolate it from all the 
discontinuous forms of knowledge that circulate 
about it?4 
To proclaim that a certain discourse is scientific is 
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to claim that it is distinguishable as a unified, rational, 
continuous, hierarchized discourse. According to Foucault, 
in order to establish such discourses, one ignores the 
myriad discontinuous, "illegitimate" discourses which also 
occupy the terrain of knowledge. The proclamation that a 
discourse is scientific is, according to Foucault, an 
attempt to bestow authoritarian power upon certain types of 
knowledge. When certain discourses are seen as 
authoritarian, the truth that they proclaim is legitimated 
and becomes hegemonic. The truth of the unauthorized, 
discontinuous discourses is then seen as illegitimate and 
subordinate. These illegitimate discourses are thus 
marginalized. In order to establish a discourse as 
scientific, therefore, knowledge is unnecessarily delimited 
and truth circumscribed, which is why Foucault states that, 
"the attempt to think in terms of totality has in fact 
proved a hindrance to research."5 
4Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/Knowledge: 
Selected Interviews & Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin 
Gordin, trans. Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1980) I 84-85. 
5Ibid. I 81. 
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It is important to note that it is not the "scientific 
method" to which Foucault objects, nor does he rule out all 
science as illegitimate. What he is above all concerned to 
call into question is the pretence that "science" is neutral 
and unaffected by the operations of power. This problem is 
particularly acute when what is claiming to be science is a 
totalizing metanarrative: 
We are concerned ... with the insurrection of 
knowledges that are opposed primarily not to the 
contents, methods or concepts of a science, but to 
the effects of the centralizing powers which are 
linked to the institution and functioning of an 
organized scientific discourse within a society 
such as ours. Nor does it basically matter all 
that much that this institutionalization of 
scientific discourse is embodied in a university, 
or, more generally, in an educational apparatus, 
in a theoretical-commercial institution such as 
psychoanalysis or within the framework of ref-
erence that is provided by a political system such 
as Marxism; for it is really against the effects 
of the power of a discourse that is considered to 
be scientific that the genealogy must wage its 
struggle. 6 
A major problem with totalizing metanarratives is that any 
position which challenges the authority of such a narrative 
is either subsumed into the sameness of the totalizing 
discourse or is ignored as being illegitimate. According to 
Foucault, there is a hierarchy to knowledges, and within 
this structure, the totalizing narratives such as 
Enlightenment rationality, Marxism, and psychoanalysis, are 
given a privileged status leaving alternative narratives 
6Ibid., 84. 
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(such as feminism) marginalized. 7 
What Foucault objects to about totalizing 
metanarratives that claim scientific status is the operation 
of power which legitimizes certain truths. The power 
operation within the scientific discourse is the top down 
juridico-discursive model of power. Truth is said to 
emanate from these authoritative metanarratives. What is 
characteristic of the theories of both Marx and Freud is 
that they fit many disparate concepts under the rubric of 
their respective theories. What Foucault is interested in 
exposing through his genealogical critique is both what is 
left out of these narratives, and what truths are created. 
Genealogical Method 
Foucault's genealogical method involves an examination 
of how we get to where we are, but without any extrapolating 
into the future. This method is anti-causal in the sense 
that it tends to highlight sharp ruptures that could not 
have been predicted. Genealogy emphasizes discontinuity 
over continuity. Thus the Marxian dream of "a science of 
history" is debunked. To understand Foucault's use of the 
term "genealogy" it might be fruitful to think of the 
literal meaning of the word. When you trace a person's 
7of course Marxism is far more marginalized itself 
these days than when Foucault was writing about it. Marxism 
is no longer the official ideology of a world's superpower, 
of all of Eastern Europe, or of powerful Communist Parties 
in Western Europe. 
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genealogy, you come up with a list of ancestors--a linkage 
of the past with the present. But there is no narrative 
structure here, there is no "logic" to the development--and 
hence no way of extrapolating into the future. There is 
something random and accidental about a family tree--so and 
so happened to marry so and so, and they happened to have 
children, one of which then married so and so, etc. The 
lives of one's ancestors are not the precursors of your own, 
in the sense that they are leading up to yours, and receive 
their meaning from your life. The lives of each must be 
evaluated in her or his own terms. Foucault's genealogical 
method allows us to understand an institution or an epoch 
(including the present one) as related to the past, but 
without assuming that we are somehow the culmination of the 
past, or a stage on the way to something even better. 
Genealogy is anticausal (and so antideterministic, 
anti-reductive) and pays attention to marginal figures and 
knowledges. These later Foucault terms subjugated 
knowledges. 
[B]y subjugated knowledges one should understand . 
. . . namely, a whole set of knowledges that have 
been disqualified as inadequate to their task or 
insufficiently elaborated: naive knowledges, 
located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the 
required level of cognition or scientificity. I 
•.. believe that it is through the re-emergence of 
these low-ranking knowledges, these unqualified, 
even directly disqualified knowledges .... and 
which I would call a popular knowledge .. . 
. though it is far from being a general common 
sense knowledge, but is on the contrary a 
particular, local, regional knowledge, a different 
knowledge incapable of unanimity .... that it is 
through the re-appearance of this knowledge, of 
these local popular knowledges, these disqualified 
knowledges, that criticism performs its work. 8 
Foucault puts forth genealogy as an alternative to the 
tyranny of globalizing knowledges. 
What [genealogy] really does is to entertain the 
claims to attention of local, discontinuous, 
disqualified, illegitimate knowledges against the 
claims of a unitary body of theory which would 
filter, hierarchize and order them in the name of 
some true knowledge and some arbitrary idea of 
what constitutes a science and its objects. 9 
Genealogical critique reveals the power operating in the 
construction and maintenance of these metanarratives. It 
therefore serves as "traps, demands, challenges" to 
scientific discourses. Genealogy allows the emergence of 
these subjugated knowledges to disrupt the hegemony of 
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globalizing discourse. Part of the "tyranny of globalizaing 
discourses" is that they produce normative accounts of both 
truth and subjectivity. 
Repression, Truth, and Power 
One of the major ways to see how subjects are 
constructed through scientific discourse is to look at 
sexuality. As Foucault writes: 
[T]he project of a science of the subject has 
gravitated, in ever narrowing circles, around the 
question of sex. Causality in the subject, the 
unconscious of the subject, the truth of the 
subject in the other who knows, the knowledge he 
holds unbeknown to him, all this found an 
8Foucault, "Two Lectures," 82. 
9Ibid., 83. 
opportunity to deploy itself in the discourse of 
sex. Not, however, by reason of some natural 
property inherent in sex itself, but by virtue of 
the tactics of power immanent in this discourse. 10 
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According to Foucault the science of the subject begins with 
the question of sex. 11 It is in Foucault's discussion of 
sexuality, especially as it appears in his first volume of 
The History of Sexuality, that one can see how the subject 
is constructed through the interplay of power and knowledge, 
and how power produces truth. One of the reasons that the 
science of the subject begins with the question of sexuality 
is that, as Foucault states in an interview, "people are 
told that the secret of their truth lies in the region of 
their sex. " 12 What is particularly important about people's 
truth being linked to their sexuality is that this truth of 
one's sexuality is one that is revealed only through the 
intervention of expert discourses. One needs the expert 
then, be it the priest, the analyst, the teacher, to tell 
one what one's sexuality means and who one "really" is. 
Foucault begins his discussion in the first volume of 
The History of Sexuality with a discussion of the Repressive 
1
°Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume I: 
An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley ((New York: Vintage 
Books, 1978), 70. 
11See Alan Sheridan, Michel Foucault: The Will To Know 
(London: Tavistock Publications, 1980), 164-194, especially 
179. 
12Michel Foucault, "The Confession of the Flesh," in 
Power/Knowledge, 214. 
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Hypotheses. Foucault's analysis here represents a deep and 
original criticism of Freud, who was the first to give the 
term "repression" its current sexual connotation. 
According to Foucault the Repressive Hypotheses begins 
with the claim that the seventeenth century initiated an age 
of sexual repression that continues to this day. This 
hypotheses asserts that sex increasingly becomes something 
which one is forbidden to discuss, and that sexual behavior 
is severely curtailed. 
The repression of sexuality is linked to the 
development of capitalism. 
By placing the advent of the age of repression in 
the seventeenth century, after hundreds of years 
of open spaces and free expression, one adjusts it 
to coincide with the development of capitalism: it 
becomes an integral part of the bourgeois order .. 
A principle of explanation emerges after the 
fact: if sex is so rigorously repressed, this is 
because it is incompatible with a general and 
intensive work imperative. At a time when labor 
capacity was being systematically exploited, how 
could this capacity be allowed to dissipate itself 
in pleasurable pursuits, except in those .... that 
enabled it to reproduce itself? 13 
The political point drawn from the Repressive Hypotheses is 
that sex itself, and discourse on sex, are repressed, 
stifled and thus in need of liberation. Moreover, since 
sexual repression is linked to capitalism, the struggle for 
sexual "liberation'' is part of an even larger political 
13Foucault, History of Sexuality, 5-6. Foucault returns 
to this theme of linking the repressive hypothesis to the 
development of capitalism several times in the History of 
Sexuality, see 36-37, 114, 120. 
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struggle. Foucault, however, does not believe that it was 
the advent of capitalism that required the repression of a 
workers' sexuality so that the worker could use all of her 
or his energy for work. One of the reasons he disagrees 
with this is that controls on sexuality were strongest among 
the bourgeois, not among the working class. 14 
What most interests Foucault is the concept of power 
implicit in the Repressive Hypothesis. It is a repressive 
form of power, as opposed to a form of power that would 
produce something. When one talks of sex as being 
repressed, the assumption is that there is a true, natural 
sexuality that is being somehow stifled or distorted by 
various forms of power. Foucault argues that this is not 
the case. Rather, the various apparatuses of "repression"--
confession, schools, church, etc.--are in fact producing 
sex. He argues that what is supposedly repressing sex is 
actually creating it, and that there is no original 
sexuality that needs to be set free from the bonds of 
various discourses and acts of repression. 15 
14See Foucault, History of Sexuality, 120-121. 
15The idea of the Repressive Hypotheses has some 
important implications for feminist theory. There is much 
debate in feminist circles as to whether there is an 
essential element to female sexuality that serves to inform 
what it means to be a woman. Theorists who have this view 
see society as serving to repress female sexuality, and they 
see women's liberation lying in the free expression of 
female sexuality. on the other hand postmodern feminist, 
such as Judith Butler, do not think that there is an 
original sexuality which is in need of liberating. 
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Throughout The History of Sexuality Foucault attempts 
to discredit the Repressive Hypotheses. He does so by doing 
a genealogy of sexuality. He looks at how discourses of 
sexuality came about, how truth became linked with 
sexuality, and how a science of confessional practices was 
built. In doing this he undercuts the idea that there is 
any such thing as an original sexuality that is repressed. 
This analysis is part of his demonstration that the idea of 
an original essential subject is a false notion, for he 
continually links subjectivity and sexuality. 
According to the Repressive Hypothesis, sex becomes a 
question of truth; the truth of the subject is revealed 
through sexuality, specifically in how others interpret the 
sexuality of one who confesses her or his own sexuality. 
The essential point is that sex was not only a 
matter of sensation and pleasure, of law and 
taboo, but also of truth and falsehood, that the 
truth of sex became something fundamental, useful, 
or dangerous, precious or formidable: in short, 
that sex was constituted as a problem of truth. 16 
It was in the nineteenth century that sex and truth became 
most explicitly and consciously linked. We can see this 
linkage of truth and sex in the discourse of Freud. For 
Freud the major way of understanding the self is through 
understanding sexuality.u According to Freudian theory 
virtually all personality structures can be explained 
16Foucault, History of Sexuality, 56. 
17For Freud, as we have seen, sexuality is the major way 
to understand the whole of civilization. 
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through sexuality, but it is a sexuality that is not 
manifest. According to Freud, the energy force of the human 
being is the libido, which is sexual, but it is also largely 
unconscious. So not only is the truth of subjectivity to be 
found in sexuality, but much of sexuality is unconscious. 
The problem then becomes one of bringing what is unconscious 
to consciousness. This, according to Freud is the goal of 
psychoanalysis. Such a process requires both a patient, or 
analysand, and a psychiatrist, the analyst, or to put it 
into Foucault's words, a confession and an interpreter of 
that confession. 
For Foucault the link between truth and confession--a 
link strongly preserved in psychoanalysis--has far-reaching 
implications. "[I]t is in the confession that truth and sex 
are joined, through the obligatory and exhaustive expression 
of an individual secret. " 18 What is unique about the 
confession is that the individual produces the truth of her 
or himself through the narrative of confession, and this 
"truth" is then interpreted and confirmed by an outside 
"expert". Through this process discourse creates subjects. 
Subjects tell of themselves, and through this telling their 
subjectivity is entwined with the relations of power 
inherent in the discursive practice. Subjectivity is 
18Foucault, History of Sexuality, 61. 
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created through the discursive practice of confession. 19 
Foucault argues that, while the confession is supposed 
to be a way for an individual to get to the essential truth 
of her/himself and lay this bare, it is in fact the 
confessional practice that produces this truth, and 
constructs the individual. The sciences of confession, such 
as psychoanalysis, makes it seem as if there is a core self 
which is being brought forth through this confessional 
practice, whereas in fact confessional practices are 
producing subjects and truth. As Foucault writes, "The 
truthful confession was inscribed at the heart of the 
procedures of individualization by power."w This is a 
productive concept of power which produces both the subject 
and truth. 
What Foucault is trying to show is that the subject is 
necessarily defined within many power relationships, the 
confession being one of these. 
The obligation to confess is now relayed through 
so many different points, is so deeply ingrained 
19According to Foucault this practice of confession, 
which is then taken up by psychoanalysis, became prominent 
in the middle ages with the codification of the sacrament of 
penance by the Lateran Council in 1215. (History of 
Sexuality, 58.) 
"Confession" is by no means confined to religious 
rituals or psychotherapy. In the late twentieth century we 
see mass media magnifying confessional practices. Talk 
shows abound with confessions both of the "ordinary person" 
and of the celebrity. "Tell all" books have become 
increasingly popular. Politicians are confessing. Our 
society is one increasingly permeated by confession. 
2
°Foucault, History of Sexuality, 58-59. 
in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect 
of a power that constrains us; on the contrary, it 
seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret 
nature, 'demands' only to surface; that if it 
fails to do so, this is because a constraint holds 
it in place, the violence of a power weighs it 
down, and it can finally be articulated only at 
the price of a kind of liberation. 21 
When one is confessing, therefore, one feels as if one is 
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revealing the truth of one's being, the truth that has been 
repressed, and through the act of confession one is 
overcoming a repressive power that would keep one from the 
truth of oneself. Through the act of confession, therefore, 
one unveils the very truth of one's subjectivity. These, 
says Foucault, are traditional themes in philosophy: 
"Confession frees, but power reduces one to silence; truth 
does not belong to the order of power, but shares an 
original affinity with freedom ... " 22 It is precisely these 
traditional themes "which a 'political history of truth' 
would have to overturn by showing that truth is not by 
nature free--nor error servile--but that its production is 
thoroughly imbued with relations of power. 1123 
In this crucial statement Foucault challenges the 
conception of truth so deeply ingrained in Western 
philosophy. He is saying that the philosophical notion that 
truth is free of power, that it is somehow removed from the 
21 Ibid. I 60. 
22Ibid. 
23Ibid. 
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taint of power relationships, is a false one. Truth, 
according to Foucault, does not exist independently of human 
relationships and social practices in a universal 
metaphysical, metapolitical realm. There are no Platonic 
Forms nor any Cartesian grounds for apodictic certainty. 
Rather truth is something that is produced, and this 
production takes place within a terrain of various 
relationships of power. 
Foucault challenges the basis of traditional 
philosophy, which holds that truth is something which 
operates beyond the dynamics of power. It should be noted 
that the "truth" Foucault is talking about here is not what 
Anglo-American philosophers tend to think of as the problem 
of truth, namely the relationship between propositions and 
"facts," the sort of thing that occupies epistemologists and 
philosophers of science, but a different conception also 
inherent in Western philosophy, the "truth" of one's being 
or of one's society or of one's epoch, and the notion that 
if one can penetrate the world of appearances to grasp these 
"truths," that this is a step toward liberation. According 
to Foucault, there isn't any "true" nature that is being 
suppressed and that can serve as a foundation for ethical or 
political critique. 
Foucault is also challenging the Cartesian notion of 
subjectivity. He is saying that both truth and subjectivity 
are produced through power. Foucault urges us to reconceive 
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power. As he says, "'Sexuality' is far more of a positive 
product of power than power was ever repression of 
sexuality. I believe that it is precisely these positive 
mechanisms that need to be investigated, and here one must 
free oneself of the juridical schematism of all previous 
characterizations of the nature of power. 1124 
That power is productive and not merely repressive is a 
basic theme in much of Foucault's work In Power/knowledge, 
for example, he writes: 
But it seems to me that repression is quite 
inadequate of capturing what is precisely the 
productive aspect of power. In defining the 
effects of power as repression, one adopts a 
purely juridical conception of such power, one 
identifies power with a law which says no, power 
is taken above all as carrying the force of a 
prohibition. Now I believe that this is a wholly 
negative, narrow, skeletal conception of power, 
one which has been curiously widespread .... What 
makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is 
simply the fact that it doesn't only weigh on us 
as a force that says no, but that it traverses and 
produces things, it induces pleasure, forms 
knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be 
considered as a productive network which runs 
through the whole social body, much more than as a 
negative instance whose function is repression. 25 
Foucault calls the traditional form of power the 
juridico-discursive model of power. This is the model of 
power with which both Marx and Freud operate. In 
Disciplining Foucault Jana Sawicki gives a good summation of 
the three basic assumptions of this model of power. 
24Michel Foucault, "Truth and Power, " in 
Power/knowledge, 120-121. 
25Ib. d 119 1 • ' . 
1. Power is possessed (for instance, by the 
individuals in the state of nature, by a class, by 
the people) . 
2. Power flows from a centralized source form top 
to bottom (for instance, law, the economy, the 
state. 
3. Power is primarily repressive in its exercise 
(a prohibition backed by sanctions) . 26 
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This is the type of power that is assumed in the repressive 
hypothesis. It is then assumed that the practices of 
confession allow one to overcome this juridico-discursive 
model of power. Foucault's model of power is that of 
productive power. Sawicki summarizes productive power in 
this way: 
1. Power is exercised rather than possessed. 
2. Power is not primarily repressive, but 
productive. 
3. Power is analyzed as coming from the bottom 
up. 21 
According to this analysis of power as productive and 
omnipresent, nothing, including discourses of rationality 
and truth, is free of power. 
Subjectivity 
Adherents of Enlightenment philosophy tend to conceive 
of subjectivity as pertaining to a unified agent, a unified 
"self," acting within a horizon that is ultimately rational. 
As Jane Flax has observed, 
26sawicki, Disciplining Foucault, 20. 
27Ib' d 21 }. • I • 
In the modern West, being a self and subjectivity 
are inseparable. Hence our understandings of 
subjectivity are necessarily affected by the 
concept of self we adopt. Two views of the self 
have been dominant in post-seventeenth century 
Western cultures. One is the Cartesian concept of 
the self as an ahistoric, solid, indwelling entity 
that grounds the possibility of rational thought 
and in turn is accessible and transparent to such 
thought. The defining characteristic of this self 
is its ability to engage in abstract rational 
thought, including thought about its own thought. 
such thought is said to be undermined by the 
empirical, social or bodily experience of the 
thinker. The second view is the Humean-empirical 
one. In this view, the self and its knowledge are 
derived from sense experience. Any adequate 
account of subjectivity and thought must therefore 
be rendered in terms that can be expressed in, 
referred to or tested by intersubjectively 
transmissible empirical experience. 28 
Foucault's concept of subjectivity is, among other 
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things, a reaction to the cogito as conceived by Descartes. 
Cartesian philosophy establishes the cogito as an absolute 
foundation of knowledge. The cogito is a rational agent 
that is completely present to itself. As Descartes writes 
in his "Reply to the First Objections, ''I can affirm with 
certainty that there is nothing in me of which I am not in 
any way conscious.''~ The purpose of Descartes meditations 
is to establish a firm foundation for knowledge. The cogito 
is just such a foundation. Descartes thus moves from the 
knowledge of the cogito to knowledge of the external world. 
3 Jane Flax, "Multiples: On the Contemporary Politics of 
Subjectivity," Human Studies 16 (April 1993): 35. 
29The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. Elizabeth 
s. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, vol II, (London: Cambridge 
University Press, 1984), 13. 
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For Descartes knowledge of the self comes first. We then 
pass from knowledge of the self to knowledge of the external 
world. The existence of the cogito is not determined by or 
founded on the external world. The cogito is the foundation 
of knowledge. 
Like Descartes, Foucault also places an emphasis on the 
self. Unlike Descartes, however, Foucault does not see the 
self as establishing a foundation for knowledge. The 
directionality of Foucault's philosophy is the opposite of 
Descartes. For Descartes the existence of the cogito is 
independent of the material world, including, of course, the 
body (which is necessarily part of the material world) . For 
Foucault the self is necessarily imbedded in the material 
world and indeed constructed by the world. Descartes' 
methodology in establishing the foundation of the cogito is 
radical doubt. Through his method of radical doubt 
Descartes wants to establish an absolute foundation for 
knowledge. The method of radical doubt is a means of 
establishing a criterion of truth. The purpose of radical 
doubt is to establish an absolutely certain foundation for 
knowledge. 
Foucault's philosophy questions almost every aspect of 
Descartes' project. Foucault's method is, as we have seen, 
genealogical. His genealogical method is also a way of 
questioning "the conditions of possibility, modalities and 
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constitution of the 'objects' and domains 1130of knowledge and 
the self, but his approach is fundamentally different from 
Descartes'. For Foucault the self and his genealogical 
method are related as follows: 
one has to dispense with the constituent subject, 
to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, 
to arrive at an analysis which can account for the 
constitution of the subject within a historical 
framework. And this is what I would call 
genealogy, that is, a form of history which can 
account for the constitution of knowledges, 
discourses, domains of objects etc., without 
having to make references to a subject which is 
either transcendental in relation to the field of 
events or runs in its empty sameness throughout 
the course of history. 31 
Foucault's genealogical method requires that one look 
at how the self is constructed through history; one should 
not rely on the self as a foundation for knowledge. For 
Foucault, any concept of an unchanging, essential first 
principle is suspect. When Foucault says that we must 
"dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the 
subject itself," he is not saying that we no longer have an 
operative notion of subjectivity or that there is no subject 
of thought, or subject who can think and act. What he is 
saying is that we must "account for the constitution of the 
subject within a historical framework." This is not to say 
that one is to look at how the essential rational agent 
posited by Descartes evolves over time, or how our 
3
°Foucault, "Truth and Power," 116. 
31 Ibid., 117. 
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understanding of that subjectivity evolves over time. 
Rather Foucault's genealogical method, being one which goes 
from the outside world to the inner world, or from the 
material world to the subjective world, looks at how the 
subject is constructed in and through the material world--
specifically by the operation of the various power 
configurations that constitute the world. 
Unlike Descartes, Foucault does not think that we can 
appeal to a disengaged subject who can serve as the 
foundation for knowledge. His genealogical approach is a 
reaction to just such a concept of a foundational 
transcendental agent. Genealogy "can account for the 
constitution of knowledges, discourses, domains of objects 
etc., without having to make reference to a subject which is 
either transcendental in relation to the field of events or 
runs in its empty sameness throughout the course of 
history. 11 n Rather then looking for a certain foundation of 
knowledge, Foucault wants to examine how various forms of 
knowledge develop and become hegemonic. His examination of 
subjectivity follows the same pattern. 
While Foucault says he wants to "get rid of the subject 
itself," his analysis is focused on the idea of 
subjectivity. In "The Subject and Power,'' Foucault writes, 
"[W]hat has been the goal of my work during the last twenty 
years has been to create a history of the different modes by 
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which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects. 1133 
Foucault goes on to outline some of the major themes of his 
work and how they have been related to the question of 
subjectivity. "My work has dealt with three modes of 
objectification which transform human beings into 
subjects."M Notice from this wording, we see that for 
Foucault human beings are not automatically subjects, rather 
we become subjects through the process of socialization, of 
being inserted in, and defined by, the many power dynamics 
that make up our world. Our subjectivity is something that 
is inscribed on us from the outside, it is not an essential 
element of our nature that we learn through introspection. 
The first of the three modes of objectification of the 
modern subject is scientific classification. 
The first in the modes of inquiry which try to 
give themselves the status of sciences; for 
example, the objectivizing of the speaking subject 
in_grammaire generale, philology, and linguis 
tics ... the objectivizing of the productive 
subject, the subject who labors, in the analysis 
of wealth and economics ... the objectivizing of 
the sheer fact of being alive in natural history 
or biology. 35 
With these examples Foucault outlines a theme which we have 
already discussed. The natural and social sciences, 
33Michel Foucault, "The Subject and Power," Afterward in 
Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michel Foucault: Beyond 
Structuralism and Hermeneutics (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 208. 
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Foucault argues, are not value free objective discourses. 
Rather, they are totalizing narratives bisected by value 
judgments and power dynamics. It is through these 
scientific classifications that human beings gain knowledge 
of themselves, how they think, speak, act, relate, etc. 
By examining these ''scientific" disciplines from a 
genealogical perspective, Foucault shows that they are not 
completely autonomous coherent narratives dealing with 
universals of human social life, but rather that they are 
necessarily embedded in multiple and intersecting 
relationships of power, which prevent them from progressing 
logically, but rather cause them to undergo abrupt changes 
at specific historical junctures. As the disciplines 
through which we categorize human nature go through abrupt 
changes, so does our understanding of specific aspects of 
human nature. 
The second mode of objectifying the subject is what can 
be called "dividing practices". ''The subject is either 
divided inside himself or divided from others. This process 
objectivizes him. Examples are the mad and the insane, the 
sick and the healthy, the criminals and the 'good boys.'"~ 
These dividing practices are another way that social norms, 
communicated through scientific knowledges and practices, 
are inscribed on the individual. The discourses of science 
help to create categories through which we classify and 
~Ibid. 
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identity human beings. It is through this process that the 
subject is created. It is not that there are essential 
human differences, and human beings are then divided up 
according to these differences, but rather it is the 
knowledge we gain through various "scientific" discourses 
that we use to classify human beings. 
To give but one example, consider Foucault's discussion 
of the effect on (creation of) family and morality through 
the architecture of houses. 
(T]he house remains until the eighteenth century 
an undifferentiated space. There are rooms: one 
sleeps, eats, receives visitors in them, it 
doesn't matter which. Then gradually space 
becomes specified and functional. . . . The 
working-class family is to be fixed; by assigning 
it a living space with a room that serves as 
kitchen and dining-room, a room for the parents 
which is the place of procreation, and a room for 
the children, one prescribes a form of morality 
for the family. Sometimes ... you have a boys' 
and a girls' room.n 
The division of spaces leads to a division of people and to 
the creation of subjects. An important element in this 
discussion as well, is the creation of morality. Not only 
are subjects created through dividing practices, but so are 
concepts of morality. Sexual mores are created with the 
implementation of a separate space for boys and girls as 
well as for parents. A certain idea of family is created by 
this spacing, and a particular idea of sexuality. When boys 
and girls are separated into separate rooms, and adults and 
37Michel Foucault, "The Eye of Power, " in 
Power/knowledge, 148-149. 
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children are separated, the idea is constructed that boys 
and girls need to be divided, that they are different and 
that they should remain so, that things go on privately 
between boys and girls that neither should know about. And 
the same for the adults. Things go on between parents in 
the privacy of their room which children should not know 
about. 
What is important here is the idea that this separation 
of people through spatial arrangements is not according to 
some inherent element in subjects or according to some 
transcendent moral principle, but rather that the dividing 
practices themselves create both subjectivity and morality. 
What is at stake here is the operation of power through 
spaces. 
A whole history remains to be written of spaces 
which would at the same time be the history of 
powers . ... from the great strategies of geo-
politics to the little tactics of the habitat, 
institutional architecture from the classroom to 
the design of hospitals, passing via economic and 
political installations. It is surprising how 
long the problem of space took to emerge as a 
historico-political problem. Space used to be 
either dis-missed as belonging to 'nature'-that 
is, the given, the basic conditions, 'physical 
geography', in other words a sort of 'prehistoric' 
stratum; or else it was conceived as the 
residential site or field of expansion of peoples, 
of a culture, a language or a state.n 
The third mode of objectification of subjects is the 
38 b' d I 1 • , 149. 
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way human being turns him/herself into a subject. 39 The 
other two modes of objectifying the subject are passive. In 
the scientific discourses and in the dividing practices the 
subject itself is not active in its own creation. In this 
third mode the subject is active. One of the key elements of 
Foucault's discussion of this mode is that we gain knowledge 
of who we are by looking at discourses outside ourselves. 
In particular, for modern subjects, we try to find out who 
we are by learning what various experts, psychiatrists, 
biologists, etc., say we are. We then attempt to take this 
external knowledge and apply it to ourselves. We are 
separated from ourselves through lack of knowledge. 
Consequently we need the intervention of outside discourses 
and experts in order to get to know ourselves. The 
consequence is that we construct ourselves with the help of 
external "expert'' narratives about how we are supposed to 
be.~ In this way subjects partake of their own self-
39This is one of the few places in which Foucault refers 
to human beings as both male and female. Something that is 
lacking in this examination of subjectivity is the gender 
specific aspect of subject formation. Foucault's lack of 
discussion of gender in his discussion of subjectivity has 
been criticized by many feminist scholars. Some aspects of 
this critique will be examined in the following two 
chapters. 
·~ current example of this would be the proliferation 
of self-help books. One reads these books in order to find 
out how one is "supposed to be" or how one can fix oneself. 
Women's magazines in particular abound with experts telling 
women how to apply various knowledges to herself, such as 
knowledge of sexuality, fashion, emotions, and how she can 
then create herself according to these sanctioned normative 
standards. 
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formation. A subject position is constructed through these 
various knowledges that subjects rely on to understand 
themselves. While the subject thinks that there is an 
inherent self that these various practices such as 
confession and psychiatry may help her to understand or 
exhume, Foucault maintains that there is no original subject 
that these knowledges help us to understand, but rather that 
we construct ourselves in the process of applying knowledges 
to ourselves. 
Resistance 
Foucault makes an important contribution to political 
philosophy in that he shows that all relationships are 
relationships of power, and that all discourses are always 
already conducted within this terrain of power. There is no 
sacred realm which is free of these operations of power. 
What makes this important in terms of politics (and 
particular emancipatory politics) is that it opens up points 
of contestation and of resistance. Foucault's analysis of 
power, in showing that power goes from the bottom up, that 
power is everywhere, even in the very construction of truth, 
sexuality, and subjectivity, opens up these areas to 
politically engaged critique. Philosophy traditionally goes 
from the macro-level to the micro-level, from the 
metaphysics of truth down to its local and particular 
applications. Foucault argues that power relationships at 
the micro-level of society produce these macro-level 
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discourses; thus the political project is not to free truth 
from its contestation within power, but to expose the 
constructed hegemony of certain discourses which claim the 
authority of being true: "It's not a matter of emancipation 
truth from every system of power (which would be a chimera, 
for truth is already power) but of detaching the power of 
truth from the forms of hegemony, social, economic and 
cultural, within which it operates at the present time. 1141 
Some of Foucault's critics have maintained that because 
power is everywhere, there is little or no room for 
resistance.~ To the contrary the multiplicity of power 
relationships opens up the field of resistance, and it is in 
this that I find its greatest benefit for postmodern 
feminist emancipatory political praxis. Foucault writes: 
Where there is power, there is resistance, and 
yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is 
never in a position of exteriority in relation to 
power. . . . These points of resistance are 
present everywhere in the power network. Hence no 
single locus of great Refusal, no soul of revolt, 
source of all rebellions, or pure law of the 
revolutionary. Instead there is a plurality of 
resistances, each of them a special case; 
41 Foucault, "Truth and Power," 133. 
~See Sandra Bartky, "Foucault, Femininity, and 
Modernization of Patriarchal Power," in Femininity and 
Domination (New York: Routledge, 1990), 63-82; Susan Bordo, 
"Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Skepticism and Nancy 
Hartsock, "Foucault on Power: A Theory for Women?" both in 
Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda Nicholson {New York: 
Routledge, 1990), 133-175; Michael Walzer, "The Politics of 
Michel Foucault" and Barry Smart, "The Politics of Truth and 
the Problem of Hegemony" both in Foucault: A critical 
Reader, ed. David Couzens Hoy (London: Basil Blackwell, 
1986), 51-68, 157-173. 
resistances that are possible, necessary, 
improbable; others that are spontaneous, savage, 
solitary, concerted, rampant, or violent. 43 
In his essay "The Subject and Power" Foucault states much 
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the same thing, "[T)here is no relationship of power without 
the means of escape or possible flight. 1144 Once he has 
reconceptualized power, Foucault can open up the field of 
viable resistance. Marx's concept of power, as we have 
seen, suggests only the model of revolution, whereas 
Foucault's concept of power opens up the possibility for 
various acts of resistance--while at the same time not 
foreclosing the possibility of revolution. 
What Foucault's analysis points out is that resistance 
can take many forms at the same time. We can have local 
resistances as well as large scale resistances. What his 
analysis allows for, indeed demands, is multiple strategies 
of resistance, including the practices of our everyday life. 
Are there no great radical ruptures, massive 
binary divisions, then? Occasionally, yes. But 
more often one is dealing with mobile and 
transitory points of resistance, producing 
cleavages in a society that shift about, 
fracturing unities and effecting regroupings, 
furrowing across individuals themselves, cutting 
them up and remolding them, marking off 
irreducible regions in them, in their bodies and 
minds. 45 
While not dispensing with the idea of a revolution in the 
43Foucaul t, History of Sexuality, 9 6. 
44Foucault, "Subject and Power," 225. 
45Foucault, History of Sexuality, 95. 
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Marxian sense, Foucault's analysis opens up new avenues of 
resistance, such as that of reconceiving subjectivity. As 
we have seen, neither truth nor subjectivity are free of 
power relationships. It now becomes clear how Foucault's 
notion of subjectivity is related to his concept of 
political intervention. Just as truth and knowledge and 
sexuality are constructed, so is subjectivity. And the 
subject is constructed within the terrain of power 
operations. So the subject itself becomes a point of 
political resistance. 
Maybe the most certain of all philosophical 
problems is the problem of the present time, and 
of what we are, in this very moment. . . . The 
conclusion would be that the political, ethical, 
social, philosophical problem of our days is not 
to try to liberate the individual from the state, 
and from the states's institutions, but to 
liberate us both from the state and from the type 
of individualization which is linked to the state. 
We have to promote new forms of subjectivity 
through the refusal of this kind of individuality 
which has been imposed on us for several 
centuries. 46 
What Foucault is pointing to here, and what is similar 
to what he has said in History of Sexuality, is that 
reconceiving of subjectivity is itself an act of political 
resistance. This is another place where we see the way 
paved for postmodern feminist theory. Clearly a project of 
postmodern feminist theory is to "promote new forms of 
subjectivity" through the refusal of the genderless subject 
that has been the agent of Western philosophical thought. 
46Foucault, "Subject and Power," 216. 
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For Foucault the act of political resistance is inseparable 
from subjectivity, because he recognizes that the act of 
constructing a subject is always a political act. 
It must be said that Foucault does not develop 
adequately the gendered aspects of subjectivity, nor the 
manner in which a specifically feminist emancipatory 
practice can come out of his work. These issues are 
addressed, as we shall see, by both Jane Flax and Judith 
Butler. In the following two chapters I will examine 
postmodern feminist critiques and appropriations of 
Foucault's philosophy. I think that Foucault's analysis of 
power and resistance, which form his concept of constructed 
subjectivity, are highly useful for grounding an 
emancipatory postmodern feminist politics. I think, 
however, that the specific feminist implications of his 
analysis need to be made more clear. One also needs to 
examine more specifically the role of gender in constructing 
subjectivity. 
Fraser Critique 
Let me conclude this chapter by examining an important 
criticism of Foucault. I will demonstrate that this 
criticism, although widespread, fails to grasp the true 
nature of Foucault's philosophy. Foucault's analysis of the 
discursive production of truth and power has had a major 
impact on social and political philosophy. Some argue that 
his philosophy opens up possibilities of political practice 
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(especially for an engaged emancipatory politics), while 
others think his deconstruction of metapolitical rationalism 
leads to both relativism and nihilism. In other words, some 
contend that Foucault's philosophy is significant precisely 
because it deconstructs Enlightenment concepts of 
rationalism, while others think this disruption forecloses 
possibilities of a just political praxis. 
In a series of influential articles, Nancy Fraser has 
criticized the normative ambiguities in Michel Foucault's 
work, by which she means that he at once suspends and 
invokes normative frameworks. 47 She concludes that for 
Foucault to have an adequate political philosophy, he must 
have a more clearly articulated normative framework. 
Nancy Fraser's central critique of Foucault concerns 
the alleged normative ambiguity of Foucault's analysis of 
power. Fraser claims that his ambiguous normative framework 
renders his philosophy incapable of laying the ground for an 
engaged politics. 48 The implicit assumption of Fraser's 
critique is that a viable and just political philosophy is 
not possible if one cannot appeal to a transcendentally-
47Nancy Fraser. "Foucault on Modern Power: Empirical 
Insights and Normative Confusions," "Michel Foucault: A 
'Young Conservative'?" "Foucault's Body Language: A 
Posthumanist Political Rhetoric?" in Unruly Practices: 
Power, Discourse and Gender in Contemporary Social Theory 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), Chapters 
1-3. 
48Fraser, "Foucault on Modern Power. " 
grounded normative framework. 49 
Fraser questions whether Foucault's work can be 
simultaneously politically engaged and normatively 
neutral.~ She claims that Foucault's work suspends or 
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"brackets" the standard modern liberal normative framework, 
which distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate 
exercise of power51 • Fraser is using the term "bracketing" 
as it is used in the phenomenological tradition. Within 
this tradition the term bracketing is associated primarily 
with Husserl52 • As Husserl uses this term, it means 
disconnecting assumptions about the existence status of the 
spatio-temporal world of our everyday, pre-reflexive 
experience, as well as the multitude of theories 
(scientific, theological, social, and cultural) which 
comprise the natural attitude. It is this later part of the 
49Fraser is herself ambiguous with regards to 
transcendentally grounded normativity. In some instances 
she seems to distance herself from transcendental grounding. 
(See, for example, "Foucault: A 'Young Conservative'?" p. 
42.) Yet time and again she criticizes Foucault for lacking 
an "adequate" normative framework, which, I believe, betrays 
a longing for a transcendental trump upon which to ground 
political theory. (See, for example, "Foucault on Modern 
Power" pp. 26-33; "Foucault: A 'Young Conservative'?" p.36, 
p.43; "Foucault's Body Language: A Posthumanist Political 
Rhetoric?" p.64. 
5
°Fraser, "Foucault on Power," p. 19. 
51 Fraser, "Foucault on Power," p. 18. 
52See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, trans. 
Dorion Cairns (Boston & London: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers,1960), Chapter 2; Edmund Husserl Ideas:General 
Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W.R. Boyce Gibson 
(New York: Collier Books, 1931), Chapter 3. 
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phenomenological reduction--specifically these theories that 
comprise the natural attitude--that Fraser invokes. Fraser 
claims that Foucault brackets the normative framework. One 
way he does this is by suspending the categories of truth 
and falsity. 53 
But in setting up her critique of Foucault based on the 
assumption of bracketing, Fraser misses crucial features of 
his analysis of power, and misconstrues the purpose of his 
genealogies. Rather than bracketing normativity, I think it 
is clear that Foucault is deconstructing the modern liberal 
normative framework, together with the categories of truth 
and falsity. Foucault's analysis of power and truth is a 
thinking over and against the normative framework associated 
with traditional metaphysics. As we have seen, he shows the 
historical and cultural specificity of such a construction 
as true/false. The purpose of his analysis of power via 
genealogical method is to challenge the possibility of a 
transcendental grounding of truth disengaged from power. 
Thus he calls into question the dichotomies true/false and 
legitimate/illegitimate, thereby opening up these concepts 
to strategic redeployment. 
Let me clarify what I mean by "deconstruction." In 
"Contingent Foundations" Judith Butler writes, "To 
deconstruct is not to negate or to dismiss, but to call into 
question and, perhaps most importantly, to open up a term . 
"Fraser, "Foucault on Power," pp. 20-1. 
121 
. . to a reusage or redeployment that previously has not 
been authorized. 1154 Deconstruction is thus a disruption of 
foundational, metapolitical, and hegemonic positions such as 
"a power-free zone of rights." Foucault's position is not a 
simple negation or dismissal. Rather it is a calling into 
question and an opening up of such concepts of rights, 
truth, and legitimacy so that they may be strategically 
redeployed in previously unauthorized ways. Rather than 
being a neutral and unengaged suspension of normativity, 
such a project is fundamentally an engaged critique. 
It is an important question, whether or not one can 
deconstruct absolute categories of truth and falsity and 
still have a viable and just politics. However, Fraser 
avoids such an engaged critique of Foucault by misreading 
him. Fraser says Foucault refrains "from problematizing the 
normative validity of power/knowledge regimes"." By this 
Fraser means that he does not address the question of the 
legitimacy of the various institutions and practices which 
he studies. But Foucault's genealogical analysis of power 
is a problematizing of the normative validity of 
power/knowledge regimes. He does this, not by questioning 
whether or not such regimes are legitimate, but rather by 
questioning the framework of normativity for evaluating 
54Judi th Butler, "Contingent Foundations," in Feminist 
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson 
(New York & London: Routledge, 1995), p. 49. 
55Fraser, "Foucault on Power," p. 21. 
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social practices. 
By saying that he is bracketing the normative framework 
Fraser misses the key move of Foucauldian philosophy, namely 
the opening up of such terms as normativity, truth, and 
legitimacy to a reusage and redeployment. In other words 
Foucault is deconstructing the normative framework, not 
bracketing it. Foucault specifically deconstructs the 
traditional question of political philosophy: the scope and 
limits of the legitimate exercise of political power. He 
asks instead, what relationships of power are operative in 
constructing the truth claims of the normative framework 
being invoked. Foucault attempts to show that the liberal 
normative framework of power, legitimate vs. illegitimate 
power, points to the wrong question. The problematic that 
shapes Foucault's work is rather, "what rules of right are 
implemented by the relations of power in the production of 
discourses of truth?"~ 
In order to examine this problem, he looks at the 
production and relationships of power. This examination is 
a deconstruction of the liberal normative framework of 
legitimacy/illegitimacy. This examination of power is meant 
to challenge the totalizing narrative on which liberal 
notions of normativity are built and to disrupt the 
56Michel Foucault, "Two Lectures," in Power/knowledge: 
Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977, ed. Colin 
Gordon, trans. Gordon et al. (New York: Pantheon Books, 
1980), 93. 
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hegemonic metapolitical position of such a normative model. 
In challenging the top-down juridico-discursive model of 
power, and instead conceiving of power as permeating all 
discourses, Foucault necessarily and intentionally disrupts 
the liberal normative model. 
Fraser notes correctly that 
The liberal framework understands power as 
emanating from the sovereign and imposing itself 
upon the subjects. It tries to define a power-
free zone of rights, the penetration of which is 
illegitimate. Illegitimate power is understood as 
oppression, itself understood as the transgression 
of a 1 imi t. 57 
It is precisely against such a "power-free zone of rights" 
that Foucault is arguing. He does not think there is any 
such zone and is therefore arguing for a reconceptualization 
and reusage of the concept of both rights and of domination. 
According to Foucault all rights are necessarily constructed 
within the matrix of power, so there is no such thing as a 
power-free zone of rights. 
What is called for here is a reconception of rights, an 
opening up of the term which necessarily leads to a 
reconception and redeployment of politics. Political 
intervention then becomes a project, not of protecting 
inalienable rights, but rather one of waging power in a more 
strategically effective matter. 58 
57Fraser, "Foucault on Power, " p. 2 6. 
58This thesis will be elaborated more fully in Chapters 
Four and Five. 
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As a part of her critique of the normative ambiguities 
in Foucault's work, Fraser makes several claims about the 
efficacy of his argument for grounding a politics. One of 
her claims is that if Foucault wants to discuss domination 
when analyzing power, then he must either invoke the liberal 
normative framework or provide some alternative framework. 
she concludes that "Foucault's empirical thesis that modern 
power is capillary does not by itself dictate the adoption 
of any particular normative framework. At most, it 
undercuts one traditional basis of the liberal one."~ 
This does not seem to be stated strongly enough. 
Foucault's theory of power necessarily disrupts any concept 
of normativity. One must always examine the power dynamics 
within which the normative is produced. Examining the 
normative as historically and situationally specific is 
basic to the genealogical method. 
Fraser goes on to say that "in using the term 
'domination' at the same time that he is ruling out the 
liberal normative framework, it appears that he is 
presupposing some alternative framework. 1160 Here she 
assumes that any engaged political critique of power must be 
based on some concept of normativity. But this 
presupposition betrays Fraser's perhaps unwitting commitment 
to the classical liberal normative tradition, a tradition 
59Fraser, "Foucault on Power," p. 27. 
60Fraser,"Foucault on Power," p. 27. 
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which I shall argue prematurely forecloses the emancipatory 
potential of politics by conceiving of normativity as 
metapolitical. (It is precisely this premature foreclosure 
that postmodern philosophy seeks to avoid.) 
Fraser concludes that Foucault "fails to appreciate the 
degree to which the normative is embedded in and infused 
throughout the whole of language at every level and the 
degree to which despite himself, his own critique has to 
make use of modes of description, interpretation, and 
judgement formed within the modern Western normative 
tradition". 61 I would argue that most of Foucault's 
analysis is directed precisely at deconstructing this 
normative framework. 
The positive effect of this deconstruction can be seen 
by considering the "politics of everyday life," which Fraser 
herself calls "probably the single most important feature of 
Foucault's thought." 
In revealing the capillary character of modern 
power and thereby ruling out crude ideology 
critique, statism, and economism, Foucault can be 
understood as in effect ruling in what is often 
called 'politics of everyday life.' For if power 
is instantiated in mundane social practices and 
relations, then efforts to dismantle or transform 
the regime must address those practices and 
relations. 62 
One of Foucault's major efforts at dismantling or 
transforming social structures involves deconstructing the 
61 Fraser, "Foucault on Power," pp. 30-1. 
62Fraser, "Foucault on Power," p. 26. 
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concept of normativity operating in the practices and 
relations of everyday life. Foucault's analysis of truth 
and power is one which looks at how the hegemonic normative 
position has been produced and what operations of power it 
conceals. As I have argued, Foucault does not suspend the 
normative framework; rather his politics of everyday life is 
a deconstruction of such a framework. 
While I disagree with Fraser's contention that Foucault 
suspends analysis of the liberal normative framework in his 
examination of power and in the end invokes such a framework 
in order to establish a foundation for resistance, I do 
think she shows the significance of his analysis of power to 
feminist theory. I agree that 
he provides the empirical and conceptual basis for 
treating such phenomena as sexuality, the family, 
schools, psychiatry, medicine, social science, and 
the like as political problems. It thereby widens 
the arena within which people may collectively 
confront, understand, and seek to change the 
character of their lives.~ 
Fraser praises the importance of Foucault for expanding 
the political arena. This has particular significance for 
feminist theorists, much of whose work involves analyzing 
the politics of such things as sexuality, family, school, 
etc. What Fraser does not acknowledge, and what is one of 
the most important aspects of Foucault's work for postmodern 
feminist theory, is that Foucault politicizes the liberal 
63Fraser, 11 Foucault on Power, 11 p. 2 6. 
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concept of normativity, including the politicization of such 
concepts as rights, legitimacy, and truth. 
Fraser claims that Foucault is unable to fully suspend 
the liberal normative framework, but rather that he 
presupposes it.M I think this conclusion comes from 
Fraser's own inability to suspend the liberal notion of 
normativity when she reads Foucault. Her inability to 
recognize Foucault's deconstruction of normativity leads her 
to conclude that normative ambiguity necessarily forecloses 
emancipatory politics and is necessarily unsatisfactory. 
Fraser is unable to discern Foucault's discussion of power 
as a deconstruction of normativity because she is too firmly 
ensconced within the traditional liberal normative 
framework. She cannot conceive of a normatively ambiguous 
political philosophy with emancipatory potential.~ 
Yet this is precisely what, in my view, is presently 
needed. 66 
Much of the critique concerning the lack of normativity 
in postmodernism is that it makes political practice 
impossible because there is no foundation in which to ground 
political activity. 
MFraser, "Foucault on Power," p. 30. 
6511 
••• what Foucault needs," writes Fraser, "and needs 
desperately, are normative criteria for distinguishing 
acceptable from unacceptable forms of power" (Ibid., p.33). 
I think this is clearly Fraser's need, not Foucault's. 
66! will elaborate on and defend this claim throughout 
the rest of this dissertation. 
We may question ... whether Foucault's rhetoric 
really does the job of distinguishing better from 
worse regimes of social practices; whether it 
really does the job of identifying forms of 
domination (or whether it overlooks some and/or 
misrecognizes others); whether it really does the 
job of distinguishing fruitful from unfruitful, 
acceptable from unacceptable forms of resistance 
to domination; and finally, whether it really does 
the job of suggesting not simply that change is 
possible but also what sort of change is 
desirable. 67 
What Foucault argues is that disrupting a foundation 
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grounded in concepts of transcendental rationality and truth 
that themselves conceal relationships of domination is 
itself a politically necessary and just move. It is often 
argued that for Foucault there is no possibility of just 
political action because there can be no prioritizing of 
actions or no basis for choosing between just and unjust 
causes: it is assumed, in other words, that if one does not 
appeal to transcendental truth or universal justice, then 
there will simply be a chaotic situation of free flowing 
nonprioritized difference. This is a misinterpretation of 
what genealogy demands. In unveiling power configurations 
one is acting justly. I think that what critics of 
postmodern political practice find most hard to accept is 
this unavailability of a "transcendental trump". It is 
incorrectly assumed that without a universal measure of the 
good, which provides a foundation for neutrality and 
normativity, there can be no justice. What this position 
67Fraser, "Foucault on Power," p. 43. 
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ignores are the systems of domination concealed within the 
very foundation they want to claim as constitutive and 
therefore necessary to just political practice. 
Far from being the nihilistic threat that Fraser and 
others would claim, the critique of normative foundations 
offered by Foucault, and as we shall see, Flax, and Butler 
represents a democratic engagement in the political field. 
This requires interrogating the "ruse of authority" of 
normative and universal categories such as legitimacy that 
claim to be free of the contestations of power dynamics. At 
the heart of Foucault's radical political project is just 
such a deconstructing of foundational premises such as truth 
and universality. It is important to note that questioning, 
deconstructing, reconfiguring and resignifying 
foundationalist categories is not the same as doing away 
with them or bracketing them. Butler, as we shall see, 
reconfigures the universal as a site of permanent contest, 
rather than as a politically neutral foundation on which to 
base other political contests. This opening of the 
universal to critique, and thereby bringing it into the 
democratic process, does not however mean that politics and 
philosophy become nihilistic and relativistic; on the 
contrary it is a radical democratization of political 
philosophy. 
It seems to me that Fraser (and most other critics of 
postmodernism) appeal, implicitly or explicitly to a 
substantive universal presumed to be well-grounded. But 
once the universal becomes a contested category--which it 
now is--there can be no metapolitical grounding for 
emancipatory politics. It is precisely in this demand to 
interrogate the hegemony of universal categories, among them 
normative concepts such as legitimacy and rights, that the 
emancipatory potential of such politics lies. This move of 
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deconstructing hegemonic foundations radically reconfigures 
both the discursive terrain of politics as well as concrete 
practices. Part of this deconstruction is the 
politicization (through genealogical critique) of 
metapolitical normativity. Genealogical critique reveals 
that any metapolitical normative framework is always already 
politically constituted. Any normative assumption is 
necessarily an authoritative move to cover over operations 
of power by labeling them as metapolitical and thus 
excluding them from critique. The liberatory potential of 
such radical disruption is great. For Fraser, ambiguity is 
necessarily wrong, whereas I strongly agree with Foucault, 
(and Flax, and Butler), that ambiguity is the only position 
possible from which to effectively enact an emancipatory 
democratic politics. 
Chapter Four 
Flax 
In this chapter I will outline Flax's concepts of 
subjectivity, rationality and justice, and examine how she 
positions her theory in relationship to Freud, Marx, and 
Foucault. Flax situates her theory of subjectivity with 
specific reference to the discourses of psychoanalysis, 
feminism, and postmodernism. While she is clearly a 
feminist thinker, as an analysis of gender is central to 
most of her theorizing, her relationship to psychoanalysis 
and postmodernism is less clear. Flax's discussion of 
subjectivity makes continuous reference to psychoanalysis, 
feminist theory, and postmodernism, so it is almost 
impossible to look at her work apart from a critique of 
these discourses. Flax's own theorizing moves in and out of 
these three discourses, showing how they both reflect and 
contribute to the contemporary philosophical debates about 
knowledge, power, rationality, and justice, as well as 
showing how they can lead to useful concept of subjectivity 
for the late twentieth century. 
Throughout her examination of these discourses, she, 
like myself, places the examination of subjectivity in the 
forefront. 
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As old ways of understanding subjectivity are 
thrown into doubt, crises of representation, 
knowledge, power and legitimacy intensify. 
Contemporary psychoanalytic, feminist and post-
modernist theorists both reflect and contribute to 
these crises . 1 
Flax's concern with subjectivity mirrors that of my 
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overall project. Throughout this work I have been examining 
the relationship of various concepts and theories of 
subjectivity to political praxis, with the aim of 
determining which concept of subjectivity is most useful for 
grounding an emancipatory feminist politics, Flax states a 
similar objective: 
Considering the weight the modern subject is 
expected to carry, it is not surprising that a 
central debate in contemporary political discourse 
concerns the nature of subjectivity and its 
possible relations to emancipatory action. One 
recurrent question in these debates is what kind 
of self is required for effective struggles 
against domination. 2 
Flax herself concludes that, "a unitary self is unnecessary, 
impossible and a dangerous illusion."3 What is important 
about Flax's attention to the often conflicting discourses 
of psychoanalysis, feminism and postmodernism is that in her 
attempt to situate her own concept of subjectivity within 
1Jane Flax, "Multiples: On the Contemporary Politics of 
Subjectivity," Nous 16 {April 1993): 33. Reprinted with 
some modifications in Jane Flax, Disputed Subjects: Essays 
on Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Philosophy (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 92-110. All page numbers in this chapter 
will refer to the Nous version of the article. 
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the context of these discourses, she allows for the fact 
that the subject position can be fluid and variable. 
on Freud 
Rather than analyzing the entirety of Flax's discussion 
of psychoanalysis, I will focus on her discussion of Freud's 
concept of subjectivity. Flax applies elements from 
postmodernist and feminist discourses in order to criticize 
Freud. Of course she is not the first thinker to examine 
Freud in light of these discourses, but she is dissatisfied 
with conclusions commonly drawn: "Postmodernists 
appropriate Freud's concept of the 'decentered' self but 
radically reduce its complexity and consequences. Some 
feminists simply reject all of psychoanalytic theory because 
of the truly ignorant and offensive ways Freud sometimes 
analyzes women. 114 
Flax begins her own analysis by pointing out that 
Freud's work has an ambiguous relationship to Enlightenment 
thinking. In important ways it is disruptive of such 
thought, but in other equally important ways it is 
conscripted within the Enlightenment narrative. One of the 
major tenets of Enlightenment thought that is challenged by 
Freud is the primacy of rationality in the organization of 
subjectivity. Rather than saying humans are primarily 
4Jane Flax, Thinking Fragments: Psychoanalysis, 
Feminism, and Postmodernism in the Contemporary West 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 50. 
rational thinkers as would modern philosophers, 
in [Freud's] view humans are originally and 
primarily desiring creatures. Our being is not 
defined by the capacity to reason, as Plato and 
Kant believe; by the ability to speak, reason and 
engage in political deliberation, as Aristotle 
argues; or by the power to produce objects of 
value and need, as Marx claims. 'The core of our 
being,' according to Freud, consists of ..•• 
[u]nconscious wishful impulses, most of which are 
forever inaccessible to our preconscious or 
conscious, will nonetheless remain the dominating 
force in our mental life. 5 
Flax emphasizes that for Freud desire, which is often 
unconscious, displaces reason as the primary quality of 
human beings. As I discussed in the chapter on Freud, 
Freud's introduction of the analysis of desire and the 
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unconscious into an analysis of self functioned to radically 
disrupt the role of rationality. 
[T]he self in Freud's theories becomes 
increasingly fragmented, decentered, and 
heterogeneous in its qualities and dynamics. 
Forces are always affecting our 'rational' thought 
and behavior, but these forces can be (at best) 
only imperfectly known or comprehended. The 
agency of our knowing is 'contaminated' by the 
influence of these unconscious forces, including 
desire. 6 
One can read Flax as saying that with Freud, the 
Cartesian self becomes 'contaminated.' Uncertainty and 
ambiguity, in the form of the unconscious and desire, are 
introduced at the core of the rational subject. It is 
through this displacement of the rational subject and of the 
5Ibid., 53. 
6Ibid., 59. 
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centrality of rationality in understanding ourselves and our 
world that Freud has affinity with postmodern thinkers. 
Flax puts it this way, 
As postmodernists argue, Freud's increasingly 
complex structural theories undermine the concepts 
of mind upon which Enlightenment concepts of 
knowledge depend. . . . Unlike many philosophers 
Freud conceptualizes the mind as full embodied, 
inherently conflictual, dynamic, nonunitary, and 
constituted in and through processes that are 
intrinsically different and cannot be synthesized 
or organized into a permanent, hierarchical 
organization of functions or control. Both the 
rationalist's faith in the powers of reason and 
the empiricist's belief in the reliability of 
sense perception and observation are grounded in 
and depend on the mind's capacity to be at least 
partially undetermined by the effects of the body, 
passions, and social authority or convention. 
However, Freud's theories of mind render such 
beliefs highly problematic. 7 
One of the most significant aspects of Freud's concept 
of subjectivity for Flax is that it allows for, and indeed 
introduces the necessity of, ambiguity. For Flax it is also 
important that while Freud decenters the self, he neither 
says the self does not exist, nor does he reduce the 
complexity of an analysis of subjectivity. Unlike Foucault, 
who focuses on external relations of power and their role in 
the construction of self, Freud looks at the internal 
dynamics of subjectivity, such as the power relationships 
between the id, ego, and superego. Flax emphasizes as well 
the fact that Freud focuses on the somatic construction of 
self, which is necessarily biological. 
7Ibid., 60. 
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While Freud's discourse in many way challenges 
Enlightenment concepts, especially the privileging of 
rationality, Flax concludes that in important ways he is in 
complicity with the Enlightenment metanarrative. 
[I]n many ways ..• Freud's thinking remains within 
the Enlightenment project. His emphasis on the 
liberating power of rational insight; his 
individualistic concept of the self; his distrust 
of the 'irrational,' including 'illusions' such as 
religion as well as the unconscious; and his 
insistence on the importance to the individual and 
to culture of the defense of the ego and reason 
against the 'irrational' demands of desire or 
authority place him firmly within the 'master 
narratives' of the Enlightenment. Freud's ... 
move to locate and conflate women, the irrational, 
desire, and nature 'outside' and against culture 
are also congruent with and contribute to the 
persistence of these narratives. 8 
While she recognizes Freud's contribution to our knowledge 
of the irrational and decentered subject, she thinks that 
Freud ultimately pulls back from the full implications of 
these ideas. Even though he has an extended discussion of 
the irrational, he ultimately contends that rationality is 
normative. 9 Flax's concept of a multiple and fluid self, 
which learns to thrive among ambiguities, is one which does 
not privilege the rational over the irrational, nor the 
individualistic self over the relational self. 
Flax systematically attacks the gendered dichotomy in 
Freud's work. According to this analysis Freud associates 
femininity with nature, other, libido economics, body and 
8Ibid., 228-229. 
9See my discussion of this in Chapter Two. 
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patient. Masculinity, on the other hand, is associated with 
culture, self, object relations theory, mind, and analyst. 10 
Flax, who does not want the 'master narratives' of the 
Enlightenment to predominate, thinks that one needs to have 
a dialogue between feminism and both Freudianism and 
postmodernism so as to erode the hegemony of any one of 
these theories. She thinks that both postmodernists and 
Freudian discourse can benefit from a more rigorous analysis 
of gender. Not only have "Postmodernists .•. paid 
insufficient attention to many of the obscuring effects of 
the riddle of sex on and within psychoanalytic discourses" 
but also "the evidence that even Freud's supposedly gender-
neutral concepts are affected by gender relations ought to 
encourage more psychoanalysts and postmodernists to attend 
more seriously to feminist theories. " 11 Flax maintains that, 
while much of Freud's analysis concerning gender is deeply 
flawed, his analysis also opens up the space for debate and 
allows for ambiguity. Flax summarizes the relationship of 
feminist theorists to Freud's work by acknowledging this 
ambiguity. 
Feminist theorists offer ambivalent and 
conflicting evaluations of psychoanalysis. Some 
simply reject it because of Freud's patently 
masculinist biases. Other feminists have found 
1
°For a discussion of these "gendered antimonies" 
pervading Freud's work see Thinking Fragments 77-88. 
11Flax, Thinking Fragments, 77. 
the paradoxes in psychoanalytic theory a useful 
and revealing object of analysis. The 
second approach is more fruitful. Unexamined 
anxieties about gender and gender relations do 
pervade, structure, and constrict the entire body 
of Freud' s work. 12 
On Marx 
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While Flax applies the discourses of postmodernism and 
feminism to critique Freud, she applies Freud to critique 
Marx. She writes, 
Psychoanalysis illuminates some of the 
deficiencies and failures of Marxism. From a 
psychoanalyst's perspective, Marxist accounts of 
human subjectivity and intersubjectivity appear 
particularly thin and impoverished. Psycho-
analysts investigate the importance of fantasy, 
desire, families, and sexuality in the 
constitution of individual subjectivity, in the 
behavior of persons in the 'outside' world, and in 
the structure of social institutions such as the 
state. Once one begins to identify the effects of 
unconscious processes class conflict forfeits its 
privileged (or exclusive) role as the dynamic 
force of human history. 13 
The failures and deficiencies that psychoanalysis 
illuminates in Marxism are the absence in Marxism of an 
analysis of sexuality and fantasy. Flax also criticizes Marx 
from both a Foucauldian and a feminist perspective. Like 
Foucault, Flax is concerned that Marx's analysis claims the 
authority of a transcendental truth and does not recognize 
the historically specific power relationships within which 
12Ibid., 76. 
13Jane Flax, Disputed Subjects: Essays on 
Psychoanalysis, Politics, and Philosophy (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), 11. 
the analysis is constructed. 
Claims to neutrality or knowledge of objective 
scientific laws violate Marx's own accounts of the 
historical and social constitution of knowledge. 
Their plausibility eventually relies on a 
transcendental trump. Marxist theorists employ 
such trumps as positing mental access to the 'iron 
laws of history' or the ontological and 
epistemological privilege of a particular sort of 
'labor' (or of the class that engages in it). 
Alternatively one is required to make a leap of 
faith that 'in the last instance' certain 
(economic) factors will be determinative. . • . 
Everyone might be better off if we acknowledge we 
are all operating on the terrain of power and not 
truth or objectivity. What counts as 'better 
knowledge' depends in part on its utility for 
particular political ends.M 
This critique of objective truth claims and her 
conclusion that knowledge is formed within a terrain of 
power and is therefore not neutral or transcendental is 
identical to Foucault's analysis. It is essentially a 
genealogical critique. Flax applies this methodology to 
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criticize Marx's idea of human nature. She is suspicious of 
"Marx's promotion of sensuous practical activity (or labor 
defined as the production of use values) as the human 
essence. " 15 Flax thinks that this "reflects rather than 
provides a thorough critique of capitalist societies."16 In 
doing a genealogical critique she challenges the claims to 
transcendental truth on which Marx establishes his theory by 
exposing the power relationships that are operating to form 
14Ibid. , 12. 
15Ibid. 
16Ibid. 
such truths. She concludes, 
Theorists will evaluate these arrangements 
according to the ethical, psychological, and 
political commitments that pervade and motivate 
their work. While such arrangements are necessary 
they may not always be considered the definitive 
human activity. 'Materialist' accounts of history 
may appear more appealing to us precisely because 
we live in capitalist cultures in which other 
vocabularies and ways of life, for example, ones 
based on civic virtue, kinship, faith, or 
aesthetics, are marginalized. After all, why 
should Marxism be less marked by the social 
determination of thought than any other theory? 17 
Flax is also critical of Marx from a feminist 
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perspective. Her analysis of Marxism in terms of gender is 
similar to my own. She concludes that "the gender biases in 
Marxist theories are foundational, necessary, and disabling. 
Especially important are the gendered character of its 
constituting ideas such as labor, class, and history. None 
of these ideas seem to account to or include the effects of 
male-dominant gender systems or many of the activities 
historically performed by women. " 18 My own analysis of Marx 
came to a similar conclusion. Flax concludes that Marx's 
theory is "fatally flawed"--although she acknowledges the 
perspectival and postmodern character of her judgement: "My 
belief that Marxist theory is fatally flawed, rather than 
usefully imperfect, undoubtedly has many irrational, 
aesthetic, and idiosyncratic determinants. It is certainly 
possible to arrive at a different position from the same set 
18Ibid. I 13. 
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of 'facts. '" 19 
On Foucault 
While much of Flax's own analysis relies on basic 
Foucauldian conceptions of power and knowledge, and her own 
method is an adaption of Foucault's genealogical critique, 
she does offer some insightful criticisms of Foucault. 
Applying her usual method of critiquing one discourse from 
the perspective of the another, she employs feminist 
discourse to critique postmodernism, specifically Foucault, 
for not giving adequate consideration to issues of gender, 
including the construction of the category of woman, and she 
uses psychoanalytic discourse to critique Foucault's concept 
of a socially constructed self. 
Flax criticizes Foucault because, while his philosophy 
stresses retrieval of the marginalized and repressed, he 
rarely mentions women. His own analysis is uninformed by 
any explicit or implicit reference to feminist theory. 
Foucault mentions women as one of the subjected or 
marginalized and resisting elements within 
contemporary culture. He stresses the need to pay 
attention to the minute, local, and differentiated 
forms of events and power that are said to 
constitute 'history.' However he does not 
consider the feminist claim that in important ways 
the histories of men and women are themselves 
differentiated and heterogeneous. Foucault's 
histories seem totally uninformed by any awareness 
of feminist narratives of his major subjects ... 
Systematic consideration of gender relations 
would profoundly effect his genealogies of 
19Ibid. 
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sexuality, subjectivity, power, and knowledge. 20 
In critiquing Foucault's concept of self, Flax argues 
that Foucault ignores the role of intimate social 
relationships in the construction of self as well as the 
role of gender. Flax claims that Foucault can ignore the 
role of these relationships in the formation of self, 
because they are "displaced" by Foucault's "insistence on 
self as an effect of discourse. 1121 Flax offers an 
alternative conception: 
A social self would come to be partially in and 
through powerful, affective relationships with 
other persons. These relations with others and our 
feelings and fantasies about them, along with 
experiences of embodiedness also mediated by such 
relations, can come to constitute an 'inner' self 
that is neither simply fictive nor 'natural.' 
Such a self is simultaneously embodied, gendered, 
social, and unique. It is capable of telling 
stories and of conceiving and experiencing itself 
in all these ways.u 
Flax sees this neglect of intimate social relations as 
linked to postmodernisms inadequate attention to gender. 
Postmodernist narratives about subjectivity are 
inadequate. As postmodernists construct 
subjectivity, only two alternatives appear: a 
'false' unitary and essentialist self or an 
equally nondiff erentiated but totally 
historically ... constituted 'true' one. The 
nature of this dichotomy itself is partially 
determined by the absence of any systematic 
consideration of gender or gender relations. 
Within postmodernist discourses there is no 
attempt to incorporate or do justice to the 
2
°Flax, Thinking Fragments, 212. 
21 Ibid., 231. 
22Ibid. I 2 3 2 . 
specificity of women's experiences or desires as 
discussed by women ourselves. Women's experiences 
of subjectivity suggest there are alternatives to 
the two presented within postmodernist 
discourses. 23 
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Flax is particularly critical of Foucault's contention 
that the self is the effect of "discourse." She contrasts a 
self derived from concrete social relations with a 
postmodern self deriving from "fictions" or "textual" 
convention. She prefers 
to argue that 'the self' is social and in some 
important ways gendered. Hence any self or 
concept of it must be differentiated, local, and 
historical. Gender can be used as a lever against 
essentialist or ahistoric notions of self. A 
feminist deconstruction of the self, however, 
would point toward locating self and its 
experiences in concrete social relations, not only 
in fictive or purely textual convention.N 
I agree with Flax that Foucault neglects gender (as I 
have already noted). I also agree that Foucault has ignored 
intimate relations. However, Foucault does not set up a 
"false" unitary self against a "true" constructed self--
since he deconstructs the concept of "truth. 1125 Nor does 
23Ibid. , 210. 
Nibid. 1 232 • 
25By the time she writes "Multiples" and "Minerva's Owl" 
(both found in Disputed Subjects) she becomes less rigid 
with this either/or structuring of the subjectivity debate 
and more comfortable with ambiguity, fluidity, and 
multiplicity. In these later works she embraces the varied 
positionality called for by Foucault. Her views on 
Foucault's concept of constructed subjectivity undergo 
significant change from her early discussion in Thinking 
Fragments, in which she is quite critical of this concept of 
subjectivity and does not think it is an adequate theory in 
which to ground an emancipatory feminist politics, to her 
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"discourse" exclude attention to intimate relationships. 
While it is true that Foucault's analysis for the most part 
ignores such relationships as parent, friend, or lover, his 
analysis emphasizes power, and calls our attention to its 
"microphysics," which is appropriate for analyzing these 
intimate relationships. Even intimate relationships need to 
be interpreted; hence prevailing discourses do enter in, 
even at the intimate level. By applying his analysis of 
power to such relationships, we can add a more nuanced 
dimension to our understanding of these relationships. 26 
The Multiple self 
As we have seen, Freud offers a model of a nonunif ied 
self that does not (always) privilege rationality, while 
Foucault offers a model of a socially constructed self. One 
of Flax's important contributions to our developing an 
later discussion of subjectivity in Disputed Subjects, in 
which she employs this concept of constructed subjectivity. 
Once she enriches Foucault's concept of subjectivity with an 
analysis of gender, she is able to see the potential of this 
concept to advance emancipatory feminist politics. In 
Thinking Fragments she intimates that such a move--
supplementing Foucault's concept of self with an analysis of 
gender--would indeed allow for the adoption of such a 
concept of self for feminist emancipatory politics. 
uFor example, many contemporary feminist theorists have 
used Foucault's analysis of power to analyze the 
relationship of mothering. See for examples Jane Flax, 
"Forgotten Forms of Close Combat: Mothers and Daughters 
Revisited," chap. in Disputed Subjects; Jana Sawicki, 
"Feminism and the Power of Foucauldian Discourse: Foucault 
and Mothering Theory," and "Disciplining Mothers: Feminism 
and the New Reproductive Technologies," chapters in 
Disciplining Foucault (New York: Routledge, 1991). 
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adequate notion of subjectivity is her attempt to combine 
the insights of these two thinkers, giving us a constructed, 
non-unitary self. 
Contemporary critics of the instrumental, overly 
abstract or rationalistic self have undermined the 
plausibility and desirability of any form of 
transcendental subjectivity. These concepts of 
self grew out of and reflect a particular 
historical context whose projects, practices and 
pressures have either been exhausted or are no 
longer useful to us. Their apparent existence is 
contingent also upon the repression or denial of 
many other, interrelated aspects of 
subj ecti vi ty. 27 
Flax does not dismiss the concept of a unified rational 
subject altogether. "We might want to foreground these modes 
of subjectivity [the instrumental, overly abstract or 
rationalistic] for certain purposes." However, "they are 
insufficient as a regulative ideals and as prescriptions for 
the highest level of human maturity or the definitive human 
capacity."~ This is an extremely important point. 
Enlightenment philosophy is based not only on the positing 
of a unified rational subject and a general privileging of 
rationality, but on the demand that this is the only 
philosophically viable position. The unified Cartesian 
subject and the discourse of rationality with which this 
subject conducts its philosophical speculations becomes the 
regulative ideal. This dual model--Cartesian subject and 
rational discourse--becomes prescriptive. The rational 
27Flax, "Multiples," 33-34. 
28Ibid. I 3 4 . 
agent is seen by Enlightenment philosophy as the highest 
level of subjectivity, and rational thought is the 
definitive human capacity. These are precisely the ideas 
that Flax challenges. But it is crucial to see that by 
advocating a fluid, decentered, constructed concept of 
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subjectivity, one is not dismissing the rational agent and 
rational discourse as untenable. What one is doing is 
disrupting the prescriptive, regulative, hegemonic role this 
concept of subjectivity has played throughout modern 
philosophy and to allow it to be one aspect of what Flax 
calls the multiple self. What she is trying to name is the 
denaturalized subject position that is both decentered 
within itself in that, unlike Descartes cogito it is not a 
logical agent who is completely self-present to itself, and 
decentered within the discourses that make up Enlightenment 
philosophy. Unlike Descartes' cogito, which is firmly 
embedded in the hegemonic discourse of rationality, the 
constructed subject is constructed within multiple 
discourses, none of which are hegemonic. 
There are many feminist theorists who think that it is 
dangerous to eliminate the rational unified self, and that 
in so doing we are foreclosing the liberatory potential of 
feminist theory. 29 Flax, however, supports the Foucauldian 
idea of a constructed subject, but a constructed, multiple, 
29See Jane Flax Thinking Fragments, 230, where Flax 
discusses the fact that some feminist think woman need an 
Enlightenment. 
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gendered, subject. "Gendered categories cannot be 
destabilized if we insist on their necessity as a foundation 
for 'emancipatory' knowledge."w For Flax, one does not need 
to ground an emancipatory politics in a unified subject, and 
she, like Foucault, considers the very need to do so a 
politically motivated one. She extends Foucault's analysis, 
however, to specifically consider the gendered aspect of 
subjectivity and feminist emancipatory politics. 
Contrary to the claims (or fears) of some, I do 
not believe the possibility of effective feminist 
politics requires the ability to represent a 
unitary woman or even a singular multiple category 
of women. A number of assumptions and wishes 
motivate this hankering for a universal. It is a 
trace of the continuing operation of Enlightenment 
belief systems and the absences of useful 
alternatives to them. 31 
Flax clarifies what she means by the multiple self and 
how she situates this concept in reference to 
psychoanalysis, feminism, and postmodernism. 
Psychoanalysis, feminism and postmodernism all 
require concepts of subjectivity that are fluid 
rather than solid and process-oriented rather than 
topographical. These theories and practices 
require a mechanics of fluids in which 
subjectivity is conceived as a set of processes 
rather than as a fixed entity locatable in a 
homogeneous, delimited time and space. Such 
concepts will also be more congruent with and do 
more justice to the complexities of subjectivity 
that we encounter. Psychic 'structures' are 
actually complex clusters of capabilities, modes 
of processing, altering and retaining experience, 
and foci of affect, somatic effects and 
wJane Flax, "Minerva's Owl," chap. in Disputed 
Subjects, 24. 
31 Ibid., 26. 
transformation of process into various kinds of 
languages, fantasy, delusion, defenses, thought 
and modes of relating to self and others. These 
structures are actually the consequences of the 
crosshatching of manly lines of heterogeneous 
experience and capacities. When enough lines are 
layered over each other, a solid entity amy appear 
to form. Yet the fluidity of the lines remains 
and what felt solid and real may subsequently 
separate and reform.n 
She concludes that the "Subject is a shifting and 
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always changing intersection of complex, contradictory and 
unfinished processes."" The idea of contradiction is an 
important one. These multiple subject positions do not have 
to coalesce in a coherent whole; divergent and often 
contradictory positions can coexist within a single subject. 
On Rationality 
The critique of rationality, which Flax shares with 
postmodernism, is highly controversial. It is often argued 
that if we do not posit human subjectivity as essentially 
rational, it is impossible to argue coherently, or struggle 
effectively, for emancipation. Flax disagrees strongly. 
What kinds of subjectivity resist domination and 
struggle for something else? Unlike Kant, 
Habermas, John Rawls, or some contemporary 
feminists I argue that a subject in whom 
rationality is the privileged quality cannot 
sustain emancipatory struggles. [We must) explore 
the possibilities of fluid, multiple 
subjectivities whose desires for differences will 
impel them toward resisting (inner or external) 
32Flax, "Multiples, " 3 7. 
33Ibid. I 3 9. 
relations of domination.~ 
Flax questions the assumed necessity of the link 
between rationality and justice: 
It is questionable whether there are any necessary 
or intrinsic relations between reason, however 
defined, and justice. Why should we believe that 
reason is privileged or primary for the self or 
justice? There are many factors upon which the 
development of subjectivity, self-understanding, 
and justice depends. These factors include 
political practices; child rearing and education; 
the absence of economic, race, or gender-based 
relations of domination; empathy; fantasy; 
feelings; imagination; and embodiment. Why should 
we believe that reason is, can, or should be 
independent of the contingencies of 
intersubjectivity, embodiment, language, social 
relations, or the unconscious?" 
It is important to understand that postmodern and 
feminist critiques of rationality do not call for the 
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wholesale abandonment of reason. But they do point out that 
an excessive preoccupation with reason can be 
counterproductive. In Flax's view, 
rationalistic approaches to justice are doomed to 
fail and are counterproductive. They block the 
development of other capacities, such as empathy 
and appreciation for otherness, which are required 
for the effective exercise of justice. They 
encourage and depend upon pathological forms of 
subjectivity. . . . Thinking is radically split 
off and experienced as operating independently of 
the rest of subjectivity, including our 
relatedness to and dependence on others. The 
development and maintenance of such forms of 
abstract rationality require intrapsychic and 
interpersonal relations of domination. The 
effects of such domination cannot be contained by 
34Flax, Disputed Subjects, xii. 
35Flax, "The Play of Justice," chap. in Disputed 
Subjects, 116. 
rational principles or law or social structures 
devised by philosopher-kings.~ 
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The postmodern feminist critique of rationality is one 
of its most important and most controversial positions. 
Since this critique is frequently misunderstood, and indeed, 
often caricatured, let me clarify some of its components. 
There are at least three principle elements to this 
critique--rationality as character defect, rationality as an 
interpersonal/political weapon, and an over-reliance on 
"argument" in discussion. 
Defining "man" as a "rational animal," i.e. , making 
rationality the cornerstone of humanity, gives impetus to a 
personality type obsessed with principles and consistency. 
This obsession (as Flax notes in the above quote) can block 
the development of other capacities. The critique of 
rationality is not meant to glorify the "irrational"--people 
who are truly insane--but rather, to suggest that moral and 
psychic maturity means being able to live with a certain 
degree of contradiction and confusion. 
The second element in the critique of rationality 
involves noting how the charge of "irrational" or 
"inconsistent'' can be, and regularly is, deployed to silence 
disturbing voices--especially, but not exclusively, those of 
women. When a "different voice" is trying to make itself 
heard, there is inevitably a groping, an attempt at 
y!bid., 116-117. 
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articulation that is imperfect. Such inconsistencies, etc., 
are forgiven or glossed when coming from the dominant 
tradition, but are mercilessly pursued when coming from a 
marginalized voice. 
The third element in the postmodern critique calls into 
question an over-reliance on "argument" in discussion. 
Instead of developing skills at empathetic listening, or 
seeing the point of, for example story telling as opposed to 
logical deduction, one is trained to adopt an adversarial 
approach to the speaker that involves throwing up 
counterexamples, demanding clear and precise definitions, 
etc. 
The postmodern feminist critique of rationality does 
not propose to discard "rationality" altogether. 
Inconsistencies, for example, should give one pause. And 
one does want to be able to dispute a "bad argument." But 
to make genuine progress about real issues, one has to be 
able to tolerate a certain amount of unclarity and 
inconsistency. One cannot resolve all ambiguities and 
paradoxes; one cannot always dot every "i" and cross every 
"t". Ambiguities and inconsistencies are often fruitful 
ways of keeping the conversation going. 
On Justice 
Flax agrees with Foucault as I do, that for theorists 
of emancipatory politics there is a danger in assuming that 
there is only one correct stance or subject position from 
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which to theorize or to wage resistance. Foucault's 
conception of power is most useful in that it suggests the 
importance of having many fronts from which to wage battle 
against multiple systems of domination. Flax enriches 
Foucault's analysis by adding the dimensions of gender and 
interpersonal relationships. Ambiguity, fluidity, and 
multiplicity are a necessity when one understands that the 
subject is constructed through multiple matrices of power 
and will thus necessarily change as the grids of power 
shift. This is not a weakness, but a strategical necessity. 
But a different conception of the subject entails a 
different conception of justice. "Better theories of 
justice will require different accounts of what subjectivity 
might be. It is both possible and necessary to develop 
nonrationalist concepts of subjectivity and justice.''n 
The question then needs to be addressed as to "what 
practices of justice would multiple subjects desire and 
sustain?''n Flax addresses this question in her essay "The 
Play of Justice." Many theorists, Nancy Fraser among them, 
as we have seen, claim that the postmodern subject lacks the 
ability to make normative validity claims and thus eschews 
ethically defensible politics. Flax disagrees. As she 
states, "there is no inherent contradiction between 
postmodernist commitments to the play of differences and 
nibid., 111. 
HFlax, Disputed Subjects, vii. 
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ethical ones. Quite the contrary, full commitment to the 
play of differences requires resistance to the relations of 
domination and development of new theories and practices of 
justice."D What Flax's defense of postmodern ethics claims 
is that by deconstructing normative models of subjectivity 
and justice one does not eliminate justice; in fact such a 
deconstruction enriches it. 
One aspect of ... deconstructive projects is to 
loosen the hold of transcendental or rationalistic 
theories of subjectivity and justice. There are 
good reasons to undermine our belief in such 
ideas. We believe that objective truth and 
justice are interdependent, but this is not 
necessarily the case. It is unnecessary and even 
dangerous to assume that the existence and 
practice of justice requires any transcendental 
grounding. Even if we abandon all notions of 
transcendental truth and a reason capable of 
grasping it, we can still formulate and articulate 
theories and practices of justice. Our choice is 
not necessarily between grounding justice in 
objective truth claims (judged by reason) or 
domination. 40 
Foucault shows the differential power relationships of 
domination that operate to form the traditional 
philosophical concept of transcendental truth. His 
analysis, which deconstructs the category of truth, implies 
that truth and justice are not inextricably interdependent. 
Flax extends this genealogical critique to justice itself. 
It was shown in the Foucault chapter that one need not 
appeal to a transcendental notion of truth in order to have 
39Ibid. 
4
°Flax, "The Play of Justice," 115. 
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a viable philosophy. Flax extends this argument to show 
that one need not appeal to a rational subject with access 
to a transcendental notion of justice in order to have a 
viable political theory. What is required is a 
reconceptualization of justice. For Flax (and I agree) not 
only is non-normative ethics possible, it is necessary. 
Much of the critique concerning the lack of normativity 
in postmodernism is that it makes political practice 
impossible because there is no foundation in which to ground 
political activity. What Foucault and Flax argue, however, 
is that disrupting a foundation grounded in concepts of 
transcendental rationality and truth that themselves conceal 
relationships of domination is itself a politically 
necessary and ethically just move. It is often argued then 
that there is no possibility of just political action 
because there can be no prioritizing of actions or basis on 
which to choose between just and unjust causes. It is 
assumed that if one does not appeal to a transcendental 
truth, then the there will simply be a chaotic situation of 
free flowing nonprioritized difference. This too is a 
simplified reading of what postmodern feminism demands. 
Postmodernism does not entail a belief that all 
differences are equal or reconcilable. The number 
of forms of life that can coexist peacefully is 
necessarily limited. Conflict and power (in its 
generative and constraining modes) are intrinsic 
to all social relations, including politics. 
However, postmodernists recognize the 
unavailability of any transcendental trump or 
universal measure of the good. They forsake the 
hope that there could be transdiscursive rules or 
neutral procedures to resolve disagreements. 
Rules are discourse specific and have limited and 
heterogeneous effects. The possibility always 
exists that some conflicts cannot be resolved 
peacefully or to the satisfaction of all 
disputants. 41 
As I argued earlier, what critics of postmodern political 
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practice, such as Fraser, find most difficult to accept is 
this unavailability of a "transcendental trump". It is 
incorrectly assumed that without a universal measure of the 
good to provide a foundation for neutrality and normativity, 
there can be no justice. What this position ignores are the 
systems of domination concealed within the very foundation 
they want to claim as constitutive of just political 
practice. It does not follow that all situations are equal, 
or that we cannot choose any political action because we 
have no transcendental concepts to which we can appeal. 
Flax writes, "All differences are not equal nor do they 
deserve the same political consideration. However, positing 
abstract principles or essentialist claims about human 
nature will not help us sort out which differences ought to 
be respected within particular political arrangements. 110 On 
the contrary, "it is ... likely that the plausibility of any 
universal claim depends upon its congruence with existing 
relations of power. The appearance of universality may 
require that the qualities central to the least powerful are 
41 Flax, Disputed Subjects, vii. 
42Flax, "The Play of Justice," 111. 
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rendered invisible."~ 
It is important to notice how Flax's discussion of 
justice is inseparable from a discussion of subjectivity. 
According to Plato, Kant, Rawls among others, it is 
necessarily the rational agent that grounds a theory of 
justice. This is why the postmodern disruption of such 
agency is considered irreconcilable with any concept of 
ethical political practice. Flax builds on her concept of 
subjectivity as constructed, multiple, fluid, and 
relational, and reconceives of justice as a process. 
Justice is not a finite state or permanent set of 
rules or principles (contrary to the arguments of 
writers as diverse as Plato or Rawls). It is an 
ongoing process in and through which our goals and 
purposes will change. Justice can be better 
understood and approximated if we think of it as 
interrelated practices. These practices have the 
best possibility of developing and being sustained 
and effective within transitional spaces. such 
spaces are generated by, depend upon, and reflect 
more than the operation of any form of reason. The 
domination of certain forms of reason may actually 
inhibit or block their development.« 
I think that this is a viable concept of justice (or at 
least a viable outline of a concept of justice) on which to 
base a postmodern feminist emancipatory political practice. 
It is a concept of justice appropriate to the postmodern 
feminist project, which is disruptive, playful, 
antifoundational, decentered, and fragmented, yet, I think, 
profoundly liberatory. By redefining justice, and 
~Ibid., 113. 
«Ibid., 112 
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liberating it from its previously enmeshed relationship with 
reason, we are free to engage in new kinds of political 
practices. The scope of how we conceptualized political 
practice has been partially limited by our conception of 
justice. Once we can free subjectivity, political practice, 
and justice from the limited narrative of rationality, a 
complex and exciting terrain opens up in which we can begin 
to invent new forms of theorizing and acting. 
Evaluation 
Flax's conception of justice as primarily a process and 
one that privileges relationships over the individual 
rational agent is a conception that emerges directly from 
her concept of feminist theory. 
Feminists point to the pervasive effects of gender 
relations and to a division of labor in which 
relationships, nurturance, and caretaking 
necessarily conflict with autonomy, reason, and 
history making. Relational work and capacities 
are assigned to women, defined as irrational or 
arising purely out of bodily necessity and 
devalued. The isolated agent and (his) pure 
reason become the social/political hero.~ 
We can see that the reconceptualizing of justice as a non-
normative process, which is not based on the rational agent 
has not only postmodern resonances but feminist ones as 
well. To the extent that feminist theorists are concerned 
with analyzing how gender is constructed and constituted 
through various interpretations of biology and sex, a 
45 b.d I .l ., 117. 
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theory of justice that allows us to question the 
relationships of domination concealed within normative 
ideals is necessary. 
To the extent that feminist theory is concerned with 
analyzing gender, most of Flax's own work is done with 
reference to this problematic. She defines as the goal of 
feminist theory, "to analyze gender relations: how gender 
relations are constituted and experienced and how we think 
or, equally important, do not think about them. " 46 While she 
discusses many feminist theories, including psychoanalytic, 
standpoint, dual systems theory and socialist feminist, to 
the extent that she is concerned with the construction of 
the category gender, she is clearly within a postmodern 
framework. In her later work she refers to gender as a 
"historical artifact;" and does not think that gender is 
"determined by a pregiven, unchangeable biological 
substratum but rather reflects structures of power, language 
and social practices and our struggles with and against 
these structures."~ 
However in her earlier work she is reluctant to give up 
essentialist notions of self and gender. In Thinking 
Fragments, for example, her description of feminist theory 
is much more suspicious of the postmodern project and is 
~Jane Flax, "Postmodernism and Gender Relations in 
Feminist Theory," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda 
Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 40. 
47Flax, "Multiples," 3 6. 
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reluctant to break completely with the Enlightenment concept 
of an essentialist, unified self. 
Although feminist theorists seem to undermine 
essential properties of the Enlightenment self, 
they are also unable to abandon it fully. The 
relations of feminist theorizing to the 
postmodernist project of deconstructing the self 
and the Enlightenment are necessarily ambivalent. 
In many ways women never 'had' an Enlightenment. 
Enlightenment discourse was not meant to include 
women, and its coherence depends partially on our 
continuing exclusion.a 
The shift in Flax's position, which goes unremarked by 
her, points to something problematic in her work. Flax 
claims that psychoanalysis, feminism, and postmodernism are 
transitional ways of thinking, which allow us to challenge 
the authority and rigidity of Enlightenment narratives by 
disrupting the hegemony of transcendental truth, 
rationality, and justice. Her proposed project, which she 
replicates in almost all of her work, is to stage a dialogue 
between the narratives of psychoanalysis, feminism, and 
postmodernism. I think that she partially undermines the 
usefulness of her own work, however, by replicating what she 
most wants to challenge. By this I mean she tends to 
exacerbate the rigidity of the positions of psychoanalysis, 
feminist theory, and postmodernism in order to critique 
them. 49 She subsumes radically differing theories under 
48Flax, Thinking Fragments, 230. 
49Pamela caughie makes this argument in "Feminism and 
the Postmodern Turnabout" {Chicago, IL: Radical Scholars and 
Activist Conference, 1990). 
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unified rubrics. If she modified her position by saying 
some or even most feminist theorists think x, then she would 
not be collapsing such variant theories under a single 
rubric. Her tendency to over-generalize makes her work 
unnecessarily imprecise. For example, when she writes in 
her earlier text that feminist theorists are unable to fully 
abandon the Enlightenment self, but then in her later text 
she abandons this position, and seemingly embraces a 
thoroughly postmodern conception of gender and self, it 
seems as if all of feminist theory has changed, rather than 
just her view. She sometimes overstates the position of 
postmodern theory, feminist theory, and psychoanalytic 
theory so that she can critique it, rather than showing the 
ambiguities of the very opposition of these discourses. 
For example, she writes in Thinking Fragments, "It is 
questionable whether any of the spaces opened by 
postmodernism would be comfortable to or inhabitable by 
those concerned with issues of gender and gender justice."~ 
This statement contradicts much of what she later writes 
about gender construction and justice. The point here is 
not that her work develops and matures; the point is that 
she states in all her work that it is necessary to tolerate 
ambiguity and to challenge totalizing discourses, yet she 
herself enacts both these practices repeatedly. In 
constructing her analysis by separating the categories 
SOI bid • I 2 1 Q • 
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psychoanalysis, feminism, and postmodernism, she both 
simplifies and rigidifies categorical thinking rather than 
challenging such discourses. It seems to me that by 
constantly ref erring to these three categories as separate 
discourses, she is constantly reenacting dichotomous 
thinking in a narrative that is supposed to challenge 
precisely such (modernist)thought. 
Her separation and naming of these discourses forces 
one who is reading and writing about her work to separate, 
name and categorize theories into these various rubrics as 
well. It seems that what needs to be done is a genealogy of 
the discourses of psychoanalysis, postmodernism, and 
feminism that would show how these came to be constituted as 
separate discourses, and who and what are being served by 
keeping them as discreet narratives. One conclusion that 
would likely emerge from such an analysis is that by 
reinvoking the distinction between feminism and 
postmodernism, as well as between feminism and 
psychoanalysis, one furthers the Enlightenment project of 
marginalizing gender. I would argue that one cannot think 
postmodernism without challenging gender, and thus to 
separate the discussion of feminism and postmodernism makes 
it seem as if the feminist rethinking of gender is 
derivative of and marginal to postmodern narratives. 
Flax does add an important dimension to the postmodern 
feminist conception of subjectivity, namely her 
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attentiveness to psychoanalytical insights and to the 
psychological well being and happiness of the subject. 51 For 
example, it is difficult to imagine the Foucauldian subject 
being depressed, having friends, or being a parent. These 
are dimensions of subjectivity Flax herself examines. 
Including an analysis of these various aspects of 
subjectivity greatly enriches the postmodern feminist 
project. 
Her concepts of subjectivity and of justice are also 
highly useful for feminist emancipatory political practice. 
What follows from the claim that subjectivity is 
not unitary, fixed, homogeneous or teleological: 
it does not follow that subjectivity is an empty 
or outmoded category that we can happily discard 
along with other modern hangups. To make such a 
claim would be to privilege one view of 
subjectivity such that if it is not A it is not 
anything at all. It also does not follow that we 
can make no claims about what we believe to be 
better or worse ways of being a person. While we 
cannot fall back on reassuring, universal 
standards to justify our beliefs, we can, do and 
must make judgments about how to be with and treat 
ourselves and others.~ 
Flax sees the analysis of subjectivity as itself a form of 
political intervention, a conclusion with which I completely 
agree. 
As the lesser others of Western culture- women, 
people of color, the colonized- rebel, the unitary 
self is increasing exposed as an effect of many 
kinds of relations of domination. Our notions of 
subjectivity and our choices among them do reflect 
and reinforce political and social forces. In 
51 See Flax, "Multiples," 40-46. 
52Ibid. I 4 0. 
this disrupted moment, the ability to tolerate and 
the will to encourage fluid and multiple forms of 
subjectivity is an imperative and fully ethical 
position." 
She thus concludes that rooting emancipatory struggles in 
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fluid, decentered, multiple subjects is not only necessary, 
but just. 
"Ibid., 46. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
BUTLER 
A major debate in contemporary social philosophy 
concerns the nature of subjectivity. The adherents of 
enlightenment philosophy conceive of subjectivity as 
pertaining to a unified agent acting within a horizon that 
is ultimately rational. Postmodern theorists on the other 
hand see the subject as radically fractured and decentered, 
constituted within a matrix of pervasive, non-rational power 
relations. Postmodernists such as Michel Foucault, and as 
we shall see, Judith Butler do not think that the subject, 
thought of as a unified rational agent, is desirable or even 
possible. They do not think that there is any interior 
psychic space in which can be found an ontologically 
grounded subject. In this chapter I will examine Butler's 
concept of subjectivity and consider how this is related to 
her idea of political praxis. I will argue that her concept 
of subjectivity, which conceives the subject as 
performative, is the conception most adequate to the project 
of emancipatory feminist politics. I will argue that the 
concept of self first articulated by Foucault as the 
constructed self and then developed by Butler into the 
performative self is the most useful for grounding an 
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emancipatory feminist politics. By deconstructing the 
ontologically grounded subject, performative theory allows 
for the practical and strategic enactment of various subject 
positions and thus provides us with the necessary tools for 
carrying out various emancipatory political strategies. (It 
insists, however, that we always examine the political 
implications and the exclusionary practices that this 
strategic employment entails.) I will argue, with Butler, 
that in order to successfully challenge oppressive systems 
we need multiple sites of intervention. The performative 
conception of subjectivity best allows for such political 
praxis. 
on the Subject of Politics 
As we have seen, Flax calls into question the necessity 
of grounding a theory of justice on a normative foundation 
that presupposes a unified rational subject. Butler asks an 
even deeper, more radical question: Why should we assume 
that politics requires any kind of stable subject? Why 
should we assume that there must be "a doer behind the 
deed?" 1 
To claim that politics requires a stable subject 
is to claim that there can be no political 
1Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the 
Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990), 25. 
Butler quotes from Nietzsche's On the Genealogy of Morals: 
"'the doer' is merely a fiction added to the deed--the deed 
is everything." Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of 
Morals, trans. Walter Kaufman (New York: Vintage, 1969), 45, 
quoted in Butler, Gender Trouble, 25. 
opposition to that claim. Indeed, that claim 
implies that a critique of the subject cannot be a 
politically informed critique but, rather, an act 
which puts into jeopardy politics as such. To 
require the subject means to foreclose the domain 
of the political, and that foreclosure, installed 
analytically as an essential feature of the 
political, enforce the boundaries of the domain of 
the political in such a way that enforcement is 
protected from political scrutiny. 2 
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Butler here attempts to expand the notion of the political, 
to extend the realm of political critique and activity to 
include the subject. Rather than assuming a stable subject 
as the ground for political activity, Butler problematizes 
this notion of subjectivity and includes the definition of 
subjectivity itself as part of her political analysis. If 
one assumes that politics requires a stable subject, one has 
in effect posited that subject as foundational to political 
critique, rather than including the subject position as part 
of the project of political critique. Rather than accepting 
the subject as a universal, normative grounding of 
politically informed critique, Butler extends the realm of 
politics to include a critique of the subject. She claims 
that the exclusion of the subject from political critique is 
a political move. In accepting the subject as the normative 
ground of political critique, one has made a move to exclude 
subjectivity from political scrutiny and to accept given 
notions of agency as normative. 
2Judith Butler, "Contingent Foundations," in Feminist 
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson 
(New York: Routledge, 1995), 36. 
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It is important to note, however, that Butler is not 
saying that there is no subject of politics. This is the 
move critics of postmodernism often mistakenly assume is 
being made: a refusal of the grounding subject of politics 
automatically means a refusal or "death'' of subjectivity 
altogether. But to make this move is to remain uncritically 
inscribed in the binary mode of Enlightenment rationalism. 
Butler does not accept such a simplistic negation. 
To refuse to assume, that is, to require a notion 
of the subject from the start is not the same as 
negating or dispensing with such a notion 
altogether; on the contrary, it is to ask after 
the process of its construction an~ the political 
meaning and consequentiality of taking the subject 
as a requirement or presupposition of theory. 3 
This is an argument similar to one Foucault makes in 
examining how subjectivity is constructed. Rather than 
assuming subjectivity as the unproblematic grounding of 
political theory, Butler, like Foucault, looks at the 
politics of subject formation. Like Foucault, Butler claims 
that identity is not located in an interior psychic space, 
but rather is a social construction. To understand the 
subject as a social construct, one must theorize the systems 
of power, among them patriarchy, within which the subject is 
defined. If political critique begins, implicitly or 
explicitly, with a concept of stable, universal "human 
nature," the possibility of examining the subject itself as 
a political construct is foreclosed. Like Foucault, Butler 
3Ibid., 39. 
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examines the power configurations within which subjectivity 
is constructed. She argues that any subject position, 
including the unified rational agent that grounds 
Enlightenment philosophy, is necessarily formed within 
interconnecting matrixes of power based on exclusionary 
practices. 
When theorists claim that the subject position is 
foundational to political theory, that it forms the 
normative grounding for political critique, they assume that 
subjectivity itself is free from power relationships. 
Butler, like Foucault and other postmodernists, including 
myself, argue that there is no foundational universal 
position free of power. She maintains, moreover, that this 
fact does not entail nihilism. She holds that 
power pervades the very conceptual apparatus that 
seeks to negotiate its terms, including the 
subject position of the critic; and further, that 
this implication of the terms of criticism in the 
field of power is not the advent of a nihilistic 
relativism incapable of furnishing norms, but, 
rather, the very precondition of a politically 
engaged critique. To establish a set of norms 
that are beyond power or force is itself a 
powerful and forceful conceptual practice that 
sublimates, disguises, and extends its own power 
play through recourse to tropes of normative 
universality. 4 
Butler here can be read as addressing Fraser and other 
critical theorists such as Benhabib and Habermas, as well as 
other Marxist and socialist theorist who are threatened by 
the refusal to ground social theory in a theory of the 
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subject, and who think that attempts to deconstruct 
subjectivity undercuts the emancipatory potential of 
political theory. Butler takes a Foucauldian position, and 
argues that far from announcing the end of political theory 
and practice, the deconstruction of subjectivity allows for 
an expansion of politics. It is often held by some 
Marxists, critical theorists and others who want to ground 
emancipatory politics in a subject that the deconstruction 
of subjectivity (by holding up subjectivity to political 
critique) announces the end of emancipatory politics. Like 
Foucault and Flax, Butler argues that the refusal to ground 
emancipatory politics in a concept of subjectivity that is 
seen as grounded on universal normative ideals and is itself 
outside of the realm of political critique is to prematurely 
foreclose the viable realm of political critique, and to 
constrict the scope of political intervention. Like 
Foucault and Flax, Butler underscores the point that there 
is no neutral normative territory that is foundational to 
political critique. To assume that there is prematurely 
delimits the political horizon. Far from introducing 
nihilistic relativism, "the critique of the subject is not a 
negation or repudiation of the subject, but, rather, a way 
of interrogating its construction as a pregiven 
foundationalist premise. 115 
It is the refusal to allow the subject as a 
5Ibid., 42. 
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f oundationalist premise that informs the philosophy of both 
Foucault and Butler. I think this refusal is necessary for 
any emancipatory politics to succeed, and particularly for 
an emancipatory feminist politics. When theorists accept 
the pregiven foundationalist premise of subjectivity, they 
accept uncritically the power configurations and relations 
of force that form that subject. Any theory that 
uncritically appropriates unexamined relationships of force 
and domination as the foundation of emancipatory politics 
cannot truly succeed in overthrowing oppressive systems, 
because it insists on always looking for such oppression 
externally, rather than disentangling the oppression from 
the very subjects who are being oppressed, by deconstructing 
and genealogizing how power and force relations form the 
subject. 
Far from being the nihilistic threat that Fraser and 
others fear, Butler's critique of normative foundations 
represents a democratic engagement in the political field. 
A social theory committed to democratic 
contestation within a postcolonial horizon needs 
to find a way to bring into question the 
foundations it is compelled to lay down. It is 
this movement of interrogating that ruse of 
authority that seeks to close itself off from 
contest that is, in my view, at the heart of any 
radical political project. 6 
Universality, Agency, Performativity 
It is important to note that to question, deconstruct, 
6Ibid., 41. 
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reconfigure and resignify foundationalist categories is not 
to do away with them. Even "universals" have a role to play 
in Butler's theory, although they must be approached with 
suspicion. 
How many "universalities" are there and to what 
extent is cultural conflict understandable as the 
clashing of a set of presumed and intransigent 
"universalities," a conflict which cannot be 
negotiated through recourse to a culturally 
imperialist notion of the "universal" or, rather, 
which will only be solved through such recourse at 
the cost of violence? We have, I think, witnessed 
the conceptual and material violence of this 
practice in the United States's war against Iraq, 
in which Arab "other" is understood to be 
radically "outside" the universal structures of 
reason and democracy and, hence, calls to be 
brought forcibly within. 
Butler adds, 
Within the political context of contemporary 
postcoloniality more generally, it is perhaps 
especially urgent to underscore the very category 
of the 'universal' as a site of insistent contest 
and resignif ication. Given the contested 
character of the term, to assume from the start a 
procedural or substantive notion of the universal 
is of necessity to impose a culturally hegemonic 
notion on the social field. To herald that notion 
then as the philosophical instrument that will 
negotiate between conflicts of power is precisely 
to safeguard and reproduce a position of hegemonic 
power by installing it in the metapolitical site 
of ultimate normativity. 7 
Butler insists that it is not sufficient to simply call 
for less culturally-constrained universals, but neither is 
it appropriate to abandon the concept altogether. 
The term "universality" would have to be left 
permanently open, permanently contested, 
7Ibid. I 40. 
permanently contingent, in order not to foreclose 
in advance future claims for inclusion. Indeed, 
from my position and from any historically 
constrained perspective, any totalizing concept of 
the universal will shut down rather than authorize 
the unanticipated and unanticipatable claims that 
will be made under the sign of "the universal." 
In this sense, I am not doing away with the 
category, but trying to relieve the category of 
its foundationalist weight in order to render it 
as a site of permanent political contest. 8 
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What Butler wants to do is to reconfigure the universal 
as a site of permanent contest, rather than to regard it as 
a politically neutral foundation on which to base other 
political contests. Once the universal becomes a contested 
category there is no metapolitical grounding for 
emancipatory politics. It is precisely in this demand to 
interrogate the hegemony of universal categories, among them 
subjectivity, that the emancipatory potential of such 
politics lies. This move of deconstructing hegemonic 
foundations radically reconfigures both the discursive 
terrain of politics as well as political practices. Part of 
this deconstruction is the politicization (through 
genealogical critique} of metapolitical normativity. 
Genealogical critique reveals that any metapolitical 
normative framework is always already politically 
constituted. While the liberatory potential of such radical 
disruption is great, this is a demanding task as one must 
always be contesting and interrogating foundations including 
one's own subjective position. 
8Ibid.' 40-41. 
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The traditional philosophical conception of political 
change requires not only universal principles but an agent, 
and this agency is necessary to ground any political theory. 
The postmodern move of disrupting subjectivity also 
reconfigures the meaning of agency. Rather than the agent 
being a metapolitical grounding of theory and politics, the 
site and construction of subjectivity is seen as a political 
move, and thus becomes a site of intervention. Once the 
subject is seen as constructed, its construction is open to 
contestation and reinterpretation. 
Do we need to assume theoretically from the start 
a subject with agency before we can articulate the 
terms of a significant social and political task 
of transformation, resistance, radical 
democratization? If we do not off er in advance 
the theoretical guarantee of that agent, are we 
doomed to give up transformation and meaningful 
political practice? My suggestion is that agency 
belongs to a way of thinking about persons as 
instrumental actors who confront an external 
political field. But if we agree that politics 
and power exist already at the level at which the 
subject and its agency are articulated and made 
possible, then agency can be presumed only at the 
cost of refusing to inquire into its construction. 
Consider that 'agency' has no formal existence .. 
agency is always and only a political 
prerogative. As such it seems crucial to question 
the conditions of its possibility, not to take it 
for granted as an a priori guarantee. 9 
Here Butler addresses another of the major concerns of 
the critics of postmodern political theory--the idea that 
without a pregiven agent to effect change political 
intervention is not possible. Butler argues that this 
9Ibid., 46-47. 
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conception of agency and politics is based on erroneous 
political assumptions, which conceal the workings of power 
at the level of the agent. It is a conception of agency 
which assumes that the subject is separate from the 
political field. Butler insists that there is no 
prepolitical foundational level in which agency exists, but 
rather that agency is itself is a political construction. 
Thus she says, "For the subject to be a pregiven point of 
departure for politics is to defer the question of the 
political construction and regulation of the subject 
itself. " 10 It is precisely this refusal to defer the 
political construction of subjectivity that informs the 
postmodern political project. It is because of this refusal 
that I see postmodern political theory as most adequate to 
the project of emancipatory politics. When a political 
theory begins by assuming agency, and then looks at how that 
agent can effect change in the external political field, it 
has already failed at the critical examination of the 
oppressive structures that comprise agency. One must begin 
a politically engaged critique at the level of subjectivity, 
and one must recognize the reconfiguration of the subject 
position as a political intervention. It is precisely such 
a strategy that Butler advocates: 
Where are the possibilities of reworking the very 
matrix of power by which we are constituted, of 
reconstituting the legacy of that constitution, 
lOibid. , 4 7. 
and of working against each other those processes 
of regulation that can destabilize existing power 
regimes? For if the subject is constituted by 
power, that power does not cease at the moment the 
subject is constituted, for that subject is never 
fully constituted, but is subjected and produced 
time and again. That subject is neither a ground 
nor a product, but the permanent possibility of a 
certain resignifying process, one which gets 
detoured and stalled through other mechanisms of 
power, but which is power's own possibility of 
being reworked. 11 
Here we encounter one of Butler's most central and 
significant ideas. The subject is not the metapolitical 
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ground of politics, as Enlightenment philosophy would have 
it, nor is it simply a product of various political 
configurations, as Foucault suggests. Rather the subject is 
a site of resignification, reinterpretation, and 
reorganization of the matrixes of power. In this way 
Butler's concept of subjectivity breaks from the apparent 
determinism of the Foucauldian concept of constructed 
subjectivity. For Butler, the subject is not simply 
constituted by power, but is the active site of resignifying 
power relationships and of performing this reworking of 
power. Thus, it becomes possible to inquire as to the 
political implications of asserting or privileging a certain 
subject position over another. What are the consequences 
for emancipatory politics of enacting different subject 
positions? It is the freedom to move within and among 
competing interpretations of subjectivity that Butler's 
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position allows. Such movement is necessary for 
emancipatory politics. 
Butler's concept of performativity is central to her 
conception of political practice. It is also her concept of 
agency. She introduces the concept as follows: 
The term "performativity" in my usage is taken 
from J.L. Austin's How to Do Things With Words and 
read through Derrida's "Signature, Event, Context" 
in Limited, Inc. as well as Paul de Man's notion 
of "metalepsis" articulated throughout his essays 
on Nietzsche in Allegories of Reading. A 
performative act is one which brings into being or 
enacts that which it names, and so marks the 
constitutive or productive power of discourse. To 
the extent that a performative appears to 
"express" a prior intention, a doer behind the 
deed, that prior agency is only legible as the 
effect of that utterance. For a performative to 
work, it must draw upon and recite a set of 
linguistic conventions which have traditionally 
worked to bind or engage certain kinds of effects. 
The force or effectivity of a performative will be 
derived from its capacity to draw on and reencode 
the historicity of those conventions in a present 
act. 12 
Recall that for Austin, a performative utterance is one 
that, in being uttered in a certain prescribed manner, 
brings about a specific effect; for example, "I do take this 
man to be my husband," uttered during a marriage ceremony. 
According to Austin, "the uttering of the sentence is, or 
is a part of, the doing of an action." 13 For Butler it is 
12Judith Butler, "For A Careful Reading," in Feminist 
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson 
(New York: Routledge, 1995), 134. 
13J.L Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1962), 5. While the whole book 
discusses "the performative" he outlines the basic concept 
of the performative on pages 4-7. 
important to note that 
this power of recitation is not a function of an 
individual's intention, but is an effect of 
historically sedimented linguistic conventions. 
In "Signature, Event, Context," Derrida links the 
notion of performativity to citation and 
repetition:"could a performative utterance succeed 
if its formulation did not repeat a 'coded' or 
iterable utterance, or in other words, if the 
formula I pronounce in order to open meeting, 
launch a ship or marriage were not identifiable as 
conforming with an iterable model, if it were not 
then identifiable in some way as a 'citation'?" He 
writes further, "in such a typology, the category 
of intention will not disappear; it will have its 
place, but from that place it will no longer be 
able to govern the entire scene and system of 
utterance. " 14 
As Butler emphasizes, 
when words engage actions or constitute themselves 
a kind of action, they do this not because they 
reflect the power of an individual's will or 
intention, but because they draw upon and reengage 
conventions which have gained their power 
precisely through a sedimented iterability. The 
category of "intention," indeed, the notion of 
"the doer" will have its place, but this place 
will no longer be "behind" the deed as its 
enabling source. If the subject--a category 
within language and, hence, distinct from what 
Benhabib will call a "self"--is performatively 
constituted, then it follows that this will be a 
constitution in time, and that the "I" and the 
"we" will be neither fully determined by language 
nor radically free to instrumentalize language as 
an external medium. 15 
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Saying that a subject is performative is not abandoning 
any concept of agency. According to Butler it is in the 
14Butler, "For a Careful Reading," 134. Jacques 
Derrida, "Signature, Event, Context," in Margins of 
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1982), 326, quoted in Butler, "For A Careful 
Reading," 134. 
15Butler, "For A Careful Reading," 134-135. 
performance that agency is constituted. 
To be constituted by language is to be produced 
within a given network of power/discourse which is 
open to resignif ication, redeployment, subversive 
citation from within, and interruption and 
inadvertent convergences with other such networks. 
"Agency" is to be found precisely at such 
junctures where discourse is renewed. 16 
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We can now begin to see the political potential opened 
up when the subject is understood as performative. A 
discursive subject is always already within a network of 
power/discourse, but there is room to maneuver within this 
discursive terrain. The performative subject must be 
constantly reiterated, and this process of reiteration opens 
up a space for resignification, redeployment and subversion. 
The subject comes into being through this reiteration of the 
network of power/discourse. 
If the subject is a reworking of the very 
discursive processes by which it is worked, then 
'agency' is to be found in the possibilities of 
resignif ication opened up by discourse. In this 
sense, discourse is the horizon of agency, but 
also, performativity is to be rethought as 
resignification. There is no 'bidding farewell' 
to the doer, but only to the placement of that 
doer 'beyond' or 'behind' the deed. 17 
The subject is only in the performance, but within this 
performance is room to resignify subjectivity. There is no 
subject position that is behind or beyond or outside of the 
performance, which is to say, there is no subject position 
behind or beyond or outside discursive practices. Any 
16Ibid., 135. 
17Ibid. 
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change, therefore, must come by disrupting those practices, 
so that the reiteration of the performance will reveal the 
normative conventions it tries to conceal. Thus Butler 
writes, "I would argue that there is no possibility of 
standing outside of the discursive conventions by which 'we' 
are constituted, but only the possibility of reworking the 
very conventions by which we are enabled. " 18 It is this 
reworking of conventions that constitutes political 
intervention. This is a reworking of the conventional 
concept of emancipatory political intervention, which begins 
with a concept of agency, such as women or class, and then 
proceeds to free that agent from oppressive power 
structures, such as patriarchy or capitalism. Butler's 
concept of the subject as performative entails that the 
agent is constructed through the process of political 
intervention; in this case political intervention is a 
reworking of the power/discourse matrix within which we are 
always embedded. Butler's concept of political intervention 
does not offer us the possibility of ever being "freed" from 
discursive systems, but only of reworking them. 
The Construction and Performance of Gender 
To further clarify Butler's notion of performativity, 
let us consider her most important application of the 
18 b'd I l • I 13 6. 
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concept, its application to gender . 19 
According to Butler, gender is both constructed and 
performative. Butler does not think that the construction 
of gender is somehow secondary to the construction of 
identity because all people come into the world embodied, 
and all bodies present themselves as gendered. Therefore 
gender is inseparable from identity, since all beings are 
gendered. What is necessary for feminist politics is to 
examine how this gendering takes place. 
Considering that 'the' body is invariably 
transformed into his body or her body, the body is 
only known through its gendered appearance. It 
would seem imperative to consider the way in which 
this gendering of the body occurs. My suggestion 
is that the body becomes its gender through a 
series of acts which are renewed, revised, and 
consolidated through time. From a feminist point 
of view, one might try to reconceive the gendered 
body as the legacy of sedimented acts rather than 
a predetermined or foreclosed structure, essence 
or fact, whether natural, cultural, or 
linguistic. 20 
It is important to understand that this notion of 
19Most feminists make a distinction between sex and 
gender. The most common interpretation is that sex is a 
biological given, and gender is the cultural manifestation 
(or interpretation) of sex. Such an understanding, however, 
leaves the category of biology unexamined, and allows it to 
function as a metapolitical category. In Bodies That 
Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex' (New York: 
Routledge, 1993) Butler problematizes the relationship of 
gender and sexuality by examining more closely the role of 
the body. Her analysis concerning the way bodies themselves 
are materialized, while the logical next step to her 
discussion of constructed gender, is beyond the scope of 
this dissertation. 
20Judith Butler, "Performative Acts and Gender 
Constitution: An Essay in Phenomenology and Feminist 
Theory," Theatre Journal 40 (1988): 523. 
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gender as an act or a performance does not entail that there 
is a unified subject already in place who decides to act her 
gender in one way or another. Butler is not saying either 
that there is a subject who chooses to perform a certain 
gender one way one day and another way another day, as one 
would choose one's clothes; or that there is a true sex or 
gender that the performance is expressing. To say that 
gender is a performance is to say that it is only this 
repetition of acts that constitutes gender; there is nothing 
but the performance. 
Gender is the repeated stylization of the body, a 
set of repeated acts within a highly rigid 
regulatory frame that congeals over time to 
produce the appearance of substance, of a natural 
sort of being. A political genealogy of gender 
otologies, if it is successful, will deconstruct 
the substantive appearance of gender into its 
constitutive acts and locate and account for those 
acts within the compulsory frames set by the 
various forces that police the social appearance 
of gender. To expose the contingent acts that 
create the appearance of a naturalistic necessity, 
a move which has been a part of cultural critique 
at least since Marx, is a task that now takes on 
the added burden of showing how the very notion 
of the subject, intelligible only through its 
appearance as gendered, admits of possibilities 
that have been forcibly foreclosed by the various 
reif ications of gender that have constituted its 
contingent otologies. 21 
One is always already engaged in the performance of 
gender by virtue of being an embodied subject in the world. 
The option is not to end the performance, but rather to try 
and maneuver within the performance. This is where the 
21Butler, Gender Trouble, 3 3. 
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emancipatory potential of performative theory is found. 
It is important not to think of the performance of 
gender as the expression of a particular role. There is no 
preexisting "self" who chooses to perform gender. The 
performance is constitutive of the gender (and necessarily 
then of the self). 
This distinction between expression and 
performativeness is quite crucial, for if gender 
attributes and acts, the various ways in which a 
body shows or produces its cultural signification, 
are performative, then there is no preexisting 
identity by which an act or attribute might be 
measured; there would be no true or false, real or 
distorted acts of gender, and the postulation of a 
true gender identity would be revealed as a 
regulatory fiction. That gender reality is 
created through sustained social performances 
means that the very notions of an essential sex, a 
true or abiding masculinity or femininity, are 
also constituted as part of the strategy by which 
the performative aspect of gender is concealed. 
As a consequence, gender cannot be understood 
as a role which either expresses or disguises an 
interior 'self' .... As a performance which is 
performative, gender is an 'act,' broadly 
construed, which constructs the social fiction of 
its own psychological interiority.n 
Butler refers to the concept of a true gender identity 
as a regulatory fiction. This observation then can be 
extended to the notion of an essential self. This 
"essential self" is a fictitious idea that serves to 
regulate how we conceive of what it means to be a person. 
The performative model allows us to disrupt this regulatory 
fiction, and to examine what operations of power and 
oppression are involved in its creation. The very 
22Butler, "Performative Acts," 528. 
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repetition of the performance leads us to believe there is 
an actor behind the performance, but this is part of the 
regulatory fiction that Butler challenges. As she writes, 
"the appearance of substance is precisely that, a 
constructed identity, a performative accomplishment which 
the mundane social audience, including the actors 
themselves, come to believe and to perform in the mode of 
belief. " 23 Everyone is always already performati ve. The 
possibility of political action takes place when we 
recognize that we are performing and manipulate and 
reconstitute the operations of power that go into 
constructing this script. 
Performativity as Feminist Politics 
Let me now apply the above analysis specifically to 
feminist emancipatory politics. Butler has addressed a 
standard concern many feminist theorists have regarding 
postmodernism. 
If it is not a female subject who provides the 
normative model for a feminist emancipatory 
politics, then what does? If we fail to 
recuperate the subject in feminist terms, are we 
not depriving feminist theory of a notion of 
agency that casts doubt on the viability of 
feminist as a normative model? Without a unified 
concept of woman or, minimally, a family 
resemblance among gender-related terms, it appears 
that feminist politics has lost the categorical 
basis of its own normative claims. What 
constitutes the "who," the subject, for whom 
feminism seeks emancipation? If there is no 
23Ibid., 520. 
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subject, who is left to emancipate?M 
Traditionally feminist politics has been grounded in the 
concept of "woman" and the category of women. What happens 
to this category when we apply the above critique of 
foundationalist subject positions? Does it, as some claim, 
foreclose the possibility of engaging in feminist politics, 
if the grounding subject of women is deconstructed? 
To the contrary, I would argue, with Butler, that it is 
precisely in deconstructing how the category of women is 
constructed and deconstructed that the liberatory potential 
of feminist theory can best be expressed. Butler's move to 
explicitly deconstruct the category of women (and the 
concept of "woman") is a move that reconceptualizes what is 
to count as viable political action. Traditionally 
political action is action that takes place external to the 
subject. Once the subject is reconceptualized as 
performative, political activity is necessarily 
reconceptualized as that which must take place at the level 
of the subject. The subject is no longer a metapolitical 
position. The configuration of subjectivity and the 
inscription of that position is seen as always already 
within matrices of power. 
The importance of this conception shows itself when we 
consider the difficult question of "identity politics." 
24Judith Butler, "Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and 
Psychoanalytic Discourse," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. 
Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 327. 
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Most emancipatory movements are grounded in identity 
politics. With Marx for example, it is class identity that 
predominates, and in much feminist theory it is the identity 
of women (gender) that is at the forefront. 
Reconceptualizing emancipatory politics in a way that 
removes it from the grounding in identity necessitates a 
major reconfiguration of such politics. 
A fundamental problem with identity politics is the 
rigidity of the identity categories themselves. Rather than 
examining the operations of power involved in constructing 
such identity categories as gender, race, and class, too 
often these categories are taken to be the metapolitical 
grounding of politics. (Hence the term identity politics.) 
A more fruitful move is to look at the relationships of 
power and domination that are involved in the construction 
of these categories. This necessarily means a 
reconceptualization of political praxis. Rather than being 
foundational to political praxis, the examination and 
resignif ication of identity categories become part of 
political praxis. 
(T)he political critique of the subject questions 
whether making a conception of identity into the 
ground of politics, however internally 
complicated, prematurely forecloses the possible 
cultural articulations of the subject-position 
that a new politics might well generate. 
This kind of political position is clearly 
not in line with the humanist presuppositions of 
either feminism or related theories on the Left. 
At least since Marx's Early Manuscripts, the 
normative model of an integrated and unified self 
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has served emancipatory discourses.~ 
It is the avoidance of just such premature foreclosure 
of the possible articulations of the subject position that I 
think is crucial. Part of rethinking emancipatory politics 
is rethinking the definition of oppression. 
The feminist resistance to the critique of the 
subject shares some concerns with other critical 
and emancipatory discourses: If oppression is to 
be defined in terms of a loss of autonomy by the 
oppressed, as well as a fragmentation or 
alienation within the psyche of the oppressed, 
then a theory which insists upon the inevitable 
fragmentation of the subject appears to reproduce 
and valorize the very oppression that must be 
overcome. . • . (We need to) answer the question 
of whether oppression ought to be defined in terms 
of the fragmentation of identity and whether 
fragmentation per se is oppressive. 26 
This is one of the major points of disagreement between 
Marxists and many feminist thinkers on the one hand and 
those espousing postmodernism on the other. For Marx and 
for many feminists, a fragmented subject is bad. But what 
if the subject is inevitably fragmented? If this is so, 
then oppression ought not be defined in terms of 
fragmentation of identity. I will argue that fragmentation 
per se need not be oppressive. 
The attraction of "identity" as the basis for a 
political movement cannot be denied. Large numbers of 
people can be brought together to work in the interests of 
their common identity. The postmodern disruption of 
~Ibid., 327-328. 
26Ibid., 327. 
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identity categories such as "women"and "class" makes 
unifying under such concepts difficult. This is played out 
in feminist theory in the problem of unifying under the 
category of women. Can feminist theory sustain itself as a 
political movement if the category of women is called into 
question? In the absence of such a unifying category, is 
not factionalization inevitable? Butler argues that the 
reverse is in fact the case: 
I would argue that any effort to give universal or 
specific content to the category of women, 
presuming that that guarantee of solidarity is 
required in advance, will necessarily produce 
factionalization, and that 'identity' as a point 
of departure can never hold as the solidifying 
ground of a feminist political movement. Identity 
categories are never merely descriptive, but 
always normative, and as such, exclusionary. 27 
She does not object to employing identity categories 
strategically. 
This is not to say that the term "women" ought not 
to be used, or that we ought to announce the death 
of the category. On the contrary, if feminism 
presupposes that "women" designates an 
undesignatable field of differences, one that 
cannot be totalized or summarized by a descriptive 
identity category, then the very term becomes a 
site of permanent openness and resignifiability. 28 
That the subject of feminism is always and necessarily 
fragmented is no cause for despair. Recognizing that both 
individual and collective identities are unstable can give a 
movement strength. 
27Butler, "Contingent Foundations," 50. 
28Ibid. 
I would argue that the rifts among women over the 
content of the term ought to be safeguarded and 
prized, indeed, that this constant rifting ought 
to be affirmed as the ungrounded ground of 
feminist theory. To deconstruct the subject of 
feminism is not, then, to assume censure of its 
usage, but, on the contrary, to release the term 
into a future of multiple significations, to 
emancipate it from the maternal or racialist 
ontologies to which it has been restricted, and to 
give it play as a site where unanticipated 
meanings might come to bear. 29 
188 
In other words the deconstruction of the subject is not the 
eradication of the subject as some would think; it is an 
opening up of the subject position to contestation; it is an 
allowance for the possibility of resignifying subjectivity 
by reinterpreting the ontologies within which the subject is 
given. It is a genealogizing of the power configurations 
forming the category of women, (and the concept of "woman") 
rather than an insistence that that category be a unifying 
identity uniting all feminists. 
Of course, the question is inevitably raised; how do we 
know which resignifications are truly emancipatory? Don't 
we need some set of norms to adjudicate competing 
conceptions? Butler responds as would I: 
The only answer to that question is a counter-
question: who would set those norms, and what 
contestations would they produce? To establish a 
normative foundation for settling the question of 
what ought properly to be included in the 
description of women would be only and always to 
produce a new site of political contest. That 
foundation would settle nothing, but would of its 
own necessity founder on its own authoritarian 
ruse. This is not to say that there is no 
29Ibid. 
foundation, but rather, that wherever there is 
one, there will also be a foundering, a 
contestation. That such foundations exist only to 
be put into question is, as it were, the permanent 
risk of the process of democratization. To refuse 
the contest is to sacrifice the radical democratic 
impetus of feminist politics. 30 
To engage in postmodern politics is risky and 
necessarily unsettling. This is precisely why it is so 
often criticized. But I think that to summarily dismiss 
such political engagement because it disrupts normative 
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foundations and calls for a resignification of subjectivity 
is wrong. Furthermore I don't think that such politics as 
outlined by Butler negates large scale political movements 
based on more Marxian models; it just means that the 
founding assumptions of such movements must be open to 
contestation. Butler is not saying, for example that we 
can't invoke the category of women when discussing feminist 
politics; she is saying that we must recognize that this is 
a category which is a site of permanent resignifiability. 
Many people engaged in emancipatory politics want to refuse 
the contest which necessarily arises when the authoritarian 
ruse of grounding normative assumptions is brought into 
play, but what they do not acknowledge is that to refuse the 
contest, while bringing a false sense of security by 
providing a firm foundation, is to sacrifice the radical 
democratic impetus of emancipatory politics. 
Given this framework, what is task of postmodern 
Mibid., 50-51. 
feminist politics? According to Butler, 
Obviously, the political task is not to refuse 
representational politics--as if one could. The 
juridical structures of language and politics 
constitute the contemporary field of power; hence, 
there is no position outside this field, but only 
a critical genealogy of its own legitimating 
practices. As such, the critical point of 
departure is the historical present, as Marx put 
it. And the task is to formulate within this 
constituted frame a critique of the categories of 
identity that contemporary juridical structures 
engender, naturalize, and immobilize. 31 
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One of the reasons feminists often insist on the unity 
of the category of women is so that this category can form 
the foundation of a coalition which acts jointly to achieve 
its goals. In deconstructing the category of women, Butler 
reconceives coalition politics. She proposes an 
antifoundationalist coalition politics that does not demand 
a unified subject such as women on which to ground its 
action. Many feminist theorists insist on establishing 
coalition politics based on the identity of women, or at 
least they assume that the unified identity of the category 
of women as a useful premise for grounding political action. 
Butler challenges this assumption by asking, what kind of 
politics demands this concept of unity in advance? Such a 
feminist politics that bases itself on the concept of women 
does not allow for the political critique of that concept. 
Similarly, when a concept of c.oalitional politics based on 
unity is insisted upon, there is an implicit acceptance that 
31Butler, Gender Trouble, 5. 
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solidarity is always desirable. Butler proposes, "Perhaps a 
coalition needs to acknowledge its contradictions and take 
action with those contradictions intact. Perhaps also part 
of what dialogic understanding entails is the acceptance of 
divergence, breakage, splinter, and fragmentation as part of 
the often tortuous process of democratization."n 
Butler introduces a new concept of coalition, which 
allows us to extricate ourselves from some of the unexamined 
normative categories that traditionally ground coalition 
politics. In allowing for a destabilized subject at the 
beginning of coalition politics, this antifoundational 
coalition politics does not cover over oppressive normative 
identity categories. It also does not insist on an 
agreement of foundational identities before action can 
proceed. For instance, rather than working to come to an 
agreement on what a woman is, and exactly who qualifies to 
be in this category, this antifoundational coalition 
politics recognizes that identity cannot be known before 
politically-engaged action. Moreover, when the identity of 
women is not assumed as a founding principle of politics, 
the construction of that very category can be the focus of 
political action. 
Antifoundationalist approach to coalitional 
politics assumes neither that 'identity' is a 
premise nor that the shape or meaning of a 
coalitional assemblage can be known prior to its 
achievement. Because the articulation of an 
32Butler, Gender Trouble, 14-15. 
identity within available cultural terms instates 
a definition that forecloses in advance the 
emergence of new identity concepts in and through 
politically engaged actions, the foundationalist 
tactic cannot take the transformations or 
expansion of existing identity concepts as a 
normative goal.n 
Butler's reconceptualization of the subject as 
constructed and performative thus necessitates her 
reconceptualization of political intervention and her 
192 
concept of coalition and community. I think she presents a 
legitimate reconceptualization of coalition. I do not think 
she is, as some critics claim, foreclosing the possibility 
of coalition politics or of collective action. She is 
stating that the identity on which coalitions are based 
cannot be agreed upon in advance, since that forecloses the 
possibility that the coalition itself can reconfigure that 
identity category. 
(W)hen agreed-upon identities .... no longer 
constitute the theme or subject of politics, then 
identities can come into being and dissolve 
depending on the concrete practices that 
constitute them. Certain political practices 
institute identities on a contingent basis in 
order to accomplish whatever aims are in view.M 
Identity is not a fixed category established in advanced but 
rather a strategic and performative position which is always 
already politically engaged. Antifoundational postmodern 
feminist politics does not try to artificially fix gender 
identities by demanding a unified and stable category of 
Dibid., 15. 
Mrbid., 15-16, italics mine. 
women. Rather it allows for the strategic enactment of 
various expressions of women depending on the specific 
political task being engaged. 
Gender is a complexity whose totality is 
permanently deferred, never fully what it is at 
any given juncture in time. An open coalition. • 
. will affirm identities that are alternately 
instituted and relinquished according to the 
purpose at hand; it will be an open assemblage 
that permits of multiple convergencies and 
divergences without obedience to a normative telos 
of definitional closure." 
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Butler makes it clear that she is not advocating that 
feminist politics rid itself of subjects, rather she wants 
it recognized that the subject is not fixed. Feminist 
theories that ground themselves in essentialist concepts of 
subjectivity, and therefore do not allow identity to be 
"relinquished" are, according to this position, less 
effective at instigating change, because they are unable to 
allow for the strategic enactment of subject positions 
"according to the purpose at hand". 
Coda: Response to Two Critics 
Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser, both situating 
themselves in the tradition of critical theory, have raised 
criticisms about postmodernism generally and about Butler in 
particular.~ Let me conclude this chapter with a brief 
35Ibid. , 16. 
~Benhabib is unproblematically situated within the 
tradition of critical theory. Fraser, on the other hand, 
moves between critical theory and postmodernism, and has an 
uneasy, often hesitant, relationship with the latter. For 
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summary and evaluation of this debate. 37 Benhabib questions 
the adequacy of postmodernism as a theoretical grounding for 
feminist theory. She concludes that, "the postmodernist 
position(s) thought through to their conclusions may 
eliminate not only the specificity of feminist theory but 
place in question the very emancipatory ideal of the women's 
movements al together. 1138 
Benhabib singles out Butler's conceptions of 
subjectivity and agency, and tries to show their inadequacy 
for emancipatory feminist politics. She wonders "how .. 
. the very project of female emancipation would even be 
thinkable without such a regulative principle of agency, 
autonomy, and selfhood? " 39 But this is precisely the issue 
that Butler addresses with her concept of performativity. 
What Benhabib does not adequately consider is the politics 
of agency construction. She invokes autonomy as necessary 
an example of Fraser's relationship to postmodernism see 
Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson, "Social criticism Without 
Philosophy: An Encounter Between Feminism and 
Postmodernism," in Feminism/Postmodernism, ed. Linda 
Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1990), 19-38. 
37The debates and dialogue among Benhabib, Fraser, and 
Butler (as well with Drucilla Cornell) are found in Feminist 
Contentions: A Philosophical Exchange. The papers by 
Benhabib, Butler, and Fraser were first published in Praxis 
International 11 (July 1991) . 
38Seyla Benhabib, "Feminism and Postmodernism: An 
Uneasy Alliance," in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical 
Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1995), 
20. 
39 b'd I l ., 21. 
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for feminist politics but does not address Butler's powerful 
(and I think unanswerable) criticism that autonomy is itself 
a politicized and regulative fiction, and that subjectivity 
is always constructed within the discourses of power. 
Benhabib questions the emancipatory potential of a 
subject that is constituted by discourse, for she thinks 
that such a concept of subjectivity is overly deterministic. 
"Indeed the question is: how can one be constituted by 
discourse without being determined by it? 1140 Benhabib claims 
that Butler's theory of performativity "presupposes a 
remarkably deterministic view of individuation and 
socialization processes which falls short of the currently 
available social-scientific reflections on the subject. 1141 
Clearly, Benhabib fails to understand what Butler means when 
she speaks of the subject as constituted within discourse. 
Butler's theory of performativity is structured precisely to 
avoid the overly deterministic tenor of certain currents of 
postmodernism. In fact, it opens up new categories of 
subject formation. In response to Benhabib, Butler writes, 
"To be constituted by language is to be produced within a 
given network of power/discourse which is open to 
resignification, redeployment, subversive citation from 
~Seyla Benhabib, "Subjectivity, Historiography, and 
Politics," in Feminist Contentions: A Philosophical 
Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: Routledge, 1995), 
110. 
41 Ibid. 
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within, and interruption and inadvertent convergencies with 
other such networks. 1142 
Benhabib thinks that not only is Butler's concept of 
subjectivity overly deterministic, but that it does not 
allow for emancipatory action. She is troubled by Butler's 
discussion of the absence of a "doer behind the deed,"~and 
asks, "If this view of the self is adopted, is there any 
possibility of changing those 'expressions' which constitute 
us? If we are no more than the sum total of the gendered 
expressions we perform, is there ever any chance to stop the 
performance for a while, to pull the curtain down, and only 
let is rise if one can have a say in the production of the 
play itself?"44 Again Benhabib seems to have misunderstood 
Butler's position. Butler answers Benhabib as follows: 
Benhabib misconstrues the theory of performativity 
I provide by grammatically reinstalling the 
subject 'behind' the deed, and by reducing the 
above notion of performativity to theatrical 
performance. . . . I would argue that there is no 
possibility of standing outside of the discursive 
conventions by which 'we' are constituted, but 
only the possibility of reworking the very 
conventions by which we are enabled. Gender 
performativity is not a question of instrumentally 
deploying a 'masquerade,' for such a construal of 
performativity presupposes an intentional subject 
behind the deed. On the contrary, gender 
performativity involves the difficult labor of 
deriving agency from the very power regimes which 
constitute us, and which we oppose. This is, 
42Butler, "For A Careful Reading," 135, emphasis mine. 
~Benhabib incorrectly quotes this as the "doer beyond 
the deed," "Feminism and Postmodernism," 21. 
44Ibid. 
oddly enough, historical work, reworking the 
historicity of the signifier, and no recourse to 
quasi-transcendental selfhood and inf lated 
concepts of History will help us in this most 
concrete and paradoxical of struggles. 45 
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This last part of Butler's statement can be read as a 
response to Benhabib's questioning of the postmodern 
disruption of the grand narratives of history. Benhabib 
worries that "the 'death of history' thesis occludes the 
epistemological interest in history and in historical 
narrative which accompany the aspirations of all struggling 
historical actors. Once this 'interest' in recovering the 
lives and struggles of those 'losers' and 'victims' of 
history are lost, can we produce engaged feminist theory?"% 
But Butler would agree that we cannot produce engaged 
feminist theory that does not take history into account. 
Butler's position, in employing genealogical critique, is 
necessarily and radically historical. What is at issue is 
not the importance of history, but rather how we 
conceptualize history. Does history necessarily have to be 
interpreted as some sort of single, unitary, objective truth 
as Benhabib seems to suggest, or can the interpretation and 
enactment of history be political in itself? Surely Butler, 
and postmodernists generally, are right: history does not 
have one meaning. The meaning(s) of history are the ones we 
construct, as we ourselves perform and resignify our 
~Butler, "For A Careful Reading,'' 135-136. 
%Ibid., 142. 
subjectivity. 
Of course, I use the grammar of an "I" or a "we" 
as if these subjects precede and activate their 
various identifications, but this is a grammatical 
f iction--one I am willing to use even though it 
runs the risk of enforcing an interpretation 
counter to the one that I want to make. For there 
is not "I" prior to its assumption of sex, and no 
assumption that is not at once impossible yet 
necessary identification. And yet, I use the 
grammar that denies this temporality--as I am 
doubtless used by it--only because I cannot find 
in myself a desire to replicate too closely 
Lacan's sometimes tortured pros (my own is 
difficult enough).~ 
Fraser, in her contribution to Feminist Contentions 
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offers two criticisms of Butler's position: the esotericism 
of Butler's language, and her inadequate concept of 
liberation. 
Fraser claims that Butler's language is anti-humanist 
and impersonal. She maintains that Butler uses a "self-
distancing idiom" which "projects an aura of esotericism. 1148 
Fraser asks, "Why should we use such a self-distancing 
idiom? What are its theoretical advantages (and 
disadvantages)?" But the "self" that this idiom is 
distancing from is the Enlightenment-humanist subject with 
which postmodernism takes issue. Since Butler's philosophy 
is a deconstruction of that subject, it is necessary to 
47Judi th Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive 
Limits of "Sex", (New York: Toutledge, 1993). 
48Nancy Fraser, "False Anti thesis: A Response to Sey la 
Benhabib and Judith Butler," in Feminist Contentions: A 
Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), 67. 
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invoke an idiom which signifies this deconstruction. The 
theoretical advantage, therefore, is that Butler is trying 
to invoke a new conception of subjectivity and to disrupt 
the logocentricism which informs our language. Fraser 
claims that Butler's idiom, "is far enough removed from our 
everyday ways of talking and thinking about ourselves to 
require some justification. " 49 Fraser seems to be missing 
here the very point of Butler's discussion of subjectivity, 
which demands that we rethink and redeploy subjectivity in a 
way that is radically different than our everyday way of 
thinking and speaking. To the charge that her language is 
unnecessarily esoteric Butler replies: 
I would rejoin that it is probably not 
'esotericism' that is at issue for Fraser, whose 
own language is filled with Habermasian and 
Frankfurt School locutions which are equally 
remote from •everyday ways of talking and 
thinking.' Indeed, if I understand the linguistic 
turn of Habermas, and Fraser's shared concern with 
asking after •warrants' and •validity,' it relies 
on the premise that ordinary language cannot 
provide ultimate grounds for adjudicating the 
validity of its own claims (the implicit 
presuppositions of ordinary language need to be 
made explicit through a quasi-transcendental 
reflection which is decidedly unordinary) . 50 
Fraser is also critical of what she calls Butler's 
inadequate concept of liberation. Fraser thinks that 
feminists need utopian hope. While I would say that as a 
feminist I want utopian hope, I agree with Butler that any 
49Ibid. 
50Butler, "For A Careful Reading," 13 8. 
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invocation of utopia demands the question, "utopia for 
whom?" which brings us back to the problem of a grounding 
subject. Fraser claims that certain types of 
foundationalism have emancipatory effects, and that Butler, 
in dismissing foundationalism entirely, also forecloses the 
possibility of emancipation. To this Butler replies that 
there can be a strategic enactment of foundationalism. 
Foundationalist concepts of subjectivity can be ''deployed 
strategically," "instituted through a subversive citation 
and redeployment. 1151 Unlike Fraser's concept of a 
normatively grounded, fixed foundation, Butler's idea of 
foundation is one that "moves, and which changes in the 
course of that movement." Such a concept of foundation, 
which is open to redeployment and not fixed within a rigid 
prediscursive concept of normativity, seems to me more than 
adequate to emancipatory feminist politics. 
Butler establishes a contingent foundation, which is 
guided by a contingent concept of normativity, as opposed to 
the fixed and universal concept of normativity that Fraser 
seems to want. Butler writes, 
It is clear that in order to set political goals, 
it is necessary to assert normative judgments. In 
a sense, my own work has been concerned to expose 
and ameliorate those cruelties by which subjects 
are produced and differentiated. . . . To this 
end it is crucial to rethink the domain of power-
relations, and to develop a way of adjudicating 
political norms without forgetting that such an 
adjudication will also always be a struggle of 
51 Ibid., 141. 
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power. 52 
Like Flax, Butler reconfigures our concept of 
normativity (what I referred to in my Flax chapter as "non-
normative ethics"). All normative judgments are part of the 
power/discourse matrix. There is no universal metapolitical 
normative as Fraser would have it. Any instigation of 
normativity is a political move. Just as we must act our 
subjectivity within contingent foundations, so too must our 
political practice be guided by contingent normativity. 
Since normative judgements are made within power/discourse 
matrices, they are open to critique. I agree with Butler 
that it is not only possible but necessary that political 
critique be informed by such contingent normativity. 
There is no pure place outside of power by which 
the question of validity might be raised, and 
where validity is raised, it is also always an 
activity of power. 53 
53Ibid. I 139. 
Chapter Six 
Conclusion: In Defense of Postmodernism 
I have argued that the postmodern feminist theory of 
subjectivity and of political praxis is most useful for 
grounding an emancipatory feminist politics. Performative 
theory collapses the distinction between subjectivity and 
political praxis; to be a subject is always already to be 
politically engaged. I have argued that this thesis points 
to postmodern feminism's liberatory potential. There are, 
however, many critics of this position. Many political 
philosophers, among them critical theorists and Marxists, 
think that not only is postmodernism ineffective as an 
emancipatory strategy, but that it is nihilistic, 
simplistic, dangerous, and provides no framework from which 
to challenge oppression. Critics of postmodernism often 
employ a common rhetorical strategy, adopting a dire tone, 
and warning that postmodernism advocates such varied "evils" 
as the end of philosophy, the end of politics, the death of 
history, the death of the subject, and the complete 
rejection of such Enlightenment concepts as justice, reason, 
autonomy, and free will. When examined carefully, however, 
it is often the case that these critics of postmodernism are 
feeding off their own fears and their own ideas, for ~11 too 
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often they have not seriously engaged any specific 
postmodern theorist. 
In the concluding section of this dissertation I will 
address the concerns of two prominent Marxist critics of 
postmodernism, Ellen Meiksins Wood and Terry Eagleton. A 
recent special issue of the independent socialist journal, 
Monthly Review, entitled "In Defense of History: Marxism 
and the Postmodern Agenda" features both these thinkers. 1 
Both offer the most common criticisms and (I will argue) 
misrepresentions of the postmodern position. According to 
Wood (one of the editors), the main message of this issue of 
Monthly Review is to argue "that this may be just the right 
time to revitalize Marxist critique."2 Unfortunately Wood 
and Eagleton attempt to substantiate this claim by 
delegitimating postmodernism. Their position is that 
Marxism is antithetical to a still vibrant postmodernism. 
Consequently, both of their articles consist primarily of 
sustained attacks on postmodernism. I will demonstrate that 
their attacks are invalid. 
In a sense my dissertation has come full circle. It 
began with Marxism, and it will end with Marxism. This is 
appropriate. Marxism shares with postmodern feminism a 
1Ellen Meiksins Wood, "What is the 'Postmodern' Agenda? 
An Introduction." Monthly Review 47 (July/August 1995): 1-
12. Terry Eagleton, "Where Do Postmodernists Come From?" 
Monthly Review 47 (July/August 1995): 59-70. 
2Wood, "The 'Postmodern' Agenda," 12. 
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commitment to radical social change. Like feminism it 
regards itself as a theory about oppression, and a movement 
against oppression. So the starting points of Marxism and 
postmodern feminism are quite similar. Most Marxists, 
however, view postmodernism in much the same way as do 
other, less radical, critics of postmodernism. Most 
Marxists remain firmly within the Enlightenment tradition, 
and hence their criticisms, represented here by Wood and 
Eagleton, are typical of the standard criticisms raised 
against the position this dissertation defends. In 
answering these criticisms, I am defending postmodern 
feminism generally and my own position in particular. 
In her article "What is the 'Postmodern' Agenda? An 
Introduction'' Ellen Meiksins Wood claims that 
postmodernism, among other things, is irrational, denies 
history, and has no theory of politics. I will address 
these charges in order. She begins her critique with wide-
sweeping claims against postmodernism in general that are 
characteristically vague and unsupported by examples, 
textual references, or arguments. 3 
We are being told yet again that an epoch has 
ended, that we are living in a 'postmodern' age, 
that the 'Enlightenment project' is dead, that all 
the old verities and ideologies have lost their 
relevance, that old principles of rationality no 
3It is interesting to note that nowhere in Wood's 
article does she mention any specific postmodernist, nor 
does she carefully examine any one specific postmodern 
concept. And her endnotes do not contain any references to 
postmodern texts, authors, or concepts. 
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longer apply and so on. 4 
This seems to be too strong a statement so that she can 
dismiss postmodernism in toto rather than carefully consider 
specific postmodern questions and concepts. Certainly it is 
not true that all or even most postmodernists would say that 
an epoch has ended. Wood's language belongs to those who 
think in terms of metanarratives. 5 Postmodernists do not say 
that the "Enlightenment project" is dead, only that it is no 
longer (or never was) the primary way of thinking about our 
world and organizing our conceptual framework. Finally, 
postmodernists such as myself, Butler, and Foucault do not 
argue that "principles of rationality no longer apply," only 
that they should not be hegemonic, and that other 
"nonrational" and nonlinear ways of thinking also need to be 
given serious consideration. 
Wood goes on to make the even stronger claim that 
postmodernism is fundamentally irrational. 6 What she fails 
to understand is that a theory that challenges the supremacy 
of rationality is not necessarily fundamentally irrational. 
This is similar to a common misreading of the feminist 
project--women who challenge patriarchy are often said to be 
4Wood, "The 'Postmodern' Agenda," 4. 
5Foucault speaks of epochs and ages, but he contrasts 
the "classical period" with the modern period. Neither he 
no Butler nor Flax see the contemporary period as 
constituting a "new epoch." 
6wood, "The 'Postmodern' Agenda, " 5. 
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fundamentally against men. To deconstruct, critique, 
challenge, or redeploy X is quite different than being 
fundamentally against X. Deconstructing or challenging one 
system, such as patriarchy or rationality, does not imply 
one is advocating its opposite--matriarchy or irrationality. 
A valuable part of the postmodernism project is to 
deconstruct this very type of binary thinking. 
Wood's next charge against postmodernism is that it 
denies, ignores, and is insensitive to history. In order to 
examine this charge, it is important to understand what Wood 
means by "history." 
The postmodern sense of epochal novelty depends on 
ignoring, or denying, one overwhelming historical 
reality: that all the ruptures of the twentieth 
century have been bound together in a single 
historical unity of logic--and the internal 
contradictions--of capitalism. 7 
This is precisely the type of all-encompassing grand 
statement that postmodern feminists such as myself find so 
problematic. Certainly it is reasonable to claim that 
capitalism is an important power structure, but Wood 
dogmatically asserts that it is responsible for all the 
ruptures of the twentieth century. She then contends that 
because postmodernists disagree with this claim, they ignore 
or deny history. Certainly we disagree with this view of 
history, but even the most cursory reading of Foucault, for 
example, reveals that postmodernists do not "ignore" or 
7Ibid., 4. Emphasis my own. 
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"deny" the claim that all history is bound together by the 
single historical unity of capitalism; they apply a 
genealogical critique and deconstruct it. 8 
Wood repeatedly attacks postmodernism for being 
insensitive to history. This is unwarranted. What is at 
issue is the type of historical narrative one employs. If 
history is thought in terms of genealogies, which are 
fundamentally historical, it must be acknowledged that 
postmodernism is deeply concerned with history. Certainly 
most postmodernists disagree with Wood's statement that 
there is a "single historical unity" bound by the logic of 
capitalism--if by that claim one intends to deny that there 
are other major historical forces operating in the modern 
world. Regarding this disagreement there could be an 
interesting debate. However, Wood forecloses the 
possibility of such debate by labelling the postmodern 
project as "remarkably insensitive to history. 119 But what 
she means by "history," really, is a specific theory of 
history, namely historical materialism. Postmodernists 
challenge the idea that historical materialism is the only 
way to understand historical reality. I would not say 
postmodernists are "insensitive" to history, but rather we 
8I have examined this genealogical critique in my 
discussion of Foucault's analysis of Marx. 
9Wood, "The 'Postmodern' Agenda," 5. Pamela Caughie 
addressed such charges in "Feminism and the Postmodern 
Turnabout" (Chicago, IL: Radical Scholars and Activist 
Conference, 1990). 
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challenge this view of history and deconstruct it. 
Certainly this is not the same as denying history 
altogether. 
Wood, however, does not seem to grasp this distinction. 
Later she adds, 
Not only do we have to reject the old 'grand 
narratives' like Enlightenment concepts of 
progress, we have to give up any idea of 
intelligible historical process and causality, and 
with it, evidently, any idea of 'making 
history. ' 10 
Wood equates the rejection of 'grand narratives' with the 
rejection of history. Her contention that postmodernists 
have no theory of history is thus based on this important 
misunderstanding of postmodernism. (She cites no textual 
evidence to back up her interpretation.) Wood continues to 
equate the contestation of 'grand narratives,' and the 
rejection of the idea that there is a single historical 
unity guided by the logic of capitalism, with the denial of 
any history. 
After concluding that postmodern theory denies history, 
she goes on to claim that it rules out politics as well: 
In fact, 'politics' in any traditional sense of 
the word, having to with the overreaching power of 
classes or states and opposition to them, is 
effectively ruled out, giving way to the fractured 
struggles of 'identity politics' or even the 
10Ibid., emphasis my own. For an example that 
postmodernists do not give up on the idea of "making 
history" see Pamela Caughie, "Making History," in Making 
Feminist History: The Literary Scholarship of Sandra Gilbert 
and Susan Gubar, ed. William Kain (New York: Garland, 1994), 
255-268. 
'personal is political'. . In short: a deep 
epistemological skepticism and a profound 
political defeatism. 11 
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But the issue here is whether postmodernists engage in 
politics or have a theory of history. If these concepts are 
thought of exclusively in terms of historical materialism--
then no, postmodernists do not think of politics in this way 
or have such a theory of "history"--politics limited to 
examinations of the macrostructure and all-inclusive large 
scale revolts; history being a single historical unity 
guided by the logic of capitalism. This is not to say that 
postmodernists reject out of hand such concepts of politics 
and history. It means that these concepts of "politics" and 
"history" are not the only useful ones for guiding 
emancipatory praxis. We may avail ourselves of Wood's views 
of politics and of history, but at the same time we must 
seriously consider other interpretations of what is meant by 
"politics" and "history." Wood seems unable to think in 
these terms. The way she has laid out her discussion, it is 
either Wood's view of history, or we have no theory of 
history; her view of politics or we have no politics. 
Wood has forced an artificial delimitation of the 
political field by insisting that we choose between either 
postmodernism or historical materialism. Postmodern theory, 
on the other hand, allows us to engage in political critique 
and praxis without making such a choice. While Wood finds 
11 Ibid., 9. 
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it necessary to delegitimate postmodernism in order to claim 
the superiority and necessity of Marxism, what I have argued 
for is the need to employ both various postmodern concepts 
of history and politics as well as socialist/Marxist ones. 
Rather than a wholesale rejection of Marxism, what is called 
for is a strategic deployment of non-hegemonic Marxian 
concepts • 12 
We do need a way to think together the macrostructure 
and the microstructure; we do need a way to conceptualize 
and resist large systems such as capitalism and patriarchy, 
but we must not privilege these larger struggles and dismiss 
the validity of local struggles and performative acts. In 
other words we need to be rigorously engaged in 
renegotiating power within these larger matrices of 
domination, while at the same time conceptualizing and 
working towards large scale changes. 
Wood seems to assume that there is a fundamental 
dichotomy between structures and causes on the one hand, and 
fragments and contingencies on the other. She then assigns 
the former to historical materialism, and consigns the 
latter exclusively to the domain of postmodernism. 
Current theories of postmodernity ... effectively 
12Nancy Fraser addresses this issues in "Pragmatism, 
Feminism, and the Linguistic Turn" but ultimately she 
insists on grounding this strategic deployment on a 
foundation of normativity. See Nancy Fraser, "Pragmatism, 
Feminism, and the Linguistic Turn," in Feminist Contentions: 
A Philosophical Exchange, ed. Linda Nicholson, (New York: 
Routledge, 1995), 157-171. 
deny the very existence of structures or 
structural connections and the very possibility of 
'causal analysis.' Structures and causes have 
been replaced by fragments and contingencies. 
There is no such thing as a social system (e.g., 
the capitalist system) with its own different 
kinds of power, oppression, identity, and 
discourse. 13 
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Even the most cursory reading of, for example Foucault 
or Butler, reveals that a major issue examined by postmodern 
theorist is structure. Why should one assume that 
"structures and causes" and "fragments and contingencies" 
are mutually exclusive? It is not either "structures and 
causes" or "fragments and contingencies" but both. It is in 
thinking of them together that emancipation lies, not in 
arguing for their opposition, as does Wood. I think, 
therefore, that useful political philosophy begins when we 
acknowledge that we always have both, simultaneously. The 
question ought not to be which is more important--structures 
and causes or fragments and contingencies. Rather, the 
important question is: How do we engage in useful political 
philosophy aimed at emancipatory strategies when we have 
both structures and causes as well as fragments and 
contingencies? (We must examine, for instance, how to think 
together a social system such as capitalism and selves 
structured performatively.) If one maintains a rigid 
opposition, the philosopher's task becomes one of arguing 
for one position over the other as opposed to trying to 
13Wood, "The 'Postmodern' Agenda," 5. 
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think of them both together. My whole project is one of 
learning to think of structures and causes together with 
fragments and contingencies, rather than, as Wood does, 
reifying their opposition for the sake of proving that one 
is better than the other. 
Wood ends her article by quoting from the letter she 
sent out requesting articles for this issue of the Monthly 
Review. In it she wrote, "We are proposing a collection of 
articles that will offer some suggestions about how 
historical materialism can deal with that other agenda in 
more fruitful, forceful, and liberating ways than the 
current intellectual and political fashions are able to do. 
Part of the object is to demonstrate that our terrain 
is where it's at. " 14 If the point is to prove that 
historical materialism is better than postmodernism, then 
one ought to lay out both theories carefully, and then make 
the case for one or the other. Wood, however, does a broad-
stroke misreading of the postmodern project, creating 
instead a "postmodern" strawperson, which she can knock down 
in favor of historical materialism. 
I agree with Wood that this is a time to revitalize 
Marxist critique. However, as I have argued, I think 
postmodernism does not exclude such a revitalization. In 
framing the issue--Marxism versus postmodernism--Wood misses 
an opportunity to explore the differences between Marxism 
14 b'd I 1 • , 12. 
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and postmodernism, and to examine possible ways to think 
these discourses together, as well as point out places in 
which they are irreconcilably different. Rather than 
establishing a theoretical framework for an emancipatory 
political praxis, she seems more concerned with proving that 
she (and all historical materialists) are right and, 
conversely, that all postmodernists are wrong. However, to 
state that postmodern theory is fundamentally irrational, 
deny that it has a theory of history, and claim that it 
lacks a politics, is to completely misunderstand 
postmodernism. 
In "Where Do Postmodernists Come From?" Terry Eagleton 
also attacks postmodernism in an attempt to valorize 
Marxism. He begins his article with a rhetorical ploy: 
Imagine a radical movement that had suffered an 
emphatic defeat. So emphatic, in fact, that it 
seemed unlikely to resurface for the length of a 
lifetime, if at all. As time wore on, the beliefs 
of this movement might begin to seem less false or 
ineffectual than simply irrelevant .... 
Radicals might come to find themselves less 
overwhelmed or out-argued than simply washed up, 
speaking a language so quaintly out of tune with 
their era that, as with the language of Platonism 
or courtly love, nobody even bothered any longer 
to ask whether it was true. What would be the 
likely response of the left to such a dire 
condi tion? 15 
Thus begins Eagleton's story of how postmodernism comes 
about in the wake of Marxism's ebbing hegemony. While 
clever, this ploy enables Eagleton to hide behind 
15Eagleton, "Where Do Postmodernists Come From?" 59. 
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conjecture. He provides no arguments, citations, examples, 
or specifics to support his unequivocally harsh attack on 
postmodernism. Like Wood, he does not carefully examine any 
specific postmodern concept, nor does he refer to any 
specific postmodern theorist. And like Wood, the 
"postmodernism" Eagleton disputes is one of his own 
invention. Among his many charges against postmodernism, 
Eagleton accuses postmodernism of being a naive celebration 
of otherness, lacking rigor, having no political 
commitment, presenting an impoverished view of subjectivity, 
and finally, of denying macrostructure and focusing only on 
microstructure. Let us examine these accusations. 
According to Eagleton, postmodernism, "thinks in the 
rigid opposition of 'inside' and outside,' where to be on 
the inside is to be complicit and to be on the outside is to 
be impotent. " 16 According to Eagleton, it is this 
inside/outside opposition that leads postmodernists to 
celebrate "otherness." 
The only genuine criticism could be one launched 
from outside the system altogether; and one would 
expect, therefore, a certain fetishizing of 
'otherness' .... There would be enormous 
interest in anything that seemed alien, deviant, 
exotic, unincorporable, all the way from aardvarks 
to Alpha Centuri, a passion for whatever gave us a 
tantalizing glimpse of something beyond the logic 
of the system. 17 
It is precisely such inside/outside dichotomies, 
16Ibid., 61. 
17Ibid., 61. 
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however, that postmodernism deconstructs. As we have seen, 
according to postmodern theory one can never get "outside 
the system altogether." What Eagleton calls the 
"fetishizing of 'otherness'" is actually internal to a 
discourse inclusion of marginalized discourses and voices in 
an attempt to challenge the structure of inside/outside. He 
sees this as a "fetishizing" because he thinks in terms of 
either/or. In his misunderstanding of the postmodern 
project, we are either inside or outside the system, 
therefore he claims that postmodernists reject the system; 
we either reject and ignore the 'other' or we have a 
fetishizing of 'otherness.' In attributing this binary 
construction to postmodern theory, Eagleton's argument 
demonstrates a serious misunderstanding of one of its basic 
tenents. 
Ironically, while Eagleton himself demonstrates an 
inability to grasp the subtleties and complexities of 
postmodern theory, he accuses postmodernists of being the 
ones who are unable to engage in rigorous analysis: 
Grasping a complex totality involves some rigorous 
analysis; so it is not surprising that such 
strenuously systematic thought should be out of 
fashion, dismissed as phallic, scientistic, or 
what have you. 18 
Here Eagleton snidely suggests that postmodernists who are 
critical of metanarratives, phallologocentrism, and 
scientism are simply too lackadaisical to engage in rigorous 
18Ibid. I 6 3 . 
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analysis. It is, of course, much easier for Eagleton to 
dismiss the complex discussions within postmodern theory of 
such issues as the phallic nature of discourse and the 
privileging of science, than it is for him to argue why such 
postmodern analysis is unnecessary, or prove that it is 
incorrect. 
Not only does Eagleton accuse postmodernists of being 
theoretically weak, but he also accuses us of being 
politically indifferent. 
When there is nothing in particular in it for you 
to find out how you stand--if you are a professor 
in Ithaca or Irvine, for example--you can afford 
to be ambiguous, elusive, deliciously 
indeterminate . 19 
This statement is insulting to postmodern feminists such as 
myself. Eagleton implies that postmodernists are not 
fighting for our lives but only engaging in some amusing 
academic game. This type of unsupported and disparaging 
remark I find appalling. Eagleton carelessly implies that 
postmodern feminists who argue for the efficacy of 
ambiguity, or the political necessity of indeterminacy are 
not expressing deeply held political convictions. He 
accuses postmodernists of playing a "delicious" academic 
game, snidely claiming the moral and intellectual high-
ground, without seriously addressing any of the real issues 
at stake. 
He continues in this vein, 
19Ibid. 
Cognitive and realist accounts of human 
consciousness would yield ground to various kinds 
of pragmatism and relativism, partly because there 
didn't any longer seem much politically at stake 
in knowing how it stood with you. 20 
I argue for pragmatism and relativism because there is 
everything politically at stake in knowing how it stands 
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with me. Unlike Eagleton--a white male safely ensconced in 
the academic hierarchy with connections in the "good old 
boys" network--who can self-righteously claim, without 
argument or justification, that his way is the best, (why he 
feels the need to do this is itself an issue postmodern 
feminism addresses) I feel a certain degree of urgency to 
open up the political terrain to the other, which in many 
cases is myself. Eagleton, however, would claim that I 
think he is smug simply because I am attracted, like a moth 
to light, to the "hair-raisingly avant garde." 
And what would also gradually implode, along with 
reasonably certain knowledge, would be the idea of 
a human subject "centered" and unified enough to 
take significant action. For such significant 
action would now seem in short supply; and the 
result, once more, would be to make a virtue out 
of necessity by singing the praises of the 
diffuse, decentered, schizoid human subject--a 
subject who might well not be •together' enough to 
topple a bottle off a wall, let alone bring down 
the state, but who could nevertheless be presented 
as hair-raisingly avant garde in contrast to the 
smugly centered subjects of an older, more 
classical phase of capitalism.u 
Eagleton presents the postmodern account of 
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subjectivity in an absurdly naive way, and then he attacks 
it. Of course he gives us this skewed and truncated account 
of the postmodern subject so that he can easily topple this 
strawperson and claim that his way is the only way. He 
implies that the postmodern account of subjectivity, rather 
than being the well reasoned and complex account that it is, 
is just a nonchalant effort by theoretically inept 
postmodernists to make a virtue out of a necessity. 
Eagleton repeats this theme of "making a virtue out of 
a necessity" when he discusses marcropolitics versus 
micropolitics. 
If no very ambitious form of political action 
seems for the moment possible, if so-called 
micropolitics seem the order of the day, it is 
always tempting to convert this necessity into a 
virtue--to console oneself with the thought that 
one's political limitations have a kind of 
objective ground in reality, in the fact that 
social •totality' is in any case just an illusion. 
. • • It does not matter if there is no political 
agent at hand to transform the whole, because 
there is in fact no whole to be transformed.n 
Eagleton makes the false assumption that it is either 
"ambitious form of political action" (he is obviously 
alluding to revolution here in his annoyingly vague and coy 
manner) or micropolitics. With this polemical construction 
of the problematic, Eagleton misses the chance to discuss 
seriously how we can engage in effective emancipatory 
politics employing both macropolitics and micropolitics. 
Instead he insists that we must choose between micropolitics 
22Ibid. I 6 2 . 
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and macropolitics, a choice postmodern theory claims cannot 
and should not be made. 
After claiming that postmodernism fetishizes the other, 
lacks political commitment, has an inadequate theory of 
subjectivity and is unable to theorize the macrostructure, 
Eagleton applies this description of postmodernism to judge 
its efficacy in challenging capitalism. There are several 
things wrong with his analysis, two of which I will mention 
here. The first is that the "postmodernism" he has outlined 
is so vague, misleading and bereft of depth that it is 
impossible to apply it to the critique of capitalism. And 
this is yet another place where Eagleton misses the 
opportunity to advance political theory and contribute to a 
useful dialogue between postmodernism and Marxism. The 
question he should be examining is: How can a particular 
postmodern analysis, such as Butler's or Foucault's, be 
applied specifically to the critique of capitalism? His way 
of course is much easier. 
The second problem with his analysis is that he misses 
the significant postmodern point that capitalism is not the 
only, nor necessarily the most important, structural system 
of domination. He is, for example, ignoring much of the 
feminist concern with gender when he writes, 
One might predict in this period a quickening of 
interest in psychoanalysis--f or psychoanalysis is 
not only the thinking person's sensationalism, 
blending intellectual rigor with the most lurid 
materials, but it exudes a general exciting air of 
radicalism without being particularly so 
politically. If the more abstract questions of 
state, mode of production, and civil society seems 
for the moment too hard to resolve, then one might 
shift one's political attention to something more 
intimate and immediate, more living and fleshy, 
1 ike the body. 23 
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The last part of this statement in particular is an affront 
to almost all feminist theorists in general, and certainly 
to postmodern feminists in particular. Eagleton insinuates 
that those of us who choose not to privilege the abstract 
questions of state, mode of production, etc., do this 
because they are "too hard to resolve." Maybe we do this 
because we think there are other equally important issues to 
address, such as gender. "Living and fleshy" things like 
the gendered body are unimportant to Eagleton so he assumes 
that those of us who analyze these issues are simply not up 
to the task of engaging in "real" analysis about "important" 
things. 
Eagleton does reluctantly concede that postmodernists 
offer an analysis of gender and ethnicity, but he quickly 
adds that this is at the expense of missing the "real" 
issues. 
These valuable preoccupations have also often 
enough shown a signal indifference to that power 
which is the invisible color of daily life, which 
determines our existence--sometimes literally so--
in almost every quarter, which decides in large 
measure the destiny of nations and the internecine 
conflicts between them. It is as though every 
other form of oppressive power can be readily 
debated, but not the one which so often sets the 
long-term agenda for them or is at the very least 
23 b. d I 1 • I 65. 
implicated with them at their core. The power of 
capital is now so wearily familiar that even large 
sectors of the left have succeeded in naturalizing 
it, taking it for granted as an immutable 
structure."N 
The issue here is simple--rather than arguing that 
fighting capitalism is more important than fighting, for 
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example patriarchy and racism, rather than trying to prove 
(in a blustery tirade of self-righteous verbiage) that the 
power of capital is the ultimate determiner of our 
existence, I maintain--and have argued--that for 
emancipatory political philosophy to move forward, we must 
accept that we are constructed within multiple power 
dynamics. I contend that there are multiple forces within 
which we are constructed (not determined), and by focusing 
on overthrowing a single force such as capitalism, we will 
not succeed in achieving liberation. 
While Eagleton insinuates that postmodernist, I do this 
for kicks (or because they are too lazy or stupid to think 
about ''real" things such as the state) in fact I engage in 
political philosophy to save my life, and this project 
entails engaging the fight on many levels at once, not 
wasting valuable time and energy proving one way is better 
than another. While Eagleton marks time attacking the 
legitimacy of (his view of) postmodernism as a viable 
emancipatory practice, and while he is busy declaring that 
the only thing worth fighting is the power of capital--
Nrbid., 67-68, emphasis my own. 
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fascism may well be approaching. According to Eagleton, 
however, as a postmodernist I should not even be able to see 
the problem with fascism. 
In pulling the rug out from under the certainties 
of its political opponents, this postmodern 
culture has often enough pulled it out from under 
itself too, leaving itself with no more reason why 
we should resist fascism than the feebly pragmatic 
plea that fascism is not the way we do things in 
Sussex or Sacramento.~ 
Both Eagleton and Wood, like many Marxist critics of 
postmodernism, are primarily concerned with establishing the 
hegemony of historical materialism (and conversely with 
delegitimating postmodernism). However, postmodernism, 
according to their descriptions, has become so vague and 
amorphous as to be rendered a meaningless term that stands 
for whatever they need it to mean at any particular time--
the ever ready strawperson. Battling this amorphous 
strawperson then becomes their overriding theoretical and 
political project. In my view, one of the most important 
contributions of postmodern theory to political philosophy 
is precisely that it challenges this either/or construction 
presented by both Wood and Eagleton. Postmodernism, as I 
have shown, allows us to employ multiple strategies of 
political intervention, rather than engage in a hollow 
academic debate that attempts to establish the hegemony of a 
single strategy, while proving definitively the illegitimacy 
of any other. 
~Ibid., 68. 
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